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INTRODUCTION

The U.S. is struggling to effectively contest its adversaries in
cyberspace. It would seem natural for the U.S. to be the leader in
every aspect of internet operations, after all, the internet was invented
in the U.S., and the U.S. is dominant in many areas. However, there
are regions of cyberspace in which the U.S. is not the leader, perhaps
because of a misapprehension about the nature of cyberspace.1
This paper will provide a definition of cyberspace suitable for
national security strategy discussions and address how the U.S.
should approach cyberspace operations to engage its adversaries in
the most effective manner. Historically, the U.S. has been a
champion at leveraging soft power. Cyberspace has become an
essential way to increase the reach and penetration of soft power, yet
the U.S. appears on some levels to be losing in cyberspace to nonstate groups like ISIS and to other State actors such as Russia.
This paper suggests that it would be more effective to think
of cyberspace as a combination of infrastructure (the internet) and
the information and ideas that move across the infrastructure (the
ideosphere, as defined below). This model of cyberspace helps
increase the emphasis on engaging with the actors and information
using the internet in ways counter to U.S. national interests.
II.

BACKGROUND

Cyberspace is an unprecedented national security challenge. It
doesn’t align with standard U.S. government organizational
constructs, which are generally either geographic or defined by
specific functionality. Although it is hosted on physical infrastructure
that has a physical location, it’s often not helpful to think of
cyberspace in geographic terms. Additionally, it’s not straightforward
to characterize it functionally because cyber capabilities support every
At least one author rejects the notion that cyberspace can even have a
nature. This may reflect the definitional problem discussed below. See Lawrence
Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999).
1

3
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agency and activity, and enable adversary activities, as well as being
the primary focus of some adversary missions.
U.S. strategy seems to put less emphasis to acting on
information, rather, focusing on the physical elements of
cyberspace.2 Concentrating on the hardware and operating systems
– basically the internet – rather than other elements of cyberspace
requires confronting specific operational issues. The internet is, well,
the internet.
Disabling or destroying hardware in one location may have
transnational effects. It can raise sovereignty concerns for allies and
others, and restrict the ability of the U.S. to operate, in addition to
compromising intelligence equities. Perhaps most vexing though,
disabling or destroying hardware raises questions of how to attribute
those activities to individual actors. Engaging on content rather than
infrastructure can limit these issues. To some extent the U.S. has begun
to realize this, undertaking at least some discussion about engaging
ISIS on both its ability to use the internet to communicate, and about
changing the communications to alter the message.3
Infrastructure-focused strategy also represents a lost
opportunity. Cyber operations aren’t a particularly good method for
asserting national interests directly because of the ancillary effects set
out above, and because they tend to be packets of boutique
capabilities that don’t easily translate to large-scale operations.
However, cyberspace is an ideal medium for the exercise of soft
power.4 Spreading ideals of freedom of speech, economic principles,
and democratically-driven culture, for example, supports U.S.
national security interests. As noted below, U.S. adversaries have
Infra.
Sanger, U.S. Cyberattacks Target ISIS in a New Line of Combat, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/25/us/politics/us-directscyberweapons-at-isis-for-first-time.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&cl
ickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.na
v=top-news&_r=1.
4 Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction and
persuasion rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a
country’s culture, political ideals, and policies. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power (2004)
[hereinafter “Nye”], pp. 5-8.
2
3
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been more effective at using this aspect of cyber power to maximize
their interests, which often run contrary to those of the U.S. The U.S.
should do more to close this divide.
III.

RIVAL APPROACHES TO CYBERSPACE

Although the U.S. is skilled in cyber activity, its focus has
been on espionage and, to a lesser extent, on military activity aimed at
disrupting or damaging internet infrastructure. Focusing on cyber
infrastructure for non-intelligence operations has placed the U.S.
behind some of its rivals in important aspects of cyberspace. Set out
below are three examples of approaches to the strategic use of
cyberspace that largely focus on the content rather than the
infrastructure, along with suggestions regarding how the U.S. might
glean lessons from each.
A. China
The modern Chinese economy was built on commercial
espionage.5 The Chinese government has even gone so far as to
formalize the strategy of stealing intellectual property to advance its
economy, developing a branch of the PLA, Unit 61398, dedicated to
cyber espionage. By stealing industrial secrets to advance its
economic might, China is following a strategy modeled in the early
days of the U.S. The U.S. has protested, but it is hard to ignore the
historical irony of the situation. It was national policy in the early
days of the American republic to acquire European technology by
any means available, a policy that resulted in the U.S. emerging as the
world’s industrial leader.6 For example, in 1789 Samuel Slater
emigrated to the U.S., bringing with him an intimate knowledge of
the Arkwright spinning frames that had transformed textile
5 Joshua Philipp, Hacking and Espionage Fuel China’s Growth, EPOCH TIMES
(Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1737917-investigative-report
-china-theft-incorporated/.
6 Doron Ben-Atar, Trade Secrets: Intellectual Piracy and the Origins of American
Industrial Power (2004); Alexander Hamilton, Report on the Subject of Manufactures (Dec.
5, 1791), http://www.constitution.org/ah/rpt_manufactures.pdf.
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production in England. Using this knowledge, Slater set up the first
water-powered textile mill in the U.S. Two decades later, the
American businessman Francis Cabot Lowell talked his way into a
number of British mills, and memorized the plans for the hi-tech
Cartwright power loom.7
The U.S. and China agreed in 2015 not to engage in
commercial espionage against each other, but there is doubt China
will uphold its end of the bargain. If China violates the agreement the
U.S. government may respond with economic and political action,
but there is little that can be done by the U.S. to directly prevent
Chinese commercial espionage. Attempts to defend against espionage
have been less than completely successful. The U.S. government
could respond in kind, stealing intellectual property and other
commercial information from China through cyberspace – although
U.S. industry is generally advanced compared to Chinese industry –
so that course of action provides little gain.
For the U.S., the closest effective equivalent to Chinese
action might be to remove the barriers for private citizens to strike
back with cyber means as a response to being victimized by this type
of action. Often called “hacking back,” many companies have
expressed frustration with ineffective government action in the area,
and noted a willingness to use their own cyber expertise to retrieve
stolen data, render it unusable, or simply to punish perpetrators by
disrupting their networks. Government officials consistently note the
dangers in this type of action. 8 If the U.S. decided to change course
and allow self-help activity, it would have to consider amending
several statutes prohibiting unauthorized access to both computers
and data, at rest and in transit.9 However, there seems to be little

James Surowiecki, Spy vs. Spy, THE NEW YORKER (Jun. 9 & 16, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/09/spy-vs-spy-3.
8 Craig Timberg, Ellen Nakashima & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Cyberattacks
trigger talk of ‘hacking back,’ WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/business/technology/cyberattacks-trigger-talk-of-hackingback/2014/10/09/6f0b7a24-4f02-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b_story.html.
9 These statutes include the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C.
§1030; the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 and the
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §2701. CFAA, in particular, is considered by
7
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appetite for this in Washington, and the U.S. has aggressively pursued
criminal action for what might be seen as relatively minor violations
of computer security statutes.10
B. ISIS
A non-state actor that has been active in cyberspace is ISIS. 11
ISIS has been successful at using social media to promote its message
of violence and recruit members. Al Hayat, ISIS’ media department,
has released carefully choreographed, ideology-focused videos that
have been called “Jihadi infomercials.”12 These videos present a
message encouraging would-be Jihadists and foreign fighters to
answer the call of duty. The videos feature foreign fighters appealing
to their brothers to reject Western values and join the fight. This
message provides a strong moral pull, appealing to the estranged and
isolated, particularly in Western Europe and in the U.S.
ISIS spreads its message using a variety of social media, the
most popular being Twitter and web forums. As ISIS advanced in its
territorial acquisitions, it posted pictures of hundreds of massacred
Iraqi soldiers on Twitter. The photos inspired horror and fear, which
appeared to be the intended result. ISIS videos of beheadings and
executions have been posted for maximum visibility. In a YouTube
video uploaded in August of 2014 an Iraqi police chief was beheaded.
His head was placed on his legs, and ISIS tweeted the picture with
the words, “This is our football, it’s made of skin.” The photo
included the hashtag #WorldCup, causing it to pop up in the news
some to be overly broad. See Electronic Frontier Foundation,
https://www.eff.org/issues/cfaa.
10 Mark Jaycox & Lee Tien, Obama's Computer Security Solution is a Mishmash of
Old, Outdated Policy Solutions, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Jan. 16, 2015),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/obamas-computer-security-solutionmish-mash-old-outdated-policy-solutions; Doe, FBI raids dental software researcher who
discovered private patient data on public server, DAILY DOT (May 27, 2016),
http://www.dailydot.com/politics/justin-shafer-fbi-raid/.
11 The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is also referred to as IS, ISIL,
and Daesh.
12 Jesse Singal, Why ISIS Is So Terrifyingly Effective at Seducing New Recruits,
N.Y. MAGAZINE (Aug. 18, 2014), http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2014/08/howisis-seduces-new-recruits.html.
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feeds of those following the hugely-popular soccer tournament in
Brazil, ensuring millions of views.13 ISIS also has foreign recruits use
their personal Facebook and Twitter pages to report positive
experiences about the movement, posting pictures of themselves
apparently living wealthily in extravagant houses, showing the
material upside to joining ISIS.14
The U.S. has tried to engage on social media, but at least with
publicly disclosed programs, it has generated more embarrassment
than success.15 As a nation, the U.S. has generally been good at using
soft power, even if it most often has been a happy byproduct of
American business success rather than a planned government activity.
During the Cold War, for example, East Germans were able to listen
to American punk rock and dissident announcements on Radio
Glasnost, which was run by private citizens.16 This was an example of
combining the natural attractiveness of Western culture with the
power of private citizens to tailor the narrative to suit U.S. national
security goals.

13 Tomlinson & White, This is our football, it's made of skin #World Cup: After
posting sickening beheading video of Iraqi policeman, ISIS boast of slaughtering 1,700 soldiers,
DAILY MAIL (Jun. 13, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2656905
/ISIS-jihadists-seize-two-towns-bear-Baghdad-U-S-tanks-helicopters-stolen-fleeing
-western-trained-Iraqi-forces.html.
14 Deborah Richards, The Twitter jihad: ISIS insurgents in Iraq, Syria using social
media to recruit fighters, promote violence, AUSTRALIA BROADCASTING CORPORATION
(Jun. 20, 2014), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-06-20/isis-using-social-mediato-recruit-fighters-promote-violence /5540474.
15 Such as trumpeting the decision to deploy more U.S. troops to Iraq when
that is one of the primary concerns of Muslims in the region. Elizabeth Cohen &
Debra Goldschmidt, Ex-terrorist explains how to fight ISIS online, CNN (Dec. 21,
2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/18/health/al-quaeda-recruiter-fight-isisonline/.
16 Esme Nicholson, The Cold War Broadcast That Gave East German Dissidents
a Voice, NPR (Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/11/
08/361160675/the-cold-war-broadcast-that-gave-east-german-dissidents-a-voice.
Radio and television from West Germany was quite effective at educating East
German audiences on the benefits of the non-Communist world. Esther von
Richthofen, Bringing Culture to the Masses: Control, Compromise and Participation in the
GDR (2009), p. 103.

8
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The diverse population of the U.S., the production and
international distribution of films and television programs, American
domination in the music and sports scenes, and the availability of
U.S. higher education to foreigners have all helped build an
impressive machine for the U.S. to wield soft power. 17 Although this
may not translate directly into advancing U.S. national interests, it
does show the potential for spreading U.S.-based information
effectively. This attraction to popular cultural has helped the U.S.
achieve important foreign policy goals, such as reconstruction after
WWII and victory in the Cold War.18
Unfortunately, the relative ability of the U.S. to project soft
power seems to have diminished in the past several years. The U.S.
has reduced its credibility in the Middle East by engaging in multiple
conflicts there and demonstrating little cultural understanding. 19 The
internet-enabled lower barrier to entry for news channels and
information distribution has increased competition for the attention
of the masses, and decreased the ease with which the U.S. can project
its values. Official outlets in other States are more trusted by foreign
countries, while U.S. official outlets are less trusted abroad than
unofficial U.S. outlets.
To regain its soft power mojo, the U.S. must evolve, learning
to use information to its advantage. It’s easy to see, for example, how
some stories could present a favorable contrast between the
adversary’s cause and Western values, e.g., reportage on ISIS killing
male European jihadists who arrive in theater, and subjecting females
who arrive to sexual slavery.20 There is some hope on this front, as

Nye, supra FN. 4, at Chap. 2.
Nye, supra FN. 4, at 49-53.
19 President George W. Bush’s announcement of the “war on terror” and
call for democratization of the Muslim world, for example, failed to engage with
the local population and damaged U.S. soft power reserves. Nye, “The Future of
Soft Power in U.S. Foreign Policy,” in Soft Power and US Foreign Policy (2010), pp. 47.
20 Nadette de Visser, ISIS Eats Its Own, Torturing and Executing Dutch Jihadists.
Or Did It?, DAILY BEAST (1 Mar. 2016), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/
2016/03/01/isis-eats-its-own-torturing-and-executing-dutch-jihadists-or-didit.html; Sam Webb, “‘'A living hell': The grim fate that awaits British teenage girls
17
18

9
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the U.S. Secretary of State met with Hollywood executives to discuss
the impact on groups like ISIS of how the U.S. is portrayed in
movies.21
In the absence of an effective U.S. government response to
terrorist successes in cyberspace, and under pressure to do something,
private companies have begun to step up their game. Notably,
Google has developed a capability to redirect searches for terrorist
information to pre-existing anti-terrorist material on YouTube.22 It’s
too early to determine how effective the program will be.
This issue remains on the radar of strategic thinkers in the
U.S. government, as well. Recently, the State Department began a
new campaign to help slow recruitment efforts from extremist
groups like ISIS. For example, under the new campaign, the U.S. has
been shifting away from directly sending messages to potential ISIS
recruits through the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications (CSCC), as it proved to be ineffective.23 The CSCC
approach was ultimately abandoned after being reviewed by a team
comprised of non-governmental individuals. The reviewers
undoubtedly observed that it wasn’t very effective to counter an
organization that operates under the notion that Western
governments are illegitimate with official statements from one of
believed
to
be
joining
ISIS,”
Mirror
(Feb.
21,
2015),
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/a-living-hell-grim-fate-5203372.
21 Ryan Faughnder, John Kerry meets with Hollywood studio executives to talk
Islamic State, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment
/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-john-kerry-hollywood-isis-20160216-story.html.
22 Jack Detsch, How Google aims to disrupt the Islamic State propaganda machine,
PASSCODE (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2016/
0907/How-Google-aims-to-disrupt-the-Islamic-State-propaganda-machine?cmpid
=ema:nws:Daily%2520Newsletter%2520%2809-07-2016%29&utm_source=Sailth
ru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20160907_Newsletter:%20Daily&utm_t
erm=Daily.
23 Executive Order 13584, Developing an Integrated Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications Initiative (Sept. 9, 2011); Simon Cottee, Why It’s So Hard to Stop ISIS
Propaganda, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.or
g/archive/2016/April/Pages/USProceedingwithNewStrategy toCounterISIL.aspx;
Hayes Brown, “Meet The State Department Team Trying To Troll ISIS Into
Oblivion,” Think Progress (Sept. 18, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/
09/18/3568366/think-again-turn-away/.
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those governments. One of the reviewers noted that ‘“it’s not the
U.S. government that’s going to break the [Islamic State] brand. It’s
going to be third parties.”’24
Reloading, the Department of State has now created the
Global Engagement Center (GEC), which is designed to enable
partners in countries with a majority Muslim population to act as
messengers, rather than the State Department delivering information
directly.25 The GEC is supposed to be the single entity in charge of
coordinating social media engagement to counter terrorist
organizations like ISIS. It promises to engage in “rigorous research
and modern data analysis” as well as “create, develop and sustain
effective positive alternative narratives consistent with U.S. policy
objectives.”26 Unfortunately, while these are appropriate objectives,
they seem inconsistent with maintaining rapid-fire engagement like
that undertaken by motivated individuals supporting ISIS, who
appear to receive little guidance from higher headquarters, but have
managed to control the narrative.27
Favorable facts must reach the targeted populations quickly
to make a difference, however: “Falsehood flies, and the Truth
comes limping after it.”28 Information programs encumbered by a
cautious bureaucratic process will never be timely enough to make
much of a difference. Crowdsourcing appears to be superior to
government in every aspect of internet engagement. 29 However, it is
24 Greg Miller, Panel casts doubt on U.S. propaganda efforts against ISIS, WASH.
POST (Dec. 2, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/panel-castsdoubt-on-us-propaganda-efforts-against-isis/2015/12/02/ab7f9a14-9851-11e594f0-9eeaff906ef3_story.html?postshare=901449106173651&tid=ss_tw.
25 E.O. 13721, Developing an Integrated Global Engagement Center To Support
Government-wide Counterterrorism Communications Activities Directed Abroad (Mar. 14,
2016), http://www.jurist.org/documents/executiveorders/13721.php.
26 Id.
27 Philip Kapusta, The Gray Zone, SPECIAL WARFARE (Oct.-Dec. 2015 (p.
22), http://www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/SW2804/October%202015%20
Special%20Warfare.pdf.
28 Attributed to Jonathan Swift (1710).
29 Ariana Eunjung Cha, What Yelp can tell you about a hospital that official ratings
can’t, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/toyour-health/wp/2016/04/05/going-to-the-hospital-read-the-yelp-reviews-first/.
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not clear that the State Department understands the importance of
nongovernmental involvement.
An additional issue with government agencies disseminating
information involves the restrictions setforth in the Smith-Mundt Act,
which prohibits the domestic distribution of public diplomacy
information.30 Smith-Mundt has been interpreted broadly inside the
government as prohibiting the dissemination of information by
means that might be seen by Americans.31 This creates a difficult
standard when the material is online and anyone in the world could
potentially see those materials. The federal government shouldn’t be
attempting to influence U.S. audiences, but when this type of
guidance is broadly interpreted it ignores the reality of cyberspace.
The result renders U.S. information efforts impotent and cedes the
field to terrorists who then control the narrative, unopposed.
Even though Smith-Mundt was amended in 2013 to address
this issue, it remains unclear how the law will be interpreted going
forward.32 There appears to be residual resistance to distributing
information by cyber means because of the potential exposure of
American citizens.33 As a fully realized democratic society, the U.S. is
especially concerned about maintaining a reputation for truthfulness
in the government. That is not true of every U.S. competitor.

30 Matt Armstrong has written extensively on Smith-Mundt, for example at
Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012 Introduced in House, MOUNTAINRUNNER (May
17, 2012), https://mountainrunner.us/2012/05/smith-mundt-modernization-ac/.
31 It’s unclear at this point whether or when practice will change to match
the change in the law.
32 Mick West, Debunked: 2013 NDAA Thornberry amendment, domestic
propaganda,
disinformation,
METABUNK.ORG
(May
21,
2012),
https://www.metabunk.org/debunked-2013-ndaa-thornberry-amendmentdomestic-propaganda- disinformation.t592/.
33 Nafeez Ahmed, Your Government Wants to Militarize Social Media to Influence
Your Beliefs, MOTHERBOARD (Nov. 14, 2016), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/
your-government-wants-to-militarize-social-media-to-influence-your-beliefs.
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C. Russia
The Russians are masters of using cyberspace to advance
their information agenda. Russia leverages disinformation on an
industrial scale, for example, by spreading misleading claims about
Sweden’s stockpiling of nuclear weapons, stating that nuclear
weapons on a Turkish base were at risk, by persistently denying the
presence of Russian troops in Ukraine, and most recently, by leading
a misinformation campaign during the 2016 U.S. presidential
election.34 In addition, they have been comfortable allowing, even
encouraging, private citizens to engage in offensive cyber activities
when they coincide with national interests.35
Russia’s willingness to engage the private sector in this
fashion is one reason that it has been able to remain at the forefront
of cybersecurity operationally and diplomatically. Other States have
been less willing to take this step. In fact, despite Russia’s success
with this tactic, the U.S. and other Western countries do everything
they can to prevent private actors from engaging in offensive cyber
activities. This is reminiscent of continental Europe’s reaction to
England’s mastery of the 14th century’s super-weapon, the longbow.
England adopted the use of the longbow early in its history.
From the beginning, it was clear the longbow’s range and penetration
power was superior to those of other weapons of its time. Longbows
put crossbows to shame, being only a fraction of the cost, with a
much greater firing speed and range. It was a perfect, inexpensive
Neil MacFarquhar, A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/29
/world/europe/russia-sweden-disinformation.html?_r=1; Shane Harris, “Clinton
Foundation: Those Hacked Files’ Aren’t Ours, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 4, 2016),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2016/10/04/clinton-foundation-thosehacked-files-aren-t-ours.html; U.S. was reportedly more prepared for Russian cyber attacks
than disinfomation campaign, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2016), https://venturebeat.com/2016
/12/20/u-s-was-reportedly-more-prepared-for-russian-cyber-attacks-thandisinformation-campaign/.
35 See Allen & Leeson, infra note 33; Levi Maxey, Cyber Proxies: A Central
Tenet of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare, THE CIPHER BRIEF (Feb. 24, 2017),
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/tech/cyber-proxies-central-tenet-russiashybrid-warfare-1092.
34
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weapon for peasants, as it was basically a stick of wood. Masses of
peasants armed with longbows were so critical to the defense of the
realm that Edward I prohibited all manner of sport among the
peasantry except archery, and Edward III made weekly archery
practice obligatory, banning other forms of competing activities.36
Henry VIII compelled longbow ownership and also prohibited
activities that competed with the mandatory longbow practice. 37 The
result of making archery the only lawful recreational activity for
decades was a large mass of superbly capable “special forces”
available to the king. England’s domination in this field was
complete.
England basically maintained its monopoly on longbow use
for one hundred and fifty years. This wasn’t because wood and
peasants were in short supply elsewhere, nor because other rulers
didn’t know how effective the longbow was, but because other
kingdoms lacked the political stability to trust such a powerful
weapon in the hands of the rabble.38 England was favored with the
political stability that gave it confidence to encourage a talented and
armed population. The opportunity to “crowd-source” longbow
techniques and skills significantly improved England’s military
capability. Currently, Russia is employing a similar strategy in the case
of hacking skills.
Although it may not be the most stable State in the world,
Russia has enough national coherence that it has allowed a number of
private citizens to practice with powerful cyber tools. Russia’s level of
comfort with its political stability and unity has allowed it to leverage
the power of private citizens to perfect the use of a powerful weapon.
This hasn’t given Moscow a monopoly on cyber weaponry, but has
provided a different element to its cyber strategy, meriting

36 Douglas W. Allen & Peter T. Leeson, Institutionally Constrained Technology
Adoption: Resolving the Longbow Puzzle, THE J. OF L. & ECON. (2015) [hereinafter “Allen
& Leeson”] p. 683, 688, http://www.peterleeson.com/Longbow.pdf.
37 Allen & Leeson, p. 689.
38 England’s longbow dominance lasted from about 1332-1428. Allen &
Leeson, pp. 683-684.
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comparison with the English longbow model. 39 Cyber criminals are
allowed to hone their hacking skills and their hacking tools, using
both for the advancement of outward-directed criminal enterprises.
Russia allows this broad access to a powerful means of warfare,
resulting in the development of a trained cadre of cyber operators
with ever-improving tools. While Russia must accept the inherent risk
that this cyber capability could be turned against the regime’s interest,
it can also avail itself of this force when the nationalist sentiment can
be employed to in advance State interests. The Kremlin is in a
position to purchase the loyalty of these groups by acquiescing in the
commission of cyber crime, creating a shared interest.40
In addition to leveraging patriotic feelings and private cyber
expertise, Russia actively manipulates social media for its national
security purposes, both internally and abroad. For example, people
are hired to post negative comments about anti-Russia articles online,
and do the opposite for pro-Russia articles, with the intent to
overwhelm rational discourse on Western media sites.41 These
Russian professionals have also used Twitter falsely to report an oil
spill and an Ebola outbreak in the U.S., perhaps testing a capability to
manipulate public opinion and create confusion and mistrust.42
Even if these false messages reach only a relatively small number of
people, social networks have an extraordinary power to convince
people and manipulate opinion. 43

Trend Micro increasingly observes hackers’ relationships with official
authorities and their participation in conflicts. Max Goncharov, Russian Underground
2.0, TREND MICRO (2015), http://www.trendmicro.fr/media/wp/russianunderground-2-0-wp-en.pdf.
40 Mathew J. Schwartz, Russian Cybercrime Rule No. 1: Don't Hack Russians,
BANK
INFO
SECURITY
(Sept.
14,
2015),
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/blogs/russian-cybercrime-rule-no-1-dont-hackrussians-p-1934.
41 Daisy Sindelar, The Kremlin’s Troll Army, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 12, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/the-kremlins-trollarmy/375932/.
42 Adrian Chin, The Agency, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jun. 2, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html?_r=0.
43 The Social-Network Illusion That Tricks Your Mind, MIT TECH. REV. (Jun. 30,
2015), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/538866/the-social-network-illusion39
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The U.S. might learn from Russia’s use of both social media
and private actors. The distinction between the way ISIS uses social
media and the way Russia does is that ISIS reports its activities,
however mortifying they are, and attempts to spin its own situation
to look enticing to recruits. Russia uses social media outlets to
manipulate public opinion in ways that aren’t apparent, and using
means that aren’t easily attributable to Moscow. There is evidence
that U.S. companies manipulate the news to benefit their perceived
interests, as well, so it isn’t as if this technique is unknown inside the
U.S., it just doesn’t appear to be used by the government.44
Although the U.S. has been reluctant to employ the “cyber
longbow” like the Russians have, there are plenty of examples of
private citizens performing useful national security work merely as an
unplanned collateral result of acts of conscience or activism. People
around the globe have joined to oppose ISIS online, both as
individuals and as part of groups like Ghost Sec. 45 Some are actively
engaging; others are taking good citizen-type actions such as

that-tricks-your-mind/; Sean Gallagher, Air Force research: How to use social media to
control people like drones, ARS TECHNICA (Jul 17, 2014),
http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/07/air-force-research-howto-use-social-media-to-control-people-like-drones/.
44 Michael Nunez, Former Facebook Workers: We Routinely Suppressed
Conservative News, GIZMODO (May 9, 2016), http://gizmodo.com/formerfacebook-workers-we-routinely-suppressed-conser-1775461006; Reena Flores,
Hillary Clinton Google suggestions accused of favoring candidate, CBS NEWS (Jun. 11, 2016),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/hillary-clinton-google-suggestions-accusedfavoring-candidate-election-2016/. As noted in the article, Google denies
manipulating the results.
45 Shashank Shekhar, Desi hackers join cyber war on ISIS: 'Hacktivist' group
Anonymous says 1,000 Indians are sniffing out jihadi Twitter accounts and websites, DAILY
MAIL
INDIA
(Nov.
25,
2015),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-3334089/Desi-hackersjoin-cyber-war-ISIS-Hacktivist-group-Anonymous-says-1-000-Indians-sniffingjihadi-Twitter-accounts-websites.html; Jack Smith IV, Anonymous Divided: Inside the
Two Warring Hacktivist Cells Fighting ISIS Online, TECH.MIC (December 04, 2015),
http://mic.com/articles/129679/anonymous-vs-isis-how-ghostsec-and-ghostsecurity-group-are-targeting-terrorists#.tEWnKSnXD.
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reporting Twitter accounts that support terrorist activities. Terrorist
attacks in Paris motivated many online to strike back at ISIS.46
Individual actions aren’t limited to opposing terrorist groups.
Hackers have lashed out at China in support of pro-democracy
protesters in Hong Kong. 47 The hacker group Anonymous released
information about drug-related corruption in Mexico, after finding
government action there ineffective.48 Anonymous also decided to
support protests in support of democracy in Hong Kong, taking
down thirty government sites.49 Additionally, a group called the Elves
works to counter Kremlin trolls who spread propaganda and
disinformation about Lithuania.50 Child pornography has also become

46 Andrew Blake, #OpISIS and #OpParis: Anonymous hacktivists to retaliate
against ISIS after Paris attacks, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2015),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/nov/16/opisis-and-opparisanonymous-hacktivists-to-retali/; Swati Khandelwal, “#ParisAttacks —
Anonymous declares War on ISIS: 'We will Hunt you Down!,'” Hacker News (Nov.
16, 2015), http://thehackernews.com/2015/11/parisattacks-anonymous-isis.html;
David Goldman & Mark Thompson, “Anonymous blocks jihadist website in
retaliation for Charlie Hebdo attack,”
CNN (Jan. 12, 2015)
http://money.cnn.com/2015/01/11/technology/security/anonymous-charliehebdo/.
47 Mary-Ann Russon, Anonymous brings down 30 Chinese government websites to
support Hong Kong protesters, INT’L. BUS. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2015),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/anonymous-brings-down-30-chinese-governmentwebsites-support-hong-kong-protesters-1496069.
48 Rodrigo Bijou, Governments don't understand cyber warfare. We need hackers,
TED
(Dec. 2015), https://www.ted.com/talks/rodrigo_bijou_governments_don_t_
understand_cyber_warfare_we_need_hackers/transcript?language=en.
49 Mary-Ann Russon, Anonymous brings down 30 Chinese government websites to
support Hong Kong protesters, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2015),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/anonymous-brings-down-30-chinese-governmentwebsites-support-hong-kong-protesters-1496069.
50 Michael Weiss, The Baltic Elves Taking on Pro-Russian Trolls, DAILY BEAST
(Mar. 20, 2016), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/03/20/the-balticelves-taking-on-pro-russian-trolls.html. The group has been compared to the
resistance fighters in the region during WWII.
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a target of citizen hacker groups.51 These are all indications that some,
at least, see hacking as a legitimate form of citizen action. 52
To emulate the success of the Russians, the U.S. may have to
trust the public with the cyber longbow. Private companies have
employed hackers to their advantage, even going so far as using such
hackers in the fight against U.S. adversaries. There are some
indications the U.S. government might permit private citizens with
cyber capabilities to use them wisely in certain circumstances.53 When
the FBI was unable to access the iPhone of the terrorists who killed
14 people in San Bernardino, California – and Apple refused to assist
– the Bureau reportedly paid hackers to accomplish the task.54 The
government has also shown signs it will work with hackers to
advance national defense, with programs like “Hack the Pentagon,”
in which it offers a bounty to hackers who find and report
vulnerabilities in DoD computer networks.55

Anonymous Hacktivist Group Now Gunning for Powerful Pedophile Networks,
SPUTNIK
NEWS
(Jan
26,
2016),
http://sputniknews.com/europe/20150124/1017301478.html#ixzz48LNRiLjF.
52 Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, A Notorious Hacker Is Trying to Start a
‘Hack Back’ Political Movement, MOTHERBOARD (May 23, 2016),
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/notorious-hacker-phineas-fishers-istrying-to-start-a-hack-back-political-movement.
53 Katie Moussouris, Hackers Can Be Helpers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/03/30/should-hackers-help-thefbi/hackers-can-be-helpers; Nichole Hong, U.S. Revamps Line of Attack in SocialMedia Fight Against Islamic State, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 28, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-revamps-line-of-attack-in-social-media-fightagainst-islamic-state1472415600?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Defense
%20EBB%2008-29-16&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief.
54 Shane Harris, Did the FBI Just Unleash a Hacker Army on Apple?, DAILY
BEAST (Mar. 29, 2016),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/03/29/did-the-fbi-just-unleash-ahacker-army-on-apple.html; Kevin Pousen, Double Cross, WIRED (May 2016),
https://www.wired.com/2016/05/maksym-igor-popov-fbi/.
55 Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on DoD’s Hack the
Pentagon, CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE PRESS OPERATIONS (Mar. 2, 2016),
http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-ReleaseView/Article/684106/statement-by-pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-on-dodshack-the-pentagon-cybe.
51
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Of course, hackers tend to be independent thinkers and
actors who have their own conception of right and wrong. One of
the bigger challenges presented by these groups includes using their
skills to interrupt lawful discourse. For example, groups have acted to
prevent a candidate from running for public office and hacked a
newspaper because it published information that they didn’t agree
with.56 While it’s certainly true that most private groups come with
significant baggage, there simply is no substitute for crowdsourcing. 57
The opportunity to leverage the efforts of millions of people around
the globe to invent, solve, and improve is perhaps cyberspace’s
greatest strength. No government effort can compete with the results
of this type of massive collaboration over the long haul, even if it is
as unsavory in its methods as hacking ISIS Twitter accounts with
pornography.58 And, surely no government agency would have rickrolled ISIS, unleashing the devastating Rick Astley on potential ISIS
recruits.59
The U.S. has tended to shy away from citizen groups like
Anonymous because the groups’ often offensive behavior, and,
because they sometimes act against the U.S. government’s perceived
interests. Sometimes the obnoxious activities can’t be ignored, but
most hacker groups seem generally to be in favor of democratic rule
and freedom, so there ought to be much common ground with the
56 Id.; Catalin Cimpanu, Anonymous Warns US Sen. Ted Cruz to Leave Presidential
Race, or Else, SOFTPEDIA (Mar. 21, 2016),
http://news.softpedia.com/news/anonymous-warns-us-sen-ted-cruz-to-leavepresidential-race-or-else -502009.shtml; Waqas Amir, Hacktivists Shut Down Donald
Trump
Hotel
Collections
Website,
HACKREAD
(May
21,
2016),
https://www.hackread.com/donald-trump-hotel-collections-website-down/.
57 Dai Davis, Hacktivism: Good or Evil?, COMPUTER WKLY. (Mar. 2014),
http://www.computerweekly.com/opinion/Hacktivism-Good-or-Evil.
58 Jacob Bogage, This hacker is fighting ISIS by spamming its Twitter accounts with
porn, WASH. POST (Jun. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2016/06/14/this-hacker-is-fighting-isis-by-spamming-its-twitteraccounts-with-porn/?utm_campaign=Defense%20EBB%206-1516&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Sailthru.
59 James Geddes, Hacking Group Anonymous Using Rick Astley Video to Rickroll
ISIS,
TECH
TIMES
(Nov.
28,
2015),
http://www.techtimes.com/articles/110795/20151128/hacking-groupanonymous-using-rick-astley-video-to-rickroll-isis-video.htm.
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U.S. government. The benefits of exploiting the commonality could
be enough to outweigh the negative. The general resistance to
cooperating with the government creates an obvious barrier to
working with hacker groups, and the challenges shouldn’t be
underestimated, but the potential is so great the government ought to
make an effort. The U.S. should search for those areas of overlapping
interests, subtly encouraging, or at least not discouraging, private
action in these areas.
Russia appears to have found a way to keep the groups that it
works with under control, and the U.S. must do likewise if it intends
to make better use of this resource. Russia enjoys the benefit of
working with groups motivated by money. Wealth is a
straightforward way to secure the cooperation of these groups. Less
concrete goals of groups like Anonymous – increased freedom? more
free speech? – present a greater, but not insurmountable, challenge.
IV.

A WAY FORWARD

One thing that might be preventing more creative U.S.
national security activities in cyberspace is how the U.S government
defines the actual term “cyberspace.” Rethinking that definition
should be the first step in any U.S. rebalancing efforts. 60
The U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace uses the terms
“digital infrastructure” and “internet” throughout as stand-ins for
cyberspace.61 Similarly, the Department of Defense (DoD) defines
cyberspace as, “A global domain within the information environment
consisting of the interdependent network of information technology
The word cyberspace is a bit of a historical accident. Novelist William
Gibson is credited with coining the term. He wanted a “really hot name” to use in
his novels, and recognized the value of cyberspace because it was evocative of
much
but
“meant
absolutely
nothing.”
https://www.brainpickings.org/2014/08/26/how-william-gibson-coinedcyberspace/.
61 International
Strategy
for
Cyberspace
(May,
2011),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy
_for_cyberspace.pdf.
60
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infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded
processors and controllers.”62 Both of these terms suggest an
approach focused on the physical aspect of cyberspace, largely
ignoring the people and thoughts (content) that make cyberspace
important.
A more useful approach looks at cyberspace as “the internet
plus the ideosphere.” Taking the terms separately, the internet is the
global communication network that allows computers to connect and
exchange information, consisting of hardware such as servers,
routers, cables, and switches, as well as the software necessary for the
hardware to operate.
The ideosphere, on the other hand, is the “place” where
ideas are created and grow. It’s where thoughts and theories are made
and evaluated.63 As ideas interact, often instantly on a global scale
only possible through cyberspace, they change form. The evolution
of ideas is in some ways like the evolution of living organisms, but
much faster. Ideas fuse, recombine, and evolve rapidly. The basic
element of replication in the ideosphere is the meme, which serves in
a role analogous to the gene in physical reproduction. 64 There are
many aspects of the ideosphere, but it may be simplest to define it as
“the universe of ideas.”65 It is here where U.S. adversaries excel, and,
as a result, where the U.S. needs to focus.
If strategic thinking about cyberspace were guided by a
framework of cyberspace as the internet plus the ideosphere, strategy
would be less likely to focus on infrastructure, and more likely to
concentrate on engaging with the content in cyberspace. Jim Lewis,
Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
puts it this way, “The problem in the US is we’re very militarized, so
62 JP
1-02,
D OD
DICTIONARY
(Feb.
15,
2016),
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.
63 Douglas Hofstadter, METAMAGICAL THEMAS: QUESTING FOR THE
ESSENCE OF MIND AND PATTERN, 50 (1987).
64 Google defines meme as “a humorous image, video, piece of text, etc. that
is copied (often with slight variations) and spread rapidly by Internet users.”
65 Hofstadter, at 50-51.
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we tend to think about attacking infrastructure. The Russian
approach is much more political and about trying to manipulate
public opinion.”66 A disadvantage of focusing on infrastructure is that
everyone has an interest in keeping the internet functional, and that
significantly limits engaging with the infrastructure itself.67 It’s the
information and ideas that U.S. adversaries are using to their
advantage, and information should be a priority for U.S. national
security efforts. At least one U.S. ally has taken steps in this direction.
Britain’s NSA equivalent, GCHQ, apparently engages with terrorist
internet content to discredit and embarrass leadership, in addition to
issuing false orders to individual terrorists (or potential ones). 68
Focusing engagement on content rather than infrastructure
has the added benefit of avoiding one of the thornier problems of
waging cyber-war – attribution. The U.S., for obvious reasons, seeks
to avoid negative effects on infrastructure owned by its political allies.
Information, on the other hand, can be weighed by reference only to
the information itself. Sophisticated technical operations are required
to determine whether engagement is appropriate. If information is
helpful to an adversary it can be addressed regardless of the source
and without effect on infrastructure.69

Jack Detsch, In aftermath of the DNC hack, experts warn of new front in digital
warfare,
PASSCODE
(Aug.
10,
2016),
http://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Passcode/2016/0810/In-aftermath-of-the-DNC-hack-experts-warn-ofnew-front-in-digital-warfare?cmpid=ema:nws:Daily%2520Newsletter%2520%280
8-10-2016%29&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=201
60810_Newsletter:%20Daily&utm_term=Daily.
67 Taking down connected networks quickly decreases the utility of the
other networks, as well. Metcalfe’s Law states that the value of a network is
proportional to the square of the number of users, a concept whose implications
for military operations will have to be explored elsewhere.
68 Forno & Joshi, America is ‘dropping cyberbombs’ – but how do they work?, THE
CONVERSATION (May 11, 2016), https://theconversation.com/america-isdropping-cyberbombs-but-how-do-they-work58476?mc_cid=a6d6f926a2&mc_eid=3284b6aba6.
69 Consistent with Constitutional protections, which tend to be applied to
everyone regardless of nationality.
66
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CHALLENGES

The First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech may
be the single most important right that defines what it means to be an
American.70 A key component of the exercise of free speech is the
ability to communicate freely without government interference.
Distinguishing protected speech from impermissible speech will
always be an issue in the U.S.71 A particular complicating factor is that
often, speech is permissible under some circumstances but not
others. Fiction and satire are examples of vehicles that can protect
normally unlawful speech. On the other hand, shouting “fire” when
there is none could be a lawful (albeit not very funny) joke, but may
be unlawful if that same joke resulted in injury or harm for people
trying to escape the building in which the joke was made.
An illustration of how challenging putting all this together
can be is Microsoft’s policy on dealing with “terrorist content.”
Microsoft’s approach includes definitions of prohibited speech
(which includes “. . . endorses a terrorist organization or its acts …”)
and an exclusion for its search engine, which will still be allowed to
return content responsive to searches for terrorist content. 72 For the
government to engage aggressively to remove content that is
damaging to national security (i.e., terrorist recruiting, lethal
knowledge like bomb making skills, or offensive propaganda) it must
find a way to determine when unpleasant or undesirable speech
crosses the line from constitutionally protected to legally
impermissible, based on content or context. Microsoft’s approach
isn’t perfect, but it’s an example of a corporate citizen taking up the
cyber longbow on its own.

“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein” West Virginia
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 625 (1943).
71 Matthew Weybrecht, Free Speech in an Era of Self-Radicalization, L AWFARE
(Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/free-speech-era-self-radicalization.
72 Microsoft’s
Approach to Terrorist Content Online (May 20, 2016),
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2016/05/20/microsofts-approachterrorist-content-online/#sm.0000g8l17to0xdtzrca20pluw755v.
70
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The involvement of private entities in national cyber security
is particularly important because they can act in ways the government
cannot, and act with information they already have in the course of
business or from open sources. Many government activities would
require accessing online information, yet proposals that make it easier
– or even appear to make it easier – for the government to access
private information are instantly condemned. 73 The 2013 revelations
of Edward Snowden caused a firestorm of protests against the NSA’s
surveillance activities, even though the spying programs were lawful
under U.S law. The passing of the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and
Protection Act (CISPA)74 in 2013 and Protecting Cyber Networks
Act (PCNA)75 in 2015 also caused public outrage.76 There simply
seems to be a consensus, at least among politically active citizens, that
the government should not be allowed to access and monitor large
quantities of citizens’ data, even to better ensure the security of the
U.S.77

Sorcher, Digital activists begin broad, grass-roots battle to fight anti-encryption bill,
PASSCODE (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode
/2016/0415/Digital-activists-begin-broad-grass-roots-battle-to-fightantiencryption-bill?cmpid=ema:nws:Daily%2520Newsletter%2520%2804-152016%29&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20160415
_Newsletter:%20Daily&utm_term=Daily.
74 CISPA directs the federal government to conduct cybersecurity activities
to provide shared situational awareness enabling integrated operational actions to
protect, prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from cyber incidents.
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/624.
75 This amends the National Security Act of 1947 to require the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) to develop and promulgate procedures to promote: (1)
the timely sharing of classified and declassified cyber threat indicators in possession
of the federal government with private entities, non-federal governmental agencies,
or state, tribal, or local governments; and (2) the sharing of imminent or ongoing
cybersecurity threats with such entities to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts.
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1560.
76 https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2885-coalition-letter-from55-civil-society-groups-security-experts-and-academics-opposingpcna/Coaltion%20Letter%20Strongly%20Opposing%20PCNA.b24d1869025848c
b96385603d8208dea.pdf.
77 Deena Zaru, Dilemmas of the Internet age: privacy vs. security, CNN (Mar. 29,
2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/04/politics/deena-zaru-internet-privacysecurity-al-franken/.
73
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Even the FBI’s request for Apple to crack the encryption on
the iPhone belonging to the San Bernardino shooter has generated
outrage in a large segment of the population. 78 U.S. citizens have an
increasing fear of governmental violations of privacy. A majority of
the American people don’t trust the government, and are concerned
that the government’s access to private information will result in
violations of privacy and free speech. 79
From the FBI’s perspective, this was an easy call. The
phone’s owner was dead, along with the privacy interests, and his
phone may have contained information to help stop other terrorist
attacks. Although Apple didn’t have the ability to crack the phone’s
encryption, it seemed the corporation would be best positioned to
develop the capability to assist in the case. 80 The privacy community
(and Apple) saw it differently, however.
Apple asserted that developing the technique would set a
dangerous precedent and would create a threat to the data security of
its customers.81 In the end, Apple refused to budge and the FBI
contracted with an information security company that was able break
the encryption on the phone so the FBI could access the
information.82

78 Kim Zetter, Apple’s FBI Battle Is Complicated. Here’s What’s Really Going On,
WIRED (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/apples-fbi-battle-iscomplicated-heres-whats-really-going-on/.
79 A recent study conducted by Pew Research Center found that only 19%
of Americans trust the government. Henry Gass, How do Americans view government?
Survey finds both distrust and hope, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 23, 2015),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2015/1123/How-do-Americans-viewgovernment-Survey-finds-both-distrust-and-hope.
80 See Zetter, Apples FBI Battle is Complicated. Here’s What’s Really Going on,
WIRED (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/apples-fbi-battle-iscomplicated-heres-whats-really-going-on/.
81 Tim
Cook, A Message to Our Customers (Feb. 16, 2016),
http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/.
82 Julia Edwards, FBI paid more than $1.3 million to break into San Bernardino
iPhone, REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-appleencryption-fbi-idUSKCN0XI2IB. After the FBI reported it had accessed the
phone, Apple demanded that the FBI tell it about the vulnerability used so the
weakness could be patched. Conner Forrest, Apple demands to know how FBI cracked

25

DOCUMENT2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

4/27/2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:1

Constitutional protections have given U.S. citizens the
freedom to take risks and be creative, and the ability to push back
against government programs that implicate privacy or personal
property. This arrangement greatly facilitated the success of the U.S.
economy and, as a result, U.S. international relations. Of course, the
irony in the situation is that the very freedoms that facilitated the U.S.
rise to superpower status in the physical world now impair U.S.
efforts to be similarly dominant in cyberspace. By contrast,
cyberspace has given U.S. rival States and groups another chance to
be dominant, and some of them are seizing it with both hands. The
lack of freedom may have limited rival States’ innovation and
progress previously, but the same set of circumstances allow their
leadership to push forward in cyberspace, unconstrained by concerns
over privacy and other constitutional rights. There must be a middle
ground that would permit U.S. activities in the area to advance
national security and still provide appropriate protections, even if not
absolute dominance, for citizens’ privacy.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Cyberspace is constantly shifting as new nodes are added and
others disappear. Locations of interest move (a network address can
change) and are concealed (a network address can be spoofed) with
ease. National security laws and strategy were conceived with physical
boundaries in mind, but national borders in cyberspace are porous
and uncertain.83 These factors increase the complexity of cyber
operations. Defining cyberspace more accurately as two separate
elements, infrastructure and content, may help to refocus U.S.
strategy going forward.

San
Bernardino
iPhone,
TECH
REPUBLIC
(Mar.
30,
2016),
http://www.techrepublic.com/article/apple-demands-to-know-how-fbi-crackedsan-bernardino-iphone/.When and if the government has an obligation to disclose
vulnerabilities is another fascinating debate that is beyond the scope of this article.
83 Miller, Brickey & Conti, Why Your Intuition about Cyber Warfare is Probably
Wrong,
SMALL
WARS
JOURNAL
(Nov.
29,
2012),
http://smallwarsjournal.com/print/13573.
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The success of others in the ideosphere, particularly Russia
and ISIS, is frustrating, because it is precisely the type of thing
Americans are typically good at. Generally, the U.S. does well in the
ideosphere (freedom, culture, etc.), but is not as successful as other
actors in driving towards specific goals. If the U.S. hopes to operate
more successfully in cyberspace it needs to look at things differently.
There will be occasions where engaging on cyber infrastructure will
be the best tactic, certainly when it is in conjunction with armed
conflict. In other cases, maximum effectiveness will be found in
taking on the adversary in the ideosphere. Examples may include
debating issues, undercutting positive adversary information,
manipulating information and the trust placed in it, and preventing
the efficient flow of that information.84
England’s dominance in 14th century military affairs wasn’t
due to a secret weapon that no one else could obtain. Rather,
England’s military reigned supreme in the era because its adversaries
feared empowering the public to fully participate in national security.
The dominance endured until England’s rivals decided the rewards of
extending capability beyond the elites to the population outweighed
the risks. America’s adversaries have successfully weaponized social
media.85 How long will it be before the U.S. unleashes its own cyber
longbow, employing non-traditional assets for the on-going clashes in
cyberspace?
Rather than remaining merely another of the “weary giants of
flesh and steel,” there is a need for the U.S. to engage in “the new
home of Mind.”86 U.S. leadership in cyberspace is vital to ensure it
remains a powerful, albeit flawed, force for progress and creation.
84 Maybe sending comedians to engage with ISIS, as the band U-2’s Bono
suggests, would help solve the problem. Or maybe not. Bono: send Amy Schumer and
Chris Rock to fight Islamic State, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/music/2016/apr/13/bono-send-amy-schumerchris-rock-fight-islamic-state-isis.
85 Emerson T. Brooking & Peter W. Singer, War Goes Viral, THE ATLANTIC
(Nov. 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/11/war-goesviral/501125/.
86 John Perry Barlowe, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,
ELECTRONIC FREEDOM FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspaceindependence.
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Competing will require employing citizens in the protection of the
nation, primarily addressing the information that represents human
interaction and all the inherent risks and rewards, with the physical
components of the internet playing a supporting role.
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SECTION 1

A. Introduction
A lot of recent media attention and an enormous amount of
taxpayer dollars have been focused on issues surrounding cyber
security. Problems arise because many people mean many different
things in referring to cyber security, and different groups have
different, often conflicting or even mutually contradictory goals, in
pursuing such policy. Some companies and users privilege security;
the government places a premium on surveillance, and users vary in
their concerns regarding privacy, often not fully understanding the
relationship between personal and technical aspects of the term.
Much of the debate around cyber security has generated more
heat than light, especially in the wake of the Snowden revelations,
often because those who know a lot about the technical aspects of
cyber issue know little and care less about government concerns,
while those in the policy arena are often willfully unaware of the
technical aspects of the domain they are expected to regulate.
Everyone can agree that no one wants a foreign country to infiltrate
their infrastructure or compromise their financial, transportation,
medical, utility or nuclear weapons systems. And everyone agrees that
cyber-crime and exploitation are common problems that need to be
addressed. But very few know how to go about it.
Many of the discussions around cyber security seem to go
around in circles with very little forward progress, in part because the
decision-making that generates such policy remains poorly informed
and systemically hindered. Here we hope to begin to improve
decision-making by providing a theoretical rubric for understanding
the underlying factors that influence decision-making across different
levels and fields of discipline. In addition, we hope to highlight some
of the inherent difficulties in developing successful policy within each
step and between areas of inquiry. We then offer a research agenda to
guide research into improving decision-making going forward.
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1. Levels of Analysis.
By the term ‘cyber security policy’, we refer to policy
interventions that coordinate and direct resources toward improving
cyber security. Improving cyber security involves protecting
computer networks and systems and the users of these technologies
(including people and organizations) against physical and financial
loss. Decision-making contributes to the formulation of policy
interventions at four levels: international, national, organizational,
and individual.
Interventions differ across levels. For instance, treaties or
agreements are used at the international level, laws and regulation at
the national level, and internal policies or codes of conduct at the
organizational level.

[Table 1 on following page]
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Table 1: A conceptual framework for cyber security policy decisionmaking
Level

Entities

International

Nation state,
international
fora and
organizations

National

National
government,
legislative or
executive
branch
Private
enterprise or
governmental
administrative
agency

Organizational

Individual

Individual
person

Factors
influencing
decision making
Lack of
institutional
structure for nonstate actors
Diffusion of
power
No enforcement
mechanism
Rigidity
No national
strategy
Dispersed
responsibility

Common
policy
interventions
Agreements
Treaties

Lack of evidence
base
Rigidity
Lack of technical
knowledge
Lack of
coordination and
communication
between technical
experts and
policymakers
Loss aversion
Uncertainty/infor
mation asymmetry

Company
policy
Code of
conduct
Contracts
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Law
Regulation

Heuristics
Hacker
culture
Decision
making
norms
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At an international level, the system for mediating relations
between nation states is not built in a way that allows for inclusion of
non-state actors, which are inherent to any issue connected to digital
technologies and the Internet. This, coupled with the dispersion of
power among states, individuals and non-state actors, makes
enforcement of international treaties or agreements difficult, even if
they are agreed upon and enacted.
At a national level, the lack of national strategy and dispersed
responsibilities for cyber security policy lead to contradictory policy
proposals and unintended consequences that ultimately reduce
overall cyber security. There is often a lack of communication and
integration between the public and private sector, both of which
operate in this space simultaneously. In addition, governments and
technology firms may have entirely antagonistic goals in certain areas,
including those involving privacy, security and surveillance, as the
confrontation between the FBI and Apple over unlocking the San
Bernadino shooter’s iPhone so richly illustrates.
At an organizational level, deficiencies in the information or
evidence base with which to make decisions mean that ‘good’
programs are not identified and ‘bad’ ones are not eliminated. This
problem is coupled with, and compounded by, a chronic lack of
technical knowledge in those organizations with responsibility to
respond to cyber security matters, and a simultaneous lack of
understanding of policy needs and processes within the technical
community.
At an individual level, loss aversion in a situation that is
inherently uncertain systematically restricts optimal decision making
by encouraging individual leaders to revert to automatic and natural
psychological strategies and procedures in decision-making. These
strategies and procedures may not be well suited for the complex
problems or challenges they confront. Risk can be mitigated through
processes, such as insurance, in ways that uncertainty cannot.
Uncertainty tends to make people more cautious, especially in the
wake of potential catastrophic failure; this puts defenders at a
disadvantage relative to attackers.
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The decision-making by entities at each of these four levels
are influenced by various factors, not all of which work in the same
direction. Various incentives and disincentives, constraints and
heuristics or biases influence the way in which policy mechanisms are
developed, or the ways in which people behave in response to policy
interventions. Some of these factors are unique to one level and some
apply to many (e.g. lack of information, rigidity, dispersed power).
It is our contention that the development and deployment of
policy interventions are influenced by various institutional,
organizational, human psychological and behavioral, economic and
political biases or heuristics. These influences become encoded in the
decision-making mechanisms themselves, which in turn, push those
who are subject to the interventions to behave or react in ways that
mirror the biases or heuristics or the designers of the interventions
themselves.
The cyber security field is in constant flux, and issues related
to decision-making are inherently multidisciplinary, which
necessitates timely, ongoing and integrated research to keep our
societies as productive and secure as possible. In listing the factors
that influence decision-making, we draw on the disciplines of
international relations, economics, organizational behavior, cognitive
and behavioral sciences, psychology and public policy.
How then can we make better decisions in cyber security
policy? Section one provides an overview of the obstacles to effective
decision-making in cyber security policy at the international, national,
organizational and individual levels. A number of interventions might
be instituted to try to begin to overcome the various factors that
negatively influence decision-making in cyber security policy. In the
third section, we propose some specific examples linked to the
systemic factors we identify as influencing decision-making in section
two. The last section offers a research agenda designed to support the
development of the proposed interventions we discuss in section 3.

35

DOCUMENT5 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

4/27/2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs
II.

5:1

SECTION 2

This section provides an overview of the obstacles to more
coherent and coordinated cyber security policy across levels
(international, national, organizational and individual) by discussing
issues within each level, describing what has been done in the past
and in some cases describing the past limitations to success.
A. International
1. Lack of Institutional Architecture to Deal with Non-State Actors.
Within international relations theory, the realist school of
thought characterizes the international system as anarchic. It is one in
which individual states each act in their own self-interest, unable to
cooperate out of mistrust of one other. The international system is
one comprising Westphalian nation states. This model has prevailed
since the treaty for which the system owes its name in 1648. The
liberal school of international relations theory called for the creation
of a set of international organizations and norms to manage the
relations between states in this otherwise anarchic international
system.
The Internet, as a network of networks, is not bound strictly
by national boundaries in law or in practice, since communication
across borders in this system is constant. Cyber-security thus presents
a problem that an international system comprised of nation states is
ill equipped to solve. So-called ‘non-state’ actors fill the ecology of
cyber-security, from private companies that develop the software and
hardware, private Internet service providers, organized criminal
outlets and individual ‘hackers’, not to mention both business and
personal users of the Internet. While there is some interaction
between state and non-state entities, such as relationships between
Russian law enforcement and intelligence agencies with organized
criminal groups,1 and between the Chinese military and semiautonomous hacking groups, these non-state interests are not present
1

See BRIAN KREBS, SPAM NATION (Sourcebooks, Inc., 2014).
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within the delegations representing the respective nation states in
international organizations and fora.
A patchwork of international agreements and treaties are
linked to cyber-security.2 One multilateral agreement, drafted under
the aegis of the Council of Europe, is The Budapest Convention on
Cyber Crime. Signed in 2001, it is open to non-European signatories
and has the objective of pursuing, “a common criminal policy aimed
at the protection of society against cybercrime, especially by adopting
appropriate legislation and fostering international co-operation.”3 The
Budapest Convention has attracted 50 signatories. However, it is still
criticized as being outdated and has not gained the support of key
countries in cyber security such as Brazil and Russia.4
On a bilateral level, a number of recent agreements have been
created with the intention of curbing cyber-espionage between the
United States and China,5 between China and the United Kingdom, 6
China and Germany7 and between China and Russia.8 Questions have
been raised as to whether or not the bilateral agreements, particularly
2 See Jonathan Clough, The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime: Is
Harmonisation Achievable in a Digital World?, MONASH U. (July 30, 2013),
http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/conferences/2013isoc/presentations/clough.pdf.
3 See Council of Europe (COE), CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME,
(Nov. 23, 2001), https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/Displ
ayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680081561 (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
4 Brian Harley, A Global Convention on Cybercrime?, COLUM. SCI & TECH. L.
REV. (Mar. 23, 2010), http://stlr.org/2010/03/23/a-global-convention-oncybercrime/.
5 Colin Lecher, US Reaches Economic Cybersecurity Agreement with China, THE
VERGE (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.theverge.com/2015/9/25/9399187/obamachina-cyber-security-agreement.
6 Danielle Correa, China and the UK Sign Cyber-Security Agreement, SC MAG.,
(Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.scmagazineuk.com/china-and-the-uk-sign-cybersecurity-agreement/article/448578/.
7 Kevin Sawyer, Germany and China Reach Agreement to End Commercial
Cyberwar, NAT’L MONITOR (Oct. 29, 2015), http://natmonitor.com/2015/10/29/
germany-and-china-reach-agreement-to-end-commercial-cyberwar/.
8 Lee Munson, Russia and China Sign Cyber Security Pact, Vow Not to Hack
Each Other, NAKED SECURITY (May 11, 2015), https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2
015/05/11/russia-and-china-sign-cyber-security-pact-vow-not-to-hack-eachother/.
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the one between the United States and China, can actually be
enforced and thus will achieve their stated goals. Moreover, the
agreements leave out other vital organizations such as civil society
organizations, critical infrastructure, and the government, military,
intelligence, and law enforcement organizations of the respective
countries.9
Finally, attempts have been made to include ‘Internet-based
surveillance systems’ in the Wassenaar Arrangement, a multilateral
agreement on export controls for conventional arms and dual-use
goods and technologies. The proposals to extend the Wassenaar
Arrangement have been criticized on the basis that, in the long run, it
would undermine cyber-security by criminalizing the very security
research activities that result in the identification and correction of
vulnerabilities in software and hardware.
2. Diffusion of Power.
One of the megatrends identified by the National Intelligence
Council in its report, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, is the
increasing diffusion of power globally. 10 In this increasingly
multipolar world, power shifts to networks and coalitions made up of
non-state actors such as private enterprises and individual threat
actors such as hackers. Ironically, this diffusion and dispersion of
power is partly driven by vast improvements in communication
technologies. These conditions make it difficult to implement and
enforce international agreements even when there is general
consensus and agreement on a specific cyber security policy at the
international level.
“Who do I call if I want to call Europe”, is a quote
commonly misattributed to Henry Kissinger in reference to the
difficulty in international relations and negotiations when dealing
Richard Bejtlich, To hack, or not to hack?, BROOKINGS (Sept. 28, 2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2015/09/28/to-hack-or-not-to-hack/.
10 See
Generally Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, NAT’L
INTELLIGENCE COUNS. (Dec. 2012), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/
organization/global-trends-2030.
9
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with a dispersed entity that has no single representative. The quote
nicely encapsulates the current problem facing cyber security policy at
an international level between nation states: there is simply no one
body or entity to call or to convene major stakeholders to address
cyber security threats or challenges.
The international diplomatic system has trouble integrating
the views of entities outside of the Westphalian system of nation
states. The Internet is a decentralized network of networks that
involves privately owned entities in almost all countries. In this
aspect, the Internet’s greatest strength inherently incorporates its
greatest weakness; designed to survive a nuclear conflict, redundancy
is baked into its very structure but at the expense of the ability for
central administration. As with the nation state system itself, there is
no central controlling actor or actors capable of forcing compliance
on all participants. International negotiations require the participation
of these private entities, yet the international system is not built to
incorporate such actors, and so remains unable to include them in
ways essential to the success of any treaty in this domain. And yet
without the inclusion of such groups and individuals, any
international agreement is doomed to failure from the outset.
In fact, this diffusion of nation state power is compounded
by the very ‘empowerment of the individual’ that the Internet itself
facilitates. This term refers to the way that digital technologies invert
traditional power dynamics. Now individuals, with very few
resources, are able to influence the actions and behavior of
governmental or multinational organizations many times their own
size. Suicide bombers provide a dramatic example of this
phenomenon. The influence of individual non-state actors is
particularly relevant in cyber security. Many of the threat actors in
this field are organized criminal outfits, in many cases backed
explicitly or tolerated by the state in which they reside. Widespread
availability and adoption of commercially available information
communication technologies grants individuals capabilities to access
and amplify information previously only available to nation states.
And destructive effects are not limited only to organized groups, but
can reside within the reach of individual hackers themselves as well.
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Effectively controlling such a system through a slow moving
and rigid set of decision-making rules, procedures and processes,
such as those that characterize the international system, is an
immensely difficult task. Even were binding agreements to be
reached, actual implementation of these agreements presents a whole
new set of difficulties. And enforcement proves harder still, especially
in the fast-moving technological landscape. These is a deep and
persistent, perhaps unfathomable breach, between the speed of
government and bureaucratic action, and that of technological
innovation. In such a contest, technology is bound to circumvent
particular restrictions long before those constraints can be
implemented. And this is likely to be true for the foreseeable future.
B. National
In organizations there are at least four reasons why planners
tend to fail when attempting to address complex problems. 11 First,
people tend to oversimplify the process of problem solving to save
time and energy.12 Second, people are overconfident in their own
abilities, and thus try to repeat past successes.13 Third, people have
trouble quickly absorbing and retaining the large amounts of
information necessary to understand dynamic, ever-changing
processes.14 Finally, people tend to focus on immediately pressing
problems at the expense of considering longer term or more distant
challenges or the unintended consequences and problems that
solutions can create.15
These four characteristics of poor decision-making help us
understand why the current approach to cyber security policy making
at a national and organizational level is failing.

11 See DIETRICH DÖRNER, THE LOGIC OF FAILURE: RECOGNIZING AND
AVOIDING ERROR IN COMPLEX SITUATIONS (Basic Books 1989).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
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1. No National Strategy.
In the United States, there is no national strategy and no
long-term strategy for cyber security policy. This creates a vacuum of
responsibility and an absence of direction and constraint which leads
to contradictory policy. This inevitably generates the emergence of
turf wars over the rapidly expanding Federal funds available for
programs nominally meant for ‘cyber’ purposes, but often directed
toward other only tangentially related interventions by agencies which
seek to co-opt these funds for other purposes.
This is not a new problem, nor one restricted solely to the
domain of ‘cyber’ for that matter. In 2013, the Government
Accountability Office released a report entitled, ‘National Strategy,
Roles, and Responsibilities Need to Be Better Defined and More Effectively
Implemented’.16 Specific problems identified with the cyber security
policy approach include: few milestones or performance measures in
government strategy documents; the assignment of high-level roles
and responsibilities but important operational details being left
unclear; and wide variance across cyber security strategy documents
in terms of priorities and structure, how they link to or supersede
other documents, and how they fit into an overarching national cyber
security strategy.17 Little has changed to improve these deficits in the
intervening years.
The Department of Defense’s Cyber Strategy, perhaps the
longest standing national strategy document, provides a set of
strategic goals but lacks fine-grained, operational details that are
publicly available.18 The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Initiative was released in 2013 and came with 12 initiatives but did
not come with an operational plan on how these initiatives should be

16 U.S.
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE,
GAO-13-187,
CYBERSECURITY: NATIONAL STRATEGY, ROLES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES NEED TO
BE BETTER DEFINED AND MORE EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED (2013).
17 Id.
18 The DOD Cyber Strategy, THE DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Apr. 2015),
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyberstrategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf.
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implemented and operationalized.19 The Cybersecurity National
Action Plan came with a set of actions, like setting up a Commission
on Enhancing National Cybersecurity, and creating a Federal Chief
Information Security Officer position, and allocated $19 billion in
funds across a plethora of activities, but did not include tangible
outcomes and metrics for determining cost effectiveness or ‘success’.
This is a combination tailor-made for inciting misuse of government
funds.
The responsibilities for portions of cyber security policy are
spread out across dozens of Federal agencies, the Department of
Defense and intelligence community, regulators and other ancillary
bodies (like Information Sharing and Analysis Centers, or ISACs).
This dispersed responsibility, coupled with no overarching strategy,
creates situations where agencies pursue cyber security policy goals
that match their organization’s interests but, in many cases, contradict
the cyber security concerns of other organizations, sectors, and
people, or produce unnecessary, wasteful, or even deleterious
redundancies, often even without awareness of such duplication.
Lack of fully transparent communication between these divisions
within the government serves to further complicate problems
associated with disaggregated policy planning and implementation.
A recent example is the push by FBI Director Comey for
laws that would mandate backdoors to be placed in encryption
standards. Were this policy to be successfully implemented, it would
have the effect of weakening overall cyber security (including the
cyber security of other government agencies), not to mention the
ability of foreign actors to access sensitive American materials.
Another example is the National Security Agency, which has
a dual mission that in practice is contradictory. The Signals
Intelligence mission requires that the agency acquire the
communications of foreign governments (espionage). The second
mission of the NSA, the Information Assurance mission, tasks the
agency with safeguarding the information of government agencies,
The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, EXECUTIVE OFF. OF
PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files
/cybersecurity.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2016).
19

THE
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corporations and individuals in the U.S. The approach is summarized
as ‘keep our information safe, get theirs.’
The Signals Intelligence mission requires that key information
technology infrastructure, hardware and software, be weakened and
exploited. These technologies, in many cases are the same ones used
by government agencies, corporations and individuals in the United
States itself. The weakening of these technologies puts these entities
in the U.S. at risk (the revelation in 2016 of back-doored Juniper
routers, which are used by many U.S. Federal government
departments, is a case in point). Add to this the fact that US Cyber
Command, which is the military’s designated organization for
safeguarding its networks and information, is led by the same person
that leads the NSA, and we have a muddled set of responsibilities
with little coordination.
C. Organizational
1. Lack of Evidence Base.
Evidence-based policy making is an approach where policy
decisions are based on the collection and interpretation of objective
evidence relating to the policy issue at hand and the performance of
the policy option implemented. Its intellectual roots lie in evidencebased medicine, where randomized controlled trials are used to assess
the policies or treatments that contribute most toward the resolution
of a particular condition or ailment. This etiology embodies an
important corrective; fixing one problem in the human body often
causes another because systems are enmeshed in ways that are not
always obvious, clear or systematic. Similarly, in a network design like
the Internet, focusing on simple, easy-to-measure outcomes can
quickly become a version of the drunkard’s search. Just as lowering
cholesterol does little to change overall risk of coronary artery
disease, although the ability to do so with statins makes billions for
Big Pharma every year, reducing the number of hacks may not
necessarily mean the overall system is safer. After all, body counts in
Vietnam did little to provide an accurate indicator of how well the
United States was doing in that war. Effective decision-making in
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complex environments requires knowledge about the structure of a
system and the outcomes of the decisions made in relation to the
goals that are being pursued.20 Without this knowledge, an
organization may implement interventions that ultimately exacerbate
the very problems that it seeks to mitigate.
In cyber security policy, there is a dearth of reliable, verifiable
data on the financial scale of the losses, the sources of threats and
risks, and the potential positive and negative impacts of policy
decisions. While figures on the number of cyber incidents are
released annually by the Computer Emergency Response Team (USCERT), such figures are methodologically questionable – for instance
- much of the increasing incidence figures could be chalked up to
better detection methods and companies have incentives to hide
serious breaches - and thus give very little in the way of policyrelevant guidance.
Where there are metrics available, there is no guarantee that
they will be actionable, relevant or useful. For instance, since 2003
the Department of Homeland Security has been operating an
intrusion detection system, formerly called the National
Cybersecurity Protection System, now called the EINSTEIN
program. 2122 After over a decade of operation, and $6 billion in
investment, “none [of the metrics developed by DHS] provide
insight into the value derived from the functions of the system.”23 An
estimated $19 billion was allocated to cyber security measures in the
2017 White House budget proposal, representing a 35% increase
See DÖRNER, supra note 11.
It is of great concern therefore that the Cybersecurity National Action
Plan calls for the Department of Homeland Security to enhance Federal
cybersecurity, “by expanding the EINSTEIN and Continuous Diagnostics and
Mitigation programs”.
22 Aliya Sternstein, US Homeland Security’s $6B Firewall Has More Than a
Few
Frightening
Blind
Spots,
DEFENSE
ONE
(Jan.
29
2016),
http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/01/us-homeland-securitys-6bfirewall-has-more-few-frightening-blind-spots/125528/.
23 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-294, INFORMATION
SECURITY: NHS NEEDS TO ENHANCE CAPABILITIES, IMPROVE PLANNING, AND
SUPPORT GREATER ADOPTION OF ITS NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY PROTECTION
SYSTEM (2016).
20
21
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over the previous year.24 However, it was not clear where all these
funds were going because there was no definition for what actually
constitutes a ‘cyber security program’.25 Even data on research and
development (R&D) spending on cyber security, the release of which
is required by law, have only been made available as recently as
2013.26
The lack of reliable evidence is due to a number of reasons.
There are strong incentives for corporations and government
agencies not to disclose whether an information security failure has
occurred, facilitated in part by patchy data breach notification laws,
which are set at a state level in the United States, and differ
substantially in their requirements. Companies may not want
competitors to know their weaknesses, and corporations as well as
the government may not want the public to lose faith that their
personal financial, medical, or social information is safe when they
interact with them. This of course assumes that the company is aware
of a failure in information security having even taken place, which is
far from guaranteed.
Where there are data and studies available, the most
commonly cited data sources are compiled by security or antivirus
vendors, who have business incentives to magnify the problem, or
are in studies undertaken by academic institutions or think tanks and
sponsored by corporations that operate in the field. These studies
make unrealistic assumptions about the behavioral responses of
companies, and do not take into account the unobserved differences
among companies in the datasets. They assume that all companies
react in the same way to information security incidents regardless of
industry, size (whether by headcount or annual revenues), business
model or current revenues, costs or profitability. In reality, the losses
24 The President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2017, THE WHITE HOUSE: OFF. OF
MGMT. AND BUDGET, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget (last visited
Sept. 26, 2016).
25 Middle Class Economics: Cybersecurity, THE WHITE HOUSE: THE
PRESIDENT’S
BUDGET,
FISCAL
YEAR
2016
(Aug.
7,
2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/fact
_sheets/cybersecurity-updated.pdf.
26 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 16.
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that a company might face from a security breach are influenced by
the individual company’s fragility, which in turn is a function of a
number of firm-level characteristics including customer loyalty, profit
margins or debt. For a hypothetical example, if a company with low
profit margins, low customer loyalty and high debt is subject to a
costly data breach, and that information becomes public, the periodic
drop in revenues and curtailed access to short-term debt might
render the company insolvent. This would not be the case for a
company with high margins, high customer loyalty and low debt. Yet
many studies treat all companies as if they were identical when
predicting or forecasting potential impacts of a breach.
Selection bias is also endemic. The only companies that
appear in malware or data breach incident datasets are those that: a)
detected the incident; b) subsequently reported the incident; and c)
were able to accurately quantify the impact of the incident. Of the
entire universe of companies, only a fraction of a fraction is likely to
be included in this analysis. Simple methodological problems like
ensuring a representative sample are endemic in commonly used, selfreported surveys. The total losses across countries are often based on
extrapolations for entire populations; multiplying the average loss per
company by the total companies in the country or economy may not
provide the most accurate estimate of actual breaches or losses.27
This lack of evidence means that cyber security policy makers
cannot determine where the true problems lies and where policy
interventions might have the greatest benefit given their costs, nor
can they track the subsequent outcomes of the policy interventions
that they make. This failure then compounds over years as successful
policy interventions aren’t identifiable and failed policy interventions
are allowed to persist in spite of their failure.
With no basis on which to evaluate the need for and
effectiveness of cyber security policy, there is a risk that the system
becomes nothing more than a ‘self-licking ice cream cone’: A self-

Dinei Florencio & Cormac Herley, Sex, Lies and Cyber-crime Surveys
(Microsoft Research, Working Paper), available at https://www.microsoft.com/enus/research/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/SexLiesandCybercrimeSurveys.pdf.
27
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perpetuating process that is meant to address a problem but instead
contributes to the very problem that it is ostensibly designed to solve.
2. Chronic Lack of Technical Knowledge.
The chronic lack of technical knowledge and talent within the
organizations with responsibility for cyber security policy severely
hampers these organizations’ ability to effectively develop and
implement policies. This technical knowledge gap can be attributed
to there being no standard way in which to classify or keep track of
cyber security related roles, and to the inability of Federal agencies to
retain and develop what technical talent they are able to hire.
Again, this problem is not new. In 2011, the Government
Accountability Office released a report titled ‘Cybersecurity Human
Capital: Initiatives need Better Planning and Coordination’, flagging that,
“eight agencies with the biggest IT [information technology] budgets
have trouble handling their cybersecurity workforces and determining
their composition and responsibilities.”28 It remains a persistent
problem. In a 2013 report, the GAO wrote that, “only 2 of 8 agencies
it reviewed developed cyber workforce plans and only 3 of the 8
agencies had a department-wide training program for their
cybersecurity workforce.”29 The Department of Defense was the only
agency to report their shortage to the GAO in 2011 (as they were the
only ones who had a methodology in place).
This has not stopped government agencies from announcing
large hiring targets, complete with large budgets, to hire cyber
security personnel. The Department of Defense announced that it
would have 6,000 ‘cyber-warriors’ by 2016 but there is little indication
of where these people would come from (much less what a ‘cyber-

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-8, CYBERSECURITY
HUMAN CAPITAL: INITIATIVES NEED BETTER PLANNING AND COORDINATION
(2011).
29 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 16.
28
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warrior’ does). The Office of Personnel Management was also
competing to hire 1,000 cyber security personnel in this market.30
The Department of Homeland Security is the private sector’s
liaison on cyber security matters – it also advises other agencies on
the issue. The GAO identified 1,361 cyber security personnel at DHS
in their 2013 study. One official is quoted as saying, “the National
Cyber Security Division has had trouble finding personnel for certain
specialized areas, such as watch officers”. 31 This division has a central
role in operating important interventions such as the EINSTEIN
system, developing the National Cyber Incident Response Plan, and
operating the National Cybersecurity Center.
The lack of any data to measure the problem or outcomes of
policies to address the problem makes achieving strategic goals, like
Initiative #8 of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, which
calls to, “develop a technologically-skilled and cyber-savvy workforce
and an effective pipeline of future employees,” even more
challenging.
Another underlying reason for the chronic lack of technically
skilled people in government is that government can rarely compete
with the private sector in the IT arena in terms of salary, stock
options, prestige and other remunerations. Few career public servants
have an advanced understanding of technical issues in the area of
cyber security, and even fewer private sector IT professionals have
any understanding of, much less interest in, the processes underlying
the formulation of government policy. At a cultural or ideological
level, many of those who work in or are a part of the tech industry
either in Silicon Valley or more generally have a Libertarian or
Randian bent. They are broadly skeptical of and distrust
government, 32 exacerbating the conflict between government and
industry in the surveillance versus privacy debate around cyber
security goals. Even if the government could compete head-to-head
GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFF., https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys
/pkg/FR-2015-11-10/html/2015-28566.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2016).
31 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 16.
32 A compact summary of this set of values can be found in Richard
Barbrook and Andy Cameron’s 1995 essay ‘The Californian Ideology’.
30
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in pay, it would still have to overcome the ideological forces that
dissuade Silicon Valley from collaborating openly with government.
The security and screening requirements for many positions
related to cyber security in the Federal government have created
obstacles to hiring talent as well. One example is Ashkan Soltani,
who was in line to work with the White House’s Office of Science
and Technology Policy after a stint as the Federal Trade
Commission’s Chief Technologist, but whose security clearance
application was rejected possibly due to past affiliation with Edward
Snowden. 33 In another example from 2014, the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation stated that the agency was
considering relaxing its policy, which prohibited hiring anyone who
had used cannabis in the past three years, because it was so difficult
to find candidates for cyber security roles who would pass the
policy’s requirements.34
Simultaneously, private entities with the skill base to address
some of these challenges technologically have no ostensible reason to
include policy experts on their design teams. Government does not
mandate or regulate such participants, and there is little or no support
or infrastructure in most technology companies for their
contribution. On the other side of the equation, it is hard enough for
the government agencies to find people to manage and secure their
internal information technology networks, let alone find those with
the technical knowledge and skills coupled with an understanding of
public policy formulation and implementation. Both sides are thus
confronted with enormous challenges to achieving mutual
understanding and translation of basic needs and goals.
Finally, government organizations typically set their cyber
security policy internally as a list of compliance-based check boxes
that the system administrators are expected to rigidly follow. These
33 Danny Yadron, White House denies clearance to tech researcher with links to
Snowden, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technolo
gy/2016/jan/29/white-house-tech-researcher-denied-security-clearance-edwardsnowden-nsa.
34 Leo Kelion, FBI ‘could hire hackers on cannabis’ to fight cybercrime, BBC
NEWS (May 22, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-27499595.
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check box lists are developed from the perspective of the defender,
not the adversary, so they are typically circumvented by highly
resourced and sentient adversaries. Their ‘one size fits all’ approach
emphasizes attaining compliance over actually directing resources
towards areas where dynamic risks are greatest for the organization in
question.
The management of government agencies also does not
permit the system administrators who manage their IT networks the
autonomy necessary to take a proactive approach to system security.
These rigid policies are the equivalent of handcuffing the security
guard at the front of the building and then telling him/her to keep
the place safe from thieves. A long-term effect is that, rather than
empowering the system administrators to proactively address cyber
security concerns, this approach drives out the most talented
technical employees, thereby compounding the already acute skills
shortage in Federal agencies.
D. Individual
1. Heuristics and Biases.
Clearly many challenges confront our ability to formulate
effective cyber-security policy. Not least among these are systematic
and predictable barriers which exist in the minds of individual
decision makers and other stake-holders. A few of these merit some
comment, specifically roadblocks related to loss aversion and the
difficulties of making decisions under conditions of uncertainty.
These proclivities can induce a kind of paralysis because people find
themselves averse not only to change, but especially to risks and
threats that incorporate some element of uncertainty.
Loss aversion constitutes a well-known phenomenon first
experimentally documented in the work of Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky.35 This work elegantly demonstrated human hedonic
See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis Of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA: J. OF THE ECONOMETRIC SOC’Y 263, 26135
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asymmetry. In short, people are more averse to loss than they are
attracted to an equal gain. So, for example, it hurts more to lose $10
than it makes most people happy to win $10. In fact, people need to
be offered about $25 on average to make them indifferent between a
bet which can lead to a loss of $10. In other words, most people need
two and a half times more potential benefit in order to take the risk
of a potential loss. This phenomenon in and of itself can, of course,
lead to a particular kind of paralysis since it embodies an inherent
status quo bias. People will of course seek out uncomplicated gains,
but if a path also poses a risk, people will, on average, show a
relatively high degree of loss aversion.
There is, however, one important consistent exception, as
described in Prospect Theory. 36 When people are operating in a socalled domain of losses, when things are bad and look to be getting
worse, people become much more prone to taking risks, including
quite dramatic ones, in order to recoup previous losses, and return to
the former status quo position.
There are a couple of important caveats in this work. Most
relevant, people will show the opposite tendency, meaning risk
aversion in the domain of losses, when probabilities are low. This
explains, for example, the almost universal acceptance of insurance
whereby people pay a sure cost to avoid the very small probability of
a larger loss. But note there that these assessments of likelihood
typically result from subjective assessments and not necessarily
objective probability, meaning that people can often misjudge how
likely a given event may be. This would certainly be especially likely in
a domain such as cyber-security where the base rate of risk is largely
unknown as we noted above. While it makes sense that any given
company or entity may want to keep successful attacks secret, this
lack of transparency makes it much more difficult for the overall
community to accurately assess the objective threat and share
important information on successful defensive strategies. This
secrecy works to the attackers’ advantage. Greater dissemination of
accurate information about kinds and types of attack, even within
91 (1979); see also Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames,
39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 341-50 (1984).
36 Id.
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closed networks, might allow for the development of more effective
counter-strategies, or even more effective insurance policies to
amortize risk across the broader system, even if such allocation were
restricted to specific sectors or industries.
In policy terms, this translates into some potentially
destructive consequences. In short, people are more likely to take
risks that could make things worse precisely when they are already in
bad circumstances. This can easily snowball to make things a lot
worse very quickly. These are the times when caution might be most
warranted, but is also less likely, particularly in an environment
permeated by a sense of crisis, time pressure or high stakes. Thus,
policy makers may prove loath to develop policies to implement if
disaster strikes when things are going well, for fear of offending
potential allies and donors, because of distraction from more pressing
problems at any given moment, or due to general status quo malaise.
However, once a crisis hits, pressure mounts, and that sense of threat
and risk is precisely what throws decision makers into a domain of
loss where the potential for optimal decision making is restricted, and
in the absence of well-developed and rehearsed standard operating
procedures, catastrophic losses become much more likely to occur
simply as a result of momentum. Under such conditions of attack,
risk acceptance dominates, especially because the crisis itself shifts
leaders’ perceptions regarding the probability of subsequent attack.
This entire process may characterize decision-making in any
number of domains but becomes exacerbated by the uncertainty that
typically permeates cyber-attacks in particular. Decision making
under uncertainty often proves difficult. In general, such decisions,
particularly when time is of the essence, are dominated by a series of
so-called judgmental heuristics37 which provide useful rules of thumb
for filling in the blanks when objective probabilities remain unknown.
Their exact operation remains outside the purview of this discussion
and can be found elsewhere.38 For our purposes, suffice it to say that
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124-31 (1974).
38 See ROSE MCDERMOTT, RISK TAKING IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS:
PROSPECT THEORY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (University of Michigan Press,
1998) (discussing an application to political science).
37
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uncertainty, like risk, can systematically restrict optimal decision
making by encouraging individual leaders to revert to established
psychological strategies and procedures in decision making that may
not be well suited for the given problems or challenges they confront.
Recall that such biases evolved precisely because in most
circumstances they offer fast and easy and largely accurate responses
to the world; in other words, they developed precisely because, on
average, they allow largely accurate estimates in the absence of
objective information at the lowest cognitive cost. However, it is
precisely in novel or unusual circumstances, such as those often
posed by cyber-security challenges, where we might expect the
systematic operation of such biases to induce predictable biases
leading to sub-optimal results.
However, this need not necessarily be the case. Sometimes,
embracing the wisdom of uncertainty can precipitate unexpected
creativity in decision-making. Admittedly, this is most likely when the
decision-making milieu is not riven by time pressures, which is why
systematic planning prior to crisis becomes essential to avoid the
more negative consequences of psychological bias in decision
making. Conversely, when planning can take place at a time of
relative security, the acceptance of uncertainty can help generate
unexpected solutions and opportunities because individuals come to
see that the standard operating procedures do not properly address
new challenges which exist in domains divergent from those areas
which the original procedures were designed to address. For example,
standard operating procedures designed to respond to a military
assault on a physical location will not offer much guidance when the
attack occurs in virtual space, however real the financial, logistical or
operational consequences of cyber breaches. Therefore, it is precisely
the inherent uncertainty of the new environment that offers the
possibility for new and creative responses, but these are only likely to
emerge under conditions of calm, not under circumstances defined
by threat and the risk, where loss aversion will dominate, and risky
choices become more likely.
Thus, it becomes easy to see how the same pattern of
unproductive and unresponsive decision-making recurs. When the
problem is not salient, it is easier not to do anything, but under
53
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conditions of threat, risky choices predominate, which may not
necessarily help future outcomes. As Einstein said, the definition of
insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a
different result. However, if we change the approach, and embrace
the creative possibilities present under conditions of uncertainty in
times of calm, it may then become possible to harness human
psychological tendencies in our own favor to develop more creative
solutions to novel problems.
III.

SECTION 3

A. Developing Governance Models that Manage to Diffuse Power
and Non-State Actors
The international system has to adapt to a world that is vastly
different from that which it was built to manage. Effective cyber
security policy development and implementation at an international
level will require bringing nation states together with private
companies,
the
technical
community,
non-governmental
organizations, and individual hackers. Faced with diffused power
across many linked entities, decision-making structures and processes
themselves have to be more adaptable, flexible, bottom-up, and
resilient. As with many contemporary global challenges, there is a
need for governance mechanisms unlike those that were used to
govern the more kinetic international challenges, which dominated
international relations prior-to and during the 20th century.
A number of international organizations are attempting to
take responsibility for various aspects of cyber security policy at the
international level. For example, in 2014, the United Nation’s
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) called for,
“Strengthening the role of ITU in building confidence and security in
the use of information and communication technologies.”39 The

International Telecommunications Union [ITU] (2014), Resolution 140
rev Busan 2014: Strengthening the role of ITU in building confidence and security
in
the
use
of
information
and
communication
technologies,
39
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ITU membership brings together governments and the private sector
(including Sector Members, Associates and Academia) to forge
agreements on radio communications standards and increasing
development through greater access to information and
communication technologies (ICTs).
The problem for organizations such as the United Nations
and other international fora is that they either do not or can only
partially include the diverse state and non-state stakeholders that
comprise the cyber security field. In addition, their typical programs
of work have timelines that span many years. In the time it takes to
complete one cycle, a field like cyber security usually moved on to
new and more pressing issues.
One model worth examining more closely is the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF), which has done a good job over the
past two decades providing a forum in which technical experts and
organizations can come together to make decisions relating to the
technical architecture on which the Internet operates. This process
has been effective because of its open format – anyone can join the
meetings – its rough consensus system for reaching agreement, and
the Request for Proposal system, which ensures that all participants
have an opportunity to make proposals and then debate these
proposals. These characteristics have resulted in technically robust
and agreed upon technical standards and outcomes for the Internet.
B. National – A National Cyber Security Plan
Following Dörner’s original findings, addressing complex
problems requires the establishment of an overall plan with clear
goals, a ‘systems level’ understanding of the environment in which
the plan will be executed, and iterative revision of the plan in
response to information updates on the state of play. Components of
a coherent plan to guide cyber security policy at a national level
include a long-term strategy with clear goals, milestones, performance
targets, resources, and responsibilities.
https://www.itu.int/en/action/cybersecurity/Documents/Resolutions/pp14_Res. 130.pdf (last visited March 7, 2016).

55

DOCUMENT5 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

4/27/2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:1

For the first time, as a follow-up to the 30-day ‘cyber sprint’,40
an operational plan was released on October 30, 2015 to upgrade
Federal cyber security in the United States. The White House
Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan (CSIP) was intended, “to
identify and address critical cyber security gaps and emerging
priorities, and make specific recommendations to address those gaps
and priorities.”41 It had 5 overarching objectives:
•

Prioritized identification and protection of high value
information and assets;

•

Timely detection of and rapid response to cyber
incidents;

•

Rapid recovery from incidents when they occur and
accelerated adoption of lessons learned from the Sprint
assessment;

•

Recruitment and retention of the most highly-qualified
cyber security workforce talent the Federal Government
can bring to bear; and

•

Efficient and effective acquisition and deployment of
existing and emerging technology.

40 After realizing that over 14 million personnel records had been stolen
from the U.S. government Office of Personnel Management, a 30 day
‘cybersecurity sprint’ was announced. The goal was to take, “number of steps to
further protect Federal information and assets and improve the resilience of
Federal networks”. In tangible terms, some steps included the patching of critical
vulnerabilities, acceleration of the implementation of multi-factor authentication,
and tightening of policies and practices for privileged users. Progress reports were
required after 30 days (The White House, 2015c). What’s extraordinary is that, after
tens of billions of dollars in prior investment, these basic steps had not yet been
implemented.
41 Memorandum from The Executive Office of the President to Heads
of Executive Departments and Agencies (Oct. 30, 2015), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2016/m-1604.pdf.
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Each of these 5 objectives was given a set of concrete goals
linked to the achievement of the objectives. Its timeline clearly laid
out the steps that had to be taken, and allocated responsibility to the
respective organizations in order to achieve the stated objectives
before September 2016.
This plan was a major first step in a very narrow part of the
U.S. Federal Government’s efforts to implement basic cyber-security
measures among selected Federal departments. This approach should
be replicated to cover cyber-security policy nationally for the public
and private sectors.
As a part of the development of this plan, a clearer and less
contradictory allocation of authority and responsibilities for key
portions of cyber security policy is required. The announcement of a
Chief Information Security Officer, who focuses on coordinating
cyber security across federal agencies, and is housed within the Office
of Management and Budget at the White House, is a promising first
step in this direction. 42
However, the announcement of the possibility that the
Signals Intelligence and Information Assurance responsibilities within
NSA may be merged, two functions that are in practice contradictory,
was a possible step in the wrong direction. 43 A far better alternative
would have been to allocate the Signals Intelligence mission to the
NSA, the government and military Information Assurance mission to
US Cyber Command (which would have to be led by a different
person than the head of the NSA), and the private sector
Information Assurance mission allocated to where it resides at
present with the Department of Homeland Security (with the Chief
Information Security Officer potentially playing an oversight or
coordination role). Such an arrangement would have avoided the
42 Danny Yadron, White House seeks its first ever chief information officer, THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb
/09/white-house-seeks-first-chief-information-security-officer-hackerscybersecurity-hacking.
43 Danny Yadron, NSA merging anti-hacker team that fixes security holes with
one that uses them, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2016/feb/03/nsa-hacker-cybersecurity-intelligence.
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prior conflict of interest by separating the offensive capabilities, by
housing them in the Department of Defense, from the defensive
capabilities, by housing them in the Department of Homeland
Security.
C. Organizational
1. Improving the Evidence Base.
More robust evidence would contribute greatly to better
cyber security policy and filling the chronic lack of technical
knowledge that has emerged in Federal agencies. Creating a
mechanism where private companies are required to report breaches
while ensuring the secrecy of such information might go far toward
creating a more comprehensive data base, while assuring such firms
that their leaks would not risk unnecessary public distrust or the
exposure of proprietary code or information.
There needs to be standard definitions for what cyber security
budget spending actually constitutes and agreed measures for the
results or outcomes of these budget items. This is necessary so that
money nominally allocated to ‘cyber security’ is not used for other
purposes merely because its meaning can be easily morphed; the
result of a policy produced through such aggregation would be haphazard at best, lacking integration and overall strategy. This is akin to
asking for the input and output measures for cyber security policies.
With these measures in hand, the outcomes of cyber security policy
interventions can be evaluated.
Of all fields, development economics might have tools for
potential use in testing cyber security policy interventions. For
instance, the logical framework approach (log-frames) has been used
for decades to design interventions in many complex fields (e.g.
agriculture, education, health) by identifying goals, tying actions to
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those goals, and then evaluating the intervention according to preestablished metrics.44
Borrowing from the medical field, development economics
and development aid organizations have some well-developed tools
and principles for the monitoring and evaluation of interventions in
complex systems.45 Participants are randomly allocated to one of two
groups, only one of these groups is given the intervention, and then
the differences between the groups post-intervention are measured
so as to determine its effectiveness or efficiency. However, as with
the human body, the Internet is a large network, meaning that
changes in one place may affect other parts of the system in
unintended or unanticipated ways, and attention to such feedback
loops remains an important part of not making things worse by
providing a series of bandages that do nothing to stop the bleeding
(or to prevent later problems such as infections).
Lessons from this field could be drawn and deployed to give
cyber security policy makers a toolkit with which to classify their
budget items in a consistent way (the inputs). This then allows
measures of the effects of these policies across metrics like the
number of breaches per year, or the proportion of designated highvalue information that is encrypted, or any measure that is deemed
appropriate (the outputs) to be developed, and used to adjust,
eliminate or add various program elements to improve performance.
2. Specialized Track for Technical Talent.
To improve the level of technical talent in cyber security roles
within government agencies, a specialized track for this talent –
44 See D. McLean, The Logical Framework In Research Planning And Evaluation
1-11 (ISNAR, Working Paper No. 12, 1988); see also Guidance on using the revised
Logical
Framework,
DEPARTMENT FOR INT’L DEV. (Jan.
2011),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/253889/using-revised-logical-framework-external.pdf.
45 See Esther Duflo & Michael Kremer, Use of Randomization in the
Evaluation of Development Effectiveness, http://economics.mit.edu/files/2785 (last
visited Sept. 27, 2016); see also Abhijit V. Banerjee & Esther Duflo, The Experimental
Approach to Development Economics, 1 ANN. REV. ECON. 151, 151-78 (2009).
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subject to different working conditions and hiring requirements than
typical positions – is one avenue worth exploring. Indeed, as part of
the Cybersecurity National Action Plan (CNAP), a $62 million
educational fund was created, “for Americans who wish to obtain
cybersecurity education and serve their country in the civilian Federal
government.”46 This was an extension of the already-established
National Science Foundation’s and Department of Homeland
Security’s CyberCorps Scholarship for Service program and a sort of
Reserve Officer Training Corps program for new cyber security
talent.47 Such a program provides long term benefits to recipients as
well as government agencies as a larger pool of experts is recruited
and cultivated.
Other existing initiatives might provide lessons for this or
other special training initiatives. One might be the US Digital Services
(USDS), which was originally modeled on the United Kingdom’s
Government Digital Service. The USDS is housed within The White
House Office of Management and Budget that brings technical,
policy and legal professionals and places them in Federal agencies
where technical talent is lacking. They take a human centered design
approach to the use of technology to make government departments
more responsive and accessible to people. They have projects
running in areas that have been deemed priorities by the Obama
administration including Veteran’s Affairs, Department of Homeland
Security (linked to immigration, not cyber security), Social Security
and the IRS. Their annual budget is partially covered by Congress
and partly comes from the partner agencies where their members
work.
Another model that might be worth emulating is the
Jefferson Science Fellowship Program. This program has existed
since 2003 and allows tenured, or similarly ranked, academic
scientists, engineers and physicians from U.S. institutions of higher
learning to spend one year in Washington D.C. at the U.S.
The President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2017, supra note 24.
See Sean Gallagher, Obama wants you to join CyberCorps Reserve to help feds
get their act together, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 9, 2016), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2016/02/obama-wants-you-join-the-cybercorps-reserve-to-help-feds-gettheir-act-together/.
46
47
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Department of State or the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID). A similar program might be developed for
cyber security talent, in U.S. higher education establishments or even
private sector companies (given that some of the best talent resides in
the financial sector), to do a yearlong service in government agencies
where their technical talent or specialized knowledge could be used to
improve the organization’s cyber security or strategy in this area.
Such a program might also potentiate important and on-going social
networks between government and technical experts, and allow each
to achieve a greater understanding of the other’s needs, incentives,
goals and constraints.
Each of these programs may not be able to compete
financially with the private section, but by harnessing existing talent,
supporting emerging talent, and trying to attach service and prestige
to government work, such strategies can help to improve the current
reservoir of skill within existing agencies.
D. Individual
Of course, the structural incentives identified can be shifted
through organizational changes to induce greater compliance and
attention to issues surrounding cyber security, including enhanced
transparency and improved integration and communication across
agencies tasked with different but overlapping goals. But ultimately
the causal agents within any organization are individuals who remain
subject to the inherent psychological biases we discussed above.
1. Transparently Structured Choices and Consequences.
It is not easy, but there are some standard ways to reduce
individual’s susceptibility to such biases.48 First among these is simply
to make people aware of the unconscious biases that may affect their
judgment and decision-making. The simplest way to do this is not
through complicated, time-consuming, expensive training programs
during which people zone out. Rather, the idea is to make sure that
48

See supra note 35, at Id.
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choices are structured in a transparent way so that such biases
become evident. For example, in the classic experiment where people
had to make real life choices between radiation and surgery for
cancer, options were presented with “mortality” and “survival”
statistics side by side. When this is done, the equivalency of the
options becomes immediately evident, but the psychological pull
across framing also remains obvious. In a similar manner, choices
between options in response to a particular threat should present
both the costs and benefits of options side by side, not only for the
relevant choices, as is often typically done, but also relative to the
status quo (i.e. doing nothing) option so that costs and consequences
of inaction become as immediately salient as those associated with
any given course of action.
Because people are preternaturally preoccupied with loss, it is
important to find ways to convey not only probabilities, but also help
people to better understand how to psychologically calibrate the
meaning of abstract probabilities. The human mind does not do well
with very large numbers; we are all aware of the phenomenon of
“crisis fatigue” whereby one dead boy on a beach is a tragedy but
hundreds of thousands of refugees pouring into Europe from Syria is
an immigration challenge that provokes border controls and political
hostility.
These numeracy challenges can play out in myriad ways. One
of the best ways to help decision makers contemplate very large data
breaches is to encourage strategies or procedures for transforming
such issues into very direct and small scale terms. Human psychology
is much better suited for solving smaller scale problems; it is much
easier for people to get a handle on and contemplate how to respond
in a constructive way to challenges that are framed in local terms. So,
for example, we can worry about threats to the electrical grid but the
initial policy problem that needs to be solved and addressed might be
better facilitated if it was framed in terms of how to get electricity
back up in Washington, D.C. without cyber capacity, and then scale
up from these more local decisions to national policy plans.
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2. Training through Gaming and other Table-Top Simulations for
Emotion Regulation.
Importantly, as much as the Western canon has taught
professionals to privilege rationality over emotion, rationality as
posited by economists in particular is little more than an intellectual
construct completely devoid of psychological reality. Psychological
rationality is deeply emotional by design; the human mind privileges
emotional information since that is what has been key to survival in
the face of myriad threats over millennial time. This means that
people are exquisitely sensitive to emotional inputs, perhaps overly so
in modern contexts, but as with loss aversion, we are more attentive
to negative emotions such as fear and anger than more positive ones
such as hope and joy.
Negative emotions, while important and useful for helping us
to properly allocate energy and attention, and also to consolidate
memory, can nonetheless encourage over-reactions to threats and
attacks, especially uncertain ones that pose an ambiguous or
uncertain risk. Encouraging training for emotion regulation would be
time and money well spent to reduce the risk of over-reaction to
uncertain or threatening stimuli. Enormous amounts of evidence
now exist documenting the benefits of mindfulness based stress
reduction strategies in achieving such goals.49
Moreover, this is a domain in which gaming and other tabletop simulations positing different kinds of threats and crises could
prove helpful in giving people an engaging, even fun, way to gain
practice, experience and knowledge about potential response options
to any given scenario. Such strategies also work to build a sense of
community and camaraderie among those who would have to work
together in a real crisis. In this way, issues of dominance,
specialization of labor and other issues which can interfere with
effective, time-sensitive responses, can be negotiated prior to the
actual crisis, so that when real challenges emerge, team coordination
and cooperation can be as smooth as might reasonably be expected.

See P.R. Goldin & J.J. Gross, Effects of mindfulness-based stress reduction
(MBSR) on emotion regulation in social anxiety disorder, 10 EMOTION 83, 83-91 (2010).
49
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SECTION 4

Research will be required to translate many of the proposals
made in the section above into the cyber security policy field. This
section outlines a research agenda that is intended to provide some
guidance on the kinds of research questions that might profitably be
pursued and the research methods that might help yield useful
answers.
A. Developing Governance Models that Manage to Diffuse Power
and Non-State Actors
An examination of governance models that have either been
designed to coordinate diffuse entities, or that have proven to be
successful in coordinating diffuse entities, would be a useful step
forward in determining a global governance model for cyber security
policy. This paper has already mentioned the IETF as a model that
has proven successful in the past for managing technical matters
related to the Internet globally.
Perhaps there are lessons to be drawn from global
governance models in other areas of public health policy, such as the
World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control, or
in conflict mitigation and resource sharing, such as the Arctic
Council, or in the establishment of international law, such as the
United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea?
A comparative examination of these varied arrangements
would look at the types of parties involved, the mechanisms by which
decisions are made and consensus is achieved, the cost of setting up
and maintaining the mechanism (and by whom this cost is borne), the
success of the mechanism in achieving its stated objectives, and the
reasons for failure should failure be experienced.
One of the challenges with devising a new set of governance
strategies with the flexibility and adaptivity that would allow both
state and non-state actors, including businesses, to engage is that the
Internet itself, as a network of networks, and the World Wide Web,
run contrary to most established forms of government structure,
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which are hierarchical in nature. While originally hailed as a
mechanism to survive and enhance resilience in the case of nuclear
war, and later as a means by to encourage and facilitate greater
democratic involvement, the Internet also provides a platform where
individuals with very few resources can exert almost unprecedented
damage and destruction. This structure challenges those who wish to
provide an interface between hierarchical and horizontal governance
structures to offer a different kind of structure.
One kind of structure that might potentially be considered
involves the notion of panarchy as developed by Buzz Holling and
colleagues50 in their work on environmental sustainability. This work
developed out of examining how systems in nature achieve balance
across large systems over time. In this concept, three factors of
capacity, connectedness and resilience emerge most prominent.
The Internet itself offers almost limitless potential for
connectedness and great potential for resilience, but this framework
raises stark concern about the relative capacity of predator and prey.
However, this is where another biological model might prove useful
and instructive. Well-established equations such as the LotkaVolterra51 which characterizes the predator-prey dynamic would allow
similar mathematical modeling of the dynamic interaction between
hackers, governments and the businesses who try to survive and
thrive in cyber space. Although originally developed in a biological
context to represent the impact of disease and competition among
animals as a function of numbers, time and rates of interaction to
measure prospects for survival or extinction, it has long been used in

C.S. Holling, Understanding the complexity of economic, ecological, and social
systems, 4 Ecosystems 390, 390-405 (2001); Brian Walker et al., Resilience, adaptability
and transformability in social-ecological systems, 9 Ecology and Soc’y (2004).
51 A.J. Lotka, Contribution to the Theory of Periodic Reaction, 14 J. OF
PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY 271, 271-74 (1910); A.J. Lotka, Analytical Note on Certain
Rhythmic Relations in Organic Systems, 6 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI.
OF THE U.S. 410, 410-15 (1920); A.J. LOTKA, ELEMENTS OF PHYSICAL BIOLOGY,
71-274 (Williams and Wilkins, 1925); VITO VOLTERRA, VARIATIONS AND
FLUCTUATIONS OF THE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS IN ANIMAL SPECIES LIVING
TOGETHER (R.N. Chapman ed., 1931).
50
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economics to model interaction of sectors in industries as well,52 and
could readily be adapted for use in the context of cyber competition.
It has more recently been used successfully to characterize the
maintenance of cultures of honor in environments with aggressive
actors and weak institutions, a condition not unlike the current state
of Internet governance.
This model offers important insight because although it
makes a number of important simplifying assumptions, it also
highlights how the evolution of predator and prey influence each
other. In an evolutionary context, predators select for characteristics
that will enhance their ability to find and capture prey, just as prey
select for traits that increase their ability to hide, escape or otherwise
evade predation. These selection features influence the oscillation
dynamics of each side in the equation, precipitating cycles of
dominance, but because the goals of predator and prey are
antagonistic, the selection of mutually antipathetic characteristics
profoundly affects the dynamics of their interaction as well as
prospects for survival. These biological models, which exist in welldeveloped differential equations, and have already been used to
positive effect in economics, offer concrete ways to examine the
interaction between hackers and defenders, regardless of which sides
governments or businesses may be on.
B. A National Cyber Security Plan
The first step in developing a national cyber security plan
requires examining what has been done in other countries in the past,
as well as seeking to develop innovative solutions for our own
particular needs and goals. To date, there is limited comparative
literature on the national cyber security plans deployed in countries
such as Singapore’s 5 year National Cyber Security Masterplan, the
United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Strategy, and Canada’s
Cyber Security Strategy, among many others.

R.M. Goodwin, A Growth Cycle, in SOCIALISM, CAPITALISM
ECONOMIC GROWTH (C.H. Feinstein ed., 1967).
52
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Comparing the success of other country’s plans - which have
clear goals, action plans, metrics for success, timelines and
responsible agencies - would allow for a comprehensive plan to be
written in the United States that learns from the successes and
failures of others (rather than repeating any recognized mistakes).
C. Specialized Track for Technical Talent
The first step in considering new policy proposals should be a
pre-feasibility study based on cost-benefit analysis. A cost-benefit
analysis would look at the financial cost, both to the host
organization that would pay for the awardee’s stipend, and to the
organization from which the awardee is seconded. It then becomes
possible to compare this dollar amount to the benefits that would
accrue to the host organization and to the alternative policy option of
training or hiring talent from scratch. If the costs outweigh the
benefits by a certain ratio, then this policy option may not be worth
pursuing.
The point of comparing this specialized track to training or
hiring from scratch is important. The major strength of creating a
specialized track for bringing technical talent into government for the
short-term, vis-à-vis the current approach, which is epitomized by
proposals to hire 6,000 ‘cyber warriors’ into DoD or 1,000 new
personnel into OPM, is that it is will not run into the practical
resource constraints that are going to face these other proposals
(namely: that there simply aren’t enough qualified people in work
force to hire at this level for the medium-term). Indeed, a costbenefit analysis will likely find that the cost effectiveness of a
specialized track is many times less than the alternative, which would
have the added benefit of freeing up funds to be used for other
initiatives with the goal of bolstering cyber security.
D. Improving the Evidence Base
Compiling transparent, reliable, and statistically rigorous
cyber security statistics would contribute to better decisions in cyber
security policy. The problem to date has been that this responsibility
67
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has been taken on either by organizations with a stake in stoking
greater fears about cyber security (e.g. anti-virus companies and
private security vendors) or with organizations that lack the requisite
statistical capacity to provide reliable data (e.g. the FBI’s Internet
Crime Complaint Center).
This is typical practice in the U.S., where statistics are
compiled by organizations responsible for the regulation of the sector
or administration of the sector (e.g. the Federal Aviation Authority
compiles aviation data, similarly the National Center for Health
Statistics operates under the Centers for Disease Control). Assigning
a disinterested party with sufficient statistical capacity and credibility
to provide an independent assessment of the scale of the problem
could prove very helpful for beginning to design programs to help
address these issues. Could the National Institute for Standards and
Technology play a role, either as a convener or as an authority to
grant some authority to cyber security data?
When randomized control trials were applied from medicine
to the development economics field in the late 1990s, there was a
need to develop a specialized methodology to respond to the unique
logistical and ethical issues that arise in international development
work. Adjustments to randomized control trial methodologies will
likewise have to be made to adapt them to the unique characteristics
of cyber security.
For instance, it isn’t clear how comparable control and
treatment groups might be identified or separated when so many
network elements differ across organizations (indeed, even within
organization the elements are likely to differ). The rate at which the
technology changes and software is patched might also make it
difficult to keep the two groups separate and, within the groups,
maintain consistency across subjects (then again, many organizations
run on legacy systems that are 10 years old, so this might not be such
a great obstacle depending on the organization). This might imply
that the studies might only be able to be conducted at the
organization-level, though we simply don’t know yet.
An assessment of the costs of running an experiment would
be useful. The costs of randomized control trials in cyber security
68
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may not be cost-effective. The up-front costs to actually run the
experiments may not be overwhelming, especially considering the
multi-billion dollar budgets being allocated at a national level, but the
cost associated with the losses to the control group may accrue over
time and offset the potential gains from the experiment (then again,
given that attackers only need to infiltrate one out of potentially
thousands of users to compromise a system, perhaps the risk levels
remain the same whether undertaking an experiment or not, although
the cost may not).
A taxonomy of cyber security ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ would
also have to be developed in order to undertake an experiment.
Accurate measures for the effects of treatment would also need to be
developed and established. The goal would be to determine which
metrics exist and can be reliably measured, or which ones might have
to be created, in order to measure effectively the various policy
interventions that could be made to reduce certain cyber security
risks.
E. Developing Gaming and Other Table-Top Simulations
There is a long and established body of work on gaming and
table-top simulations for crisis situations, even in cyber security.
Indeed, a recommendation during a panel on mitigating cyber
security threats at a recent conference at Columbia University was
that, “simulations, war/business games, and table-top exercises can
provide additional venues for information sharing and help build
trust between participants, which can be helpful in crisis
situations.”53
Indeed, this is where using the intrinsic strengths of the
industry itself may be able to potentiate innovative methods for
training and testing; the use of simulations can prove enormously
helpful by providing a way to control for many elements while
Proceedings of the Conference on Internet Governance and Cyber Security,
COLUMBIA SCH. OF INT’L AND PUB. AFF. (May 14, 2015),
https://sipa.columbia.edu/system/files/Proceedings_ColumbiaSIPA_InternetGov
erance_Cybersecurity_Conference2015.pdf.
53
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varying one, and being able to do so across many diverse elements
quickly, either simultaneously or sequentially. Once problematic areas
are identified using this strategy, more elaborate real time
experiments can be conducted manipulating potentially problematic
aspects. Any such simulations could be easily conducted using
existing Internet based platforms which allow for multi-user
simultaneous interaction.
Where new research might be especially useful is in the
development of methods that combine psychological training and
emotion regulation training with simulations. The idea would be to
run through the several stages that comprise risk-based approaches to
cyber security, such as the NIST Risk Management Framework, so as
to identify where the failure to successfully implement the framework
occurs due to panic or individual biases and heuristics, and then
address these sources of failure.
V.

CONCLUSION

We have described the factors that we believe influence
decision making in the area of cyber security across four main levels
of analysis: international; national; organizational; and individual.
Each poses unique challenges to the development of a coherent and
consistent policy of cyber security.
After describing what has been done to enhance cyber
security at each level, and noting the challenges that remain, we have
suggested some important ways in which policy and research might
advance policy in more productive ways. These include: establishing a
coherent national plan with clear and coherent benchmarks and
policies and plans for implementation and accountability; the
conscious development of different governance structures for
regulating the Internet internationally; creating a national service
action plan for recruiting and circulating cyber talent in and out of
government; providing a more accurate evidence base of past
experience to improve future response; and establishing regular
games and simulations to train people in how to respond to differing
potential threats.
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Enhancing cyber security is a critically important project. It
also appears an overwhelming one on which we have made less
progress than those who seek to exploit the systems in question. In
developing systems designed more for overall resiliency than security,
the architects of the Internet never imagined the widespread use it
would achieve. However, this resilience has also resulted in
vulnerabilities that now need to be addressed. It will require a great
deal of coordinated action on the part of many individuals, users,
industry and government actors to improve cyber security without
compromising privacy unduly. Working diligently and creatively to
achieve such a goal will help make everyone safer and more
productive.
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INTRODUCTION

Everyday hackers attack financial institutions for a variety of
motives. Some hackers target financial institutions for money, others,
for “the lulz.” Still, others hack financial institutions for political
motivations because by doing so, they may cause damage to the
global economy.
In any of these scenarios the potential for damage is
significant. For example, in 2013 a Kiev ATM began randomly
dispensing money throughout the day.1 When a Russian
cybersecurity firm began to investigate, they discovered that the ATM
was only the tip of the iceberg: malware had severely penetrated the
bank’s computers, even sending back video feeds of employees
conducting routine tasks throughout the day. 2 The criminal group –
comprised of Chinese, Russians, and Europeans – were then able to
impersonate bank officers, turn on various cash machines, and
transfer millions of dollars from banks throughout the world into
dummy accounts.3
The largest financial institution hack in U.S. history highlights
the damages a hack can cause. The United States Attorney’s Office
for the Southern District of New York charged Gery Shalon, Joshua
Samuel Aron, and Ziv Orenstein in a 23-count indictment in
November of 2015.4 In addition to charging the men with securities
fraud and money laundering, the indictment alleged that the men had
stolen the personal information of more than 100 million
customers.5 As these examples demonstrate, cybersecurity in the
financial sector is of paramount importance.
Due to these attacks, along with other significant cyber
intrusions affecting some of the world’s biggest banks, the New
1 David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, Bank Hackers Steal Millions via Malware,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2015), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/
world/bank-hackers-steal-millions-via-malware.html.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 U.S. v. Shalon, Aaron, and Orenstein, No. 15-cr-333 (S.D. N.Y. 2015).
5 Id.
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York’s Department of Financial Services [hereinafter “NYDFS”]
proposed regulations6 requiring banks and insurance companies to
establish cybersecurity programs and designate an internal
cybersecurity officer in September of 2016.7 These regulations were
the result of years of research that probed weaknesses in financial
institutions and then asked for feedback from those institutions
regarding their efforts to strengthen their cybersecurity regimes. The
results established the groundwork for the basic regulations, subject
to a public comment period that closed in November of 2016. The
rules became effective on March 1st, 2017.
Described as a “first-in-the-nation” effort,8 the regulations
will only affect banks and other financial services providers in New
York; nevertheless, only is a relative term. Given New York’s outsized
influence on the financial services industry the rules will set a
precedent for cybersecurity within financial institutions, and, both
state and federal regulators may use the rules as a framework for their
own cybersecurity rules and regulations. Thus, it is important that the
NYDFS set a rigorous, clear standard that reflects reality and assesses
liability where appropriate.
Unfortunately, the NYDFS has unintentionally created a
conflict amongst their rules. The cybersecurity regulations require
either the chairperson of the board or a senior officer certify the
firm’s cybersecurity program meets the proposal’s requirements in an
annual certification.9 Those submitting the certification can be held
Hereinafter, unless specified otherwise, the terms “regulations” or “the
regulations” should be assumed to be referring to the DFS’s proposed regulations
discussed here.
7 Sanger & Pelroth, supra note 2.
8 Governor Cuomo, Press Release, Governor Cuomo Announces Proposal of Firstin-the-Nation Cybersecurity Regulation to Protect Consumers and Financial Institutions,
OFFICIAL NEWS FROM THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR (September 13, 2016),
available at https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announcesproposal-first-nation-cybersecurity-regulation-protect-consumers-and
[hereinafter
“Governor Cuomo Press Release”].
9 23 NYCRR 500: Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial Services
Companies, N.Y. DEP’T FIN. SERVS., Section 500.00 (Feb. 2017), available at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/adoptions/rf23-nycrr500_cybersecurity.pdf.
6
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individually liable if the organization’s cybersecurity program is
deficient.10 This liability includes civil and criminal penalties.11 Such a
program is often standard in today’s corporate culture.
This rule conflicts with NYDFS’s rule regarding anti-money
laundering [hereinafter “AML”] and Office of Foreign Assets Control
[hereinafter “OFAC”] transaction monitoring and filtering programs.
Under the AML and OFAC rules, there are no explicit criminal
penalties for individual directors, nor is there an annual certification
procedure.12 As it follows, a situation could arise where a director
would not be liable under the AML rule, but would be liable under
the cybersecurity rule.
While such a discrepancy in the rules may not seem
important, in the context of financial institutions, data breaches and
money laundering often go hand-in-hand, as demonstrated by the
above example. Indeed, given the broad scope of money laundering
laws, money laundering is almost guaranteed to occur in a data
breach of a financial institution, even if the theft only amounts to a
penny. But that is not the only reason why cybersecurity and AML
rules regarding certification should harmonize. Recent developments
in U.S. corporate liability law at the federal level may very well
influence individual corporate liability at the state level. Thus, the
NYDFS should, where appropriate, allow its regulators to pursue
criminal liability on both individuals, and the corporation. This will
create clarity in the law; reflect the reality of intertwined AML and
cybersecurity policies and close a loophole; and will track federal legal
developments.
Part II of this article will briefly explain the background of
modern individual corporate liability, cybersecurity, and money
laundering. In Part III, the proposed rules will be examined and
Id. at 500.20.
Id. at 500.20.
12 See generally NYDFS Issues Final Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Rule,
DEBEVOISE PLIMPTON (Jul. 6, 2016), http://www.debevoise.com/~/media
/files/insights/publications/2016/07/20160706_nydfs_issues_final_anti_money_l
aundering_and_sanctions_rule.pdf (discussing final changes to AML rule, including
removal of compliance rule and threat of criminal penalties).
10
11
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explained. As we will see, AML and cybersecurity are so intertwined
that it does not make sense to have different standards for what is
quickly becoming the same group. In Part IV, this author will
propose a modification in accordance with New York corporate
liability law that reflects the reality of AML and cybersecurity policy.
Part V, consists of the author’s closing remarks.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. Corporate criminal liability for individuals
New York is the birthplace of corporate criminal liability. In
New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United States,13 the
question before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether Congress had
acted constitutionally when, via the Elkins Act, legislators imputed
criminal liability to a common carrier where any agents and officers
of a common carrier granted an illegal rebate. 14 The Court held that
Congress could subject a corporation to criminal punishment solely
on the basis of an agent’s conduct because the Court saw “no valid
objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the
corporation which profits by the transaction, and can only act
through its agents and officers, shall be held punishable.”15
Corporate criminal liability law has existed in some capacity in
New York since at least 1948.16 In those days, the state of New York
imposed a $5,000 fine for a corporation convicted of a felony that
would lead to imprisonment.17 At the time, case law suggested that

New York Central R Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). For an
excellent discussion of this case and modern corporate criminal liability, see Andrew
Weissmann with David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 INDIANA
L. J. 411, 420-421 (2013) (discussing New York Central).
14 Id. at 421.
15 N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 495.
16 See Corporate Criminal Liability in New York, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 794 (1948)
(“under the present state of law, a corporation may be liable for almost any crime
perpetrated in connection with corporate activities.”).
17 Id. at 794.
13
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directors, officers, or employees acting within the scope of their
authority could render a corporation criminally liable.18
It was around this time that a theory began to form of
holding individuals in corporations accountable for crimes. During
the Nuremberg trials after World War II, Justice Robert Jackson,
Chief Counsel for the United States at Nuremberg, stated during the
trial of industrialist Gustav Krupp that, “the great industrialists of
Germany were guilty of the crimes charged in this indictment quite as
much as its politicians, diplomats, and soldiers.”19 Other cases
followed involving industrialists committing war crimes through their
corporations.20 Still, with the exception of acts constituting war
crimes,21 or blatant statutory violations such as securities fraud, for
decades prosecuting individuals for crimes committed in connection
with their work at a corporation was uncommon.
H. David Kotz, former Inspector General at the Securities
and Exchange Commission and current Managing Director of the
Berkeley Research Group, has two theories on why this has occurred.
First, historically, companies were much more likely to engage in a
settlement process with the government, whereas individuals who
faced prison time were much more likely to fight any charges. A
recalcitrant individual is not preferable to a prosecutor, who
unfortunately tends to be overworked and is trying to resolve a case

Id. at 795 (citing, e.g., People v. Lawyers Title Corp., 282 N.Y. 513, 27
N.E. 2d 30 (1940) (illegal practice of law); People v. Woodbury Dermatological
Institute, 192 N.Y. 454, 85 N.E. 697 (1908) (illegal practice of medicine); People v.
Globe Jewelers Inc. 249 App. Div. 122, 291 N.Y. Supp. 362 (1 st Dep’t 1936)
(treasurer of the corporation sent out a fake form, simulating a court order))
(footnote omitted).
19 Chatham House, What Are the Relevant Legal Principles Relating to the
Responsibility of Companies and CEOs for Violations of International Criminal Law? (2012).
20 Id.
21 See Rule 156, Definition of War Crimes, Int’l. Comm. Of Red Cross
(defined as “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international
armed conflict” and “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in an
armed conflict not of an international character,”), https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule156 (last visited Mar. 30,
2017).
18
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as quickly as possible.22 Secondly, and on a related note, corporations
do not face the negligence or intent requirement that individuals face
in criminal prosecutions, nor is there a priority for cases that are
novel, challenging, and difficult to prove, which shifted enforcement
away from individuals and instead towards more obvious corporate
conduct with a lower evidentiary threshold. 23
Yet, because of a flurry of disastrous financial events ranging
from Enron’s collapse to the financial meltdown of 2008, the
enforcement approach utilized by agencies has changed dramatically
in the past decade. For years critics argued that the Department of
Justice [hereinafter “DOJ”] and the Securities and Exchange
Commission [hereinafter “SEC”] were not doing much to bring civil
and criminal cases against parties involved in the 2008 financial
crisis.24 For example, in 2013 Jed Rakoff, U.S. District Court Judge of
the Southern District of New York – no stranger to fraud trials
prosecuted by the SEC –, complained that the government was not
holding individuals responsible for massive frauds, “speak[ing] greatly
to weaknesses in our prosecutorial system.”25
This sentiment set the stage for a memorandum from Deputy
Attorney General Sally Yates in September 2015 that outlines a new
DOJ policy regarding individual liability in corporate contexts, which
came to be known as the “Yates Memo.”26 Since the memo, the DOJ
has increasingly imposed criminal and civil liability for individuals
conducting corporate misconduct.27 This policy also requires
Berkeley Research Paper, https://risk.thomsonreuters.com/content/
dam/openweb/documents/pdf/risk/white-paper/yates-memo-background-andits-impact-white-paper.pdf (registration required).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. (quoting Nate Raymond, Judge Criticizes Lack of Prosecution against Wall
Street Executives for Fraud, REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/
article/financial-judge-idUSL2N0IX1B620131113.
26 Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing, Sally Q. Yates,
Department of Justice, Sept. 9, 2015, https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/
download.
27 Roberto J. Gonzalez & Jessica S. Carey, The Government’s Making AML
Enforcement Personal, NAT’L L. J. (Feb. 22, 2016), available at https://www.
paulweiss.com/media/3359752/gonzalez_carey__nlj_022216.pdf.
22
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companies to provide “all” relevant facts about “all” individuals
involved in wrong doing, regardless of “position, status, or seniority,”
in order for the company to get any kind of cooperation credit.28
The election of President Donald J. Trump makes it unclear
whether the Yates memo will continue to be enforced. A March 8,
2017 memorandum from United States Attorney General Jeff
Sessions says that violent crime will be a priority for the United States
Department of Justice.29 At least one commentator believes that in a
time of shrinking budgets, a focus on violent crime means a shift
away from white-collar crime. 30 However, as James Connelly of
Womble Carlyle in Atlanta has pointed out, federal policies change
slowly.31 Yates herself believes that the priorities laid out in her
memorandum represent core values of criminal justice and are thus
not ideological.32 For the purposes of this Article, we will assume that
the Yates Memo is indicative of a long-term trend in federal
prosecution.
Similarly, the federal government has become aggressive in
pursuing individual wrongdoing in the anti-money laundering
(“AML”) sector. In Treasury v. Haider, Civil No. 14-CV-9987
(S.D.N.Y.), the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District of New York (acting on behalf of FinCEN at the United
States Department of Treasury) issued a 146-page complaint against
MoneyGram International’s former Chief Compliance Officer,
Timothy Haider, for the willful failure to implement an effective
Yates
Memo,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/
download.
29 Memorandum,
available
at
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/
documents/world/read-the-memo-sent-by-sessions-on-violent-offenders/2367/.
30 Bethany McLean, Why White-Collar Crooks May Be Cheering This Sessions
Memo, YAHOO (Mar. 21, 2017), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/why-white-collarcrooks-may-be-cheering-this-jeff-sessions-memo-133115487.html.
31 James Connelly, Trump Administration Likely to Maintain Yates Memo
Priorities on Corporate Wrongdoing, WOMBLE CARLYLE (Feb. 14, 2017),
http://www.wcsr.com/Insights/Articles/2017/February/Trump-AdministrationLikely-to-Maintain-Yates-Memo-Priorities-on-CorporateWrongdoing?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=
View-Original.
32 Id.
28
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AML compliance program or properly file suspicious activity reports,
as required under the Bank Secrecy Act.33 The acts in that case
occurred in New York, among other places. Haider allegedly failed to
implement disciplinary or termination policies, contravening legal
advice provided to Haider.34 Despite the fact that Haider had
knowledge of the fraudulent activity occurring at MoneyGram by its
agents and outlets, he continued to allow those agents and outlets to
conduct the fraud through MoneyGram’s currency transfer system.35
The complaint also alleges that Haider knew or should have known
specific agents posed an unreasonable fraud risk, which
MoneyGram’s Director of AML Compliance called “egregious and
beyond anyone’s ability to doubt that the agent and knowledge and
involvement.”36 Nevertheless, Haider did not cut ties with any agents
or outlets.37 Finally, while Haider was in charge SAR analysts were
unable to access sufficient information to file SARS because Haider
kept each department in a separate “silo.”38 Because of this, they
failed to have a coherent diligence process, and ignored warning signs
regarding authorizing new agents or outlets.39 Even though the case is
still ongoing, the thoroughness of the complaint, the magnitude of
the violations, and the District of Minnesota’s denial of Mr. Haider’s
claim that only financial institutions themselves are liable for the
failure to maintain an effective AML program, could all be harbingers
of the future.40
In terms of individual liability, in New York, “[a] person is
criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he
performs or causes to be performed in the name of or in behalf of a
corporation to the same extent as if such conduct were performed in
his own name or behalf.”41 Although this statute appears to lack a
33 FinCEN Seeks Civil Money Penalty and Injunction Against Former Chief
Compilance Officer of MoneyGram, FINCEN (Jan. 2, 2015), http://www.sidley.com
/en/news/2015-02_banking_and_financial_services_update (citations omitted).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See generally Gonzalez & Carey, supra note 27.
41 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.25 (2016).
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mens rea requirement, New York adopts the Model Penal Code’s
definitions for “purposely,” “knowingly,” “willfully,” “recklessly,”
and “negligently.”42 When a mens rea requirement is not stated in a
criminal statute, the intent is nevertheless established if the defendant
acted purposely, knowingly, or recklessly.43 Thus, corporate criminal
liability arises when an individual commits an offense purposely,
knowingly, or recklessly. It is unclear whether the New York
Attorney General (“NYAG”) is prioritizing individual corporate
liability, as their counterparts in Washington, D.C. are, but given the
language of New York’s final rules, described infra, as well as New
York’s reputation as the financial center of the United States, the
NYAG is likely to follow suit.
The individual liability is strongest in the cybersecurity rules,
so our discussion will begin there.
B. Cyber-Attacks
Cyber-attacks – “an attack initiated from a computer against a
website, computer system or individual computer . . . that
compromises the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the
computer or information stored on it”44 - are not new.45 Cyberattacks take many forms, including: gaining or attempting to gain
unauthorized access to a computer system; denial of service attacks;
installation of viruses; and unauthorized use of a computer for
processing or storing data.46 The first cyber-attack occurred in 1988
when Robert Tapan Morris – a professor who now works at MIT
that was convicted for the cyber-attack – introduced the Morris
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05 (2016).
See generally the Model Penal Code.
44 VINCE FARHAT, BRIDGET MCCARTHY, & RICHARD R AYSMAN,
HOLLAND & KNIGHT, CYBER ATTACKS: PREVENTION AND PROACTIVE
RESPONSES (2011), available at https://www.hklaw.com/files/Publication
/bd9553c5-284f-4175-87d2-849aa07920d3/Presentation/PublicationAttachment
/1880b6d6-eae2-4b57-8a97-9f4fb1f58b36/Cyber-attacksPreventionandProactiveRe
sponses.pdf.
45 NATO, The history of cyber attacks – a timeline, available at http://www.nato
.int/docu/review/2013/cyber/timeline/EN/index.htm.
46 Farhat, McCarthy, and Raysman, supra note 44.
42
43
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worm to determine the size of the Internet.47 The worm replicated
itself to multiple computers through weaknesses in the UNIX system,
and slowed down those computers to the point that they were
unusable.48
At first, the most serious cyber-attacks seemed to focus on
government and military servers. For example, in the 2000s, countries
as diverse as China, Estonia, and the United States reported hacks on
various government servers, as well as hacks on private email servers
belonging to high-ranking officials.49 Nevertheless, by 2010 cyberattacks on private websites had become a frequent occurrence. To
illustrate, throughout December of 2009 and January of 2010 a group
calling itself the “Iranian Cyber Army” disrupted both Twitter and
the Chinese search engine Baidu to redirect users to a site containing
a political slogan. 50 In 2013, some South Korean financial institutions
reported a cyber infection resembling past cyber efforts by North
Korea.51
Indeed, as connectivity throughout the world has increased
over the last seventeen years, so too has cyber-attacks.52 In 2007, the
U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, an arm of the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), reported 12,000 cyberincidents. Because DHS defines a cyber-incident as a “violation of an
explicit or implied security policy,” and provides examples such as
denials of service, the unauthorized use of a system for processing or
storing data, and attempts to gain unauthorized access to systems or
their data,53 we may infer that cyber-incidents and cyber-attacks are
functionally similar, if not identical. By 2009, the number of cyberincidents had doubled from 2007; in 2012, the number had
NATO, supra note 45.
Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Brian Fung, How Many Cyberattacks Hit the United States Last Year?,
NEXTGOV (Mar. 8, 2013) http://www.nextgov.com/security/2013/03/how-manycyberattacks-hit-united-states-last-year/61775/.
53 Press Release, Department of Homeland and Security, Report Cyber
Incidents, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, available at https://www.dhs.gov/howdo-i/report-cyber-incidents (last accessed Nov. 30, 2016).
47
48
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quadrupled. It is unclear whether this result occurred due to an
increase in attacks, or due to an increase in detection. Regardless, the
number of attacks underlines the frequency of cyber-attacks.
Cyber-attacks can have many effects depending on what
specific entity is attacked, and the level of the breach. For example,
energy company BP reports 50,000 attempted cyber-attacks per day.54
These intrusions can range from something as harmless (albeit
annoying) as taking down the website to keep web browsers from
learning more about the company, to a highly-damaging intrusion
that steals long-term strategy, confidential project-related employee
emails, or proprietary information regarding a company’s
manufacturing process. The National Nuclear Security
Administration, an agency tasked with the military application of
nuclear science, records 10 million hacks a day.55 Given that the
National Nuclear Security Administration handles nuclear security for
the United States and assists the military in determining the
effectiveness of nuclear weapons,56 a successful cyber-attack on this
organization could be disastrous to international security.
Financial institutions can suffer greatly from a cyber-attack.
For example, in June of 2016 the international consulting firm
Deloitte published a report outlining 14 business impacts of a cyberincident.57

Michael Tomaso, BP Fights Off Up to 50,000 Cyber-Attacks a Day: CEO,
CNBC.Com (Mar. 6, 2013), available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/100529483.
55 Jason Koebler, U.S. Nukes Face Up to 10 Million Cyber Attacks Daily, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/
articles/2012/03/20/us-nukes-face-up-to-10-million-cyber-attacks-daily.
56 Our
Mission, NAT’L NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMIN, https://nnsa
.energy.gov/ourmission.
57 See Deloitte, Press Release (June 15, 2016)(listing customer breach
notifications; post-breach customer protection; regulatory compliance; public
relations/crisis communications; attorney fees and litigation; cybersecurity
improvements; technical investigations; insurance premium increases; increased
cost for debt raising; operational disruption or destruction; lost value of customer
relationships; lost contract revenue; devaluation of trade name; and loss of
intellectual property).
54
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C. Money Laundering
“Simply put, money laundering is the process of making dirty
money look clean.”58 That is money laundering in a nutshell, but the
simplicity of the statement hides the complexity of the crime. For
example, money laundering is not just about cash; the Financial
Action Task Force (“FATF”) has demonstrated “that money
laundering can be achieved through virtually every medium, financial
institution or business.”59 Though once considered integral only with
drug trafficking, money laundering is a necessary step in virtually any
criminal activity yielding profits.60
Criminals launder money for three reasons. First, it represents
the lifeblood of the organization allowing members to cover
expenses, maintain inventories, bribe officials, expand illegal
enterprises, and finance their lifestyles.61 Second, it would be foolish
to take money directly from these enterprises for those purposes, as
law enforcement can easily trace the funds’ origin. 62 Third, these
criminal proceeds can be the target of investigation and seizure.63
Consequently, criminals have a high incentive to conceal the
existence of these funds or make illegal proceeds appear legitimate to
confound law enforcement and continue the criminal enterprise.64
Generally, money laundering can be divided into three stages:
(1) placement, (2) layering, and (3) integration. Placement, as the first
step, is “the physical disposal of cash or other assets derived from
criminal activity.”65 The funds can be placed into the financial system,
or they can be placed into casinos, shops, and other businesses. 66
58 Study Guide for the ACAMS Certification Examination 13, ASSOC. OF
CERTIFIED ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SPECIALISTS, (5th ed. 2015).
59 Id. at 14.
60 William R. Schroeder, Money Laundering: A Global Threat and the
International Community’s Response, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 1 (FBI, D.C.),
(May 2001).
61 Id. at 1.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Schroeder, supra note 60, at 15.
66 Id. at 15.
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Layering, the second step, consists of separating illegal proceeds
from their source through layers of financial transactions intended to
conceal the origin of the proceeds.67 Layering “involves converting
the proceeds of the crime into another form and creating complex
layers of financial transactions to disguise the audit trail, source and
ownership of funds.”68 The final step of the process is integration. In
integration, money is reintroduced into the economy through various
methods making it almost impossible for the funds to be traced back
to their illicit origin. 69
Money laundering affects the economy and society in various
ways, and while these effects are present in the United States, they
tend to be more pronounced in emerging markets.70 Consequently,
emerging markets serve as effective examples when studying the
consequences of money laundering. The World Bank has identified
five areas where money laundering affects developing countries:
1.

Increased crime and corruption;

2.

Damaged reputations and international consequences;

3.

Weakened financial institutions;

4.

Compromised economy and financial sector; and

5.

Damaged privatization efforts.71

Let’s focus on 1, 3, and 4. It should come as no surprise that
when a country is viewed as a money-laundering haven, criminals are
likely to go there.72 This in turn generates more crime and
Id. at 16.
Id. at 16.
69 Id. at 18.
70 John McDowell & Gary Novis, BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW
ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, The Consequences of Money Laundering and Financial Crime,
U.S. Dep’t of State 7 (May 2001).
71 Paul Allen Schott, Reference Guide to Money Laundering and Combating the
Financing of Terrorism, THE WORLD BANK & INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
Section II at II-1 (2006)[hereinafter “The World Bank”].
72 Id. at II-2.
67
68
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corruption. 73 Finally, it also encourages bribery in functionaries that
are critical to the economy, including lawyers.74
Financial institutions face unique threats from money
laundering because financial transactions can occur instantaneously.
Typically, the risks faced by financial institutions due to money
laundering can be categorized as reputational, operational, or legal
and concentration risks.75 Reputational risk is defined as the risk that
public perception of a bank’s business practices and associations,
regardless of their accuracy, will cause a decline in the public’s
confidence in the institution and its integrity. 76 Operational risk is the
loss potential from inadequate or failed internal procedures, whether
systems-based or human-based.77 Legal risk is the risk of lawsuits,
adverse judgments, unenforceable contracts, fines and penalties
generating losses, increased expenses, or even institution closure. 78
Finally, Concentration risk is the loss potential of a company due to
credit or loan exposure to borrowers.79 For example, when a bank
lacks knowledge about a customer, the customer’s business, or the
customer’s status with other creditors, the Bank has concentration
risk.80

Id. at II-3.
Id. at II-3. Whether lawyers should report a client’s suspicious
transactions has long been the subject of controversy. See AM. BAR ASSOC.,
STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL OP. 463,
CLIENT DUE DILIGENCE, MONEY LAUNDERING, & TERRORIST FINANCING (May
23, 2013) (providing risk-based control measures to assist lawyers in avoiding aiding
illegal activities “consistent with the Model Rules.”); Joel Schectman, U.S. Lawyers
Are A Money Laundering Blindspot, Some Argue, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2015, 5:30 A.M.
ET) (discussing the controversy over whether lawyers in the United States should
report suspicious transactions as attorneys must do in the European Union); See
generally Adam K. Weinstein, Prosecuting Attorneys for Money Laundering, 51 DUKE L. J.
371, 372, 378-386 (1988) (arguing that “subjecting attorneys to criminal and civil
prosecution violates their clients’ right to counsel, right to counsel of choice, and
right to effective assistance of counsel.”).
75 The World Bank, supra note 71, at II-4.
76 Id. at II-5 (citation omitted).
77 Id. at II-5 (citation omitted).
78 Id. at II-5 (citation omitted).
79 Id. at II-5.
80 Id. at II-5.
73
74
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Many recent cases highlight the dangers financial institutions
face in money laundering. HSBC’s recent $1.9 billion settlement with
the United States government is a salient example of how money
laundering affects financial institutions. 81 HSBC “failed to apply
legally required money laundering controls to $200 trillion in wire
transfers alone, in only a three year period.”82 In fact, the Bank’s
inadequacies were so great that the DOJ discouraged HSBC from
publicizing the incident to avoid further criminal exploitation of
HSBC’s compliance gaps.83
Money launderers commonly use “front companies,” which
appear legitimate and engage in legitimate business, but are controlled
by criminals.84 Front companies are not concerned with making a
profit; they are concerned with preserving and protecting illegitimate
funds.85 Front companies have access to illicit funds that can be used
to subsidize the front company’s products and services. As a result,
this makes it difficult for legitimate enterprises to compete with those
front-companies that need-not rely on the company’s actual revenue
to continue operations.86 If a criminal organization gets big enough,
the organization can control entire sectors of the economy, which in
turn leads to economic instability due to a misallocation of resources
from “artificial distortions in asset and commodity prices.”87 Front

81 See Heather A. Lowe, Money Laundering & HSBC – How it affects you,
REUTERS (Jan. 10, 2013, 22:01 GMT) (discussed supra and infra). HSBC avoided an
indictment because state and federal authorities concluded that criminal charges
would jeopardize the bank and destabilize the financial system. Ben Protess &
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, HSBC to Pay $1.92 Billion to Settle Charges of Money
Laundering, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2012 4:10 P.M.)
82 Id.
83 James Ball & Harry Davies, HSBC money-laundering procedures “have flaws too
bad to be revealed,” GUARDIAN (Jun. 5, 2015, 10:10 EDT), http://www.theguardian
.com/business/2015/jun/05/hsbc-money-laundering-procedures-flaws-too-badto-be-revealed (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
84 The World Bank, supra note 71, at II-6.
85 Id. at II-6.
86 Id. at II-6.
87 Id. at II-6 (citing John McDowell & Gary Novis, Economic Perspectives,
U.S. State Dep’t, May 2001).
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companies can also serve as a tax-evasion vehicle, depriving a country
of revenue it would have otherwise received.88
In the United States, organized crime has used pizza parlors
to launder heroin trafficking proceeds.89 The “Pizza Connection
Trial” lasted from September 30th, 1985 and ended on March 2nd,
1987, making it the longest federal criminal trial in the Southern
District of New York at the time.90 19 defendants in a Mafia group
ranging from Brazil, Sicily, New York and the Midwest were charged
in participation of a drug ring trafficking heroin and cocaine,
laundering tens of millions of dollars through the use of pizza
restaurants as fronts.91 The case – led by then-federal prosecutor
Rudolph Giuliani and involving former-prosecutor Louis B. Freeh–
cost millions of dollars to complete. 92 These tens of millions of
dollars undoubtedly created the distortions mentioned above, and
ultimately 17 of the defendants were found guilty.93
In the United States, the methods of money laundering have
remained stable for the past ten years.94 They can be classified as one
of the following methods:

The World Bank, supra note 71, at II-6.
John McDowell & Gary Novis, The Consequences of Money Laundering and
Financial Crime, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES (Dep’t of State, D.C.) (May 2001), at 7,
http://www.ait.org.tw/infousa/zhtw/DOCS/ijee0501.pdf (last accessed Mar.
26th, 2016).
90 Ralph Blumenthal, Acquitted in “Pizza Connection Trial,” Man Remains in
Prison, N.Y. Times (Jul. 28, 1988), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/
28/nyregion/acquitted-in-pizza-connection-trial-man-remains-in-prison.html.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. To learn more about the Pizza Connection Trial, see generally Shana
Alexander, THE PIZZA CONNECTION: LAWYERS, MONEY, DRUGS, MAFIA (1988)
(discussing the trial); see also John Surico, How Mafia Pizzeria Drug Fronts Inspired One
of the Most Complex Criminal Trials Ever, VICE (Jan. 28, 2016),
http://www.vice.com/read/how-mafia-pizzeria-drug-fronts-inspired-one-of-themost-complex-criminal-trials-ever (“’It was a trial with no end in sight involving a
billion puzzle pieces,” said [organized crime expert] David Amoruso . . . “all of its
participants – defendants, lawyers, prosecutors, jurors, and the judge - had to do
their best not to be driven totally insane.”).
94 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING RISK
ASSESSMENT 3 (2015) (“This assessment finds that the underlying money
88
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1.

Use of cash and monetary instruments in amounts under
regulatory recordkeeping and reporting thresholds;

2.

Opening bank and brokerage accounts using nominees
to disguise the identity of the individuals who control the
accounts;

3.

Creating legal entities without accurate information about
the identity of the beneficial owner;

4.

Misuse of products and services resulting from deficient
compliance with anti-money laundering obligations; and

5.

Merchants and financial institutions wittingly facilitating
illicit activity.95

By reviewing the above methods, one may notice that all five
methods relate to financial institutions. These funds derive mainly
from fraud and drug trafficking.96 Fraud covers a wide range of
crimes, like healthcare fraud, federal government payments fraud, and
identity fraud.97 Drug trafficking alone generates an estimated $64
billion in cash per year.98 Furthermore, recent evidence suggests the
severance of customer relationships between U.S. banks and Mexican
money exchangers, commonly known as “casas de cambio, 99 “has led
to increases in the retention and use of drug-related cash, both in the
United States and internationally, which has “shifted money
laundering activity from Mexico to the United States.”100

laundering vulnerabilities remain largely the same as those identified in the 2005
United States Money Laundering Threat Assessment.”)
95 Id. at 3.
96 Id. at 2.
97 Id. at 2.
98 Id. at 2.
99 Hannah Stone, US Targets Bank in Mexican Money Laundering Crackdown,
INSIGHT CRIME, “Exchange houses which are often used by Mexican criminal
groups to launder funds.” available at http://www.insightcrime.org/newsanalysis/us-targets-bank-in-mexico-money-laundering-crackdown
100 Id. at 3.
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Now, one can also imagine how a criminal, state actor, or
non-state actor might try and bypass cyber-security protocols to
commit a crime, and then launder the proceeds of the crime. For
example, in 2015 a gang of hackers infiltrated more than 100 banks in
30 countries.101 At the time of the hack, employees were unknowingly
opening emails that allowed hackers to insert malware.102 This
malware manipulated the banks’ cyber-security protocols and
proceeded to and siphon as much as $1 billion directly from the
banks over a two-year period. 103 To cover their tracks the hackers
layered the proceeds into their own accounts.104
A further example can be found in a FINRA report from
February 2016 describing an incident where foreign customers
considered to be “high-risk” opened four accounts with an online
firm and engaged in patterns of fraudulent trading through the firm’s
Direct Market Access (DMA) platform.105 These customers hacked
other online broker-dealers’ accounts, engaging in a short sale
schemes that resulted in large profits for the customers’ of the firm
through their accounts, and losses in the compromised broker-dealer
accounts.106 FINRA punished the online firm for “failing to establish
and implement [AML] policies and procedures adequately tailored to
the firm’s online business in order to detect and cause the reporting
of suspicious activity; and . . . failing to establish and implement a
reasonably designed customer identification program to adequately
verify customer identity.”107
Curiously, NYDFS has recognized the intersection of AML
and cyber-security on prior occasions such as when the agency issued
101 Thomas Bock, The Convergence of Anti-Money Laundering and Bank Security,
K2 Intelligence (Nov. 2015), available at https://www.k2intelligence.com/
en/insights/thought-leadership/the-convergence-of-anti-money-laundering-andcyber-security.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 FINRA, REPORT ON CYBERSECURITY PRACTICES (Feb. 2015), available at
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/p602363%20Report%20on%20Cybersec
urity%20Practices_0.pdf.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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its BitLicense regulations.108 These regulations required financial
institutions to have designated compliance personnel and AML
procedures that are the same as those for institutions handling
traditional, fiat currency.109
The United States Department of Treasury’s Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) has also started making the
connection between cyber-security breaches and money laundering
schemes.110 FinCEN has recently begun to encourage financial
institutions to include information on cyber-security events or
breaches on Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”).111 Specifically, the
guidelines provide guidance for SAR reporting in connection with:
cyber-enabled crime and cyber events; the inclusion of relevant
cyber-related information in SARs; encouraging collaboration
between cybersecurity units and AML units within the same firm; and
sharing cyber-related information across financial institutions to
combat money laundering, terrorism financing, and cyber-attacks.112
The efficacy of linking a cybersecurity event to a SAR is evidenced by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s use of a SAR to trace $7 million
dollars from a Florida bank account to criminals in Russia and
Ukraine that had released a “Zeus” botnet virus to make the
fraudulent withdrawal.113
The convergence of opinion between government
recommendations and consultants in the private sector point to a
growing consensus that, while AML and cyber-security practices do
not and cannot have complete overlap in their functions, they do
have significant overlap in their goals and methods. It would seem
that two functions within the same organization with significantly
overlapping missions would have similar regulatory liability when

See generally Bock supra note 104.
Id.
110 Chris Kentours, Cybersecurity and AML: How the Twain Must Meet?,
FINOPS REPORT (Nov. 10, 2016), available at http://finops.co/slider/cybersecurityand-aml-how-the-twain-must-meet/.
111 Id.
112 Id; See also Clifford Chance PDF (internal citations omitted) (Note that
the advisory does not change any of the existing laws).
113 Kentours, supra note 112 at Id.
108
109
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managers in those groups fail to fulfill their duties. As we will see in
the next section, this is not the case.
III.

THE RULE, INDIVIDUAL CORPORATE LIABILITY, AND
SUGGESTIONS

In 2013, the NYDFS conducted a survey on cyber-security.114
60 community and regional banks, 12 credit unions, and 82 foreign
branches and agencies participated in the NYDFS’s questionnaire.
The questionnaire asked questions about “each participant’s
information security framework; corporate governance around cyber
security; use and frequency of penetration testing and results; budget
and costs associated with cyber security; the frequency, nature, cost
of, and response to cyber security breaches; and future plans on cyber
security.”115 NYDFS also met with “depository institutions and
cybersecurity experts . . . to discuss industry trends, concerns, and
opportunities for improvement.”116
NYDFS’s findings discussed management of information
technology systems; information security frameworks; use of security
technologies; penetration testing; budget and costs; corporate
governance; cybersecurity incidents and breaches; and planning for
the future.117 Most institutions experienced intrusions, and the larger
the institution, the more likely it was to experience malware and
phishing attempts.118
It was further noted that larger institutions were more likely
to experience financial losses after a cyber-attack.119 These institutions
were also reported to be more likely to have a cybersecurity plan

Report on Cyber Security in the Banking Sector, N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN.
SERVS. (May 2014), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/reportpub/dfs_cyber
_banking_report_052014.pdf.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
114
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instituted than their smaller counterparts.120 Recent examples help
illustrate this last point. In 2011, more than 300,000 Citibank
accounts were compromised in a targeted hack.121 In 2012, a cyberattack focused on employee login credentials at Bank of America and
Wells Fargo.122
An April 2015 update on the NYDFS report focused on
third-party security service providers, as well as steps taken to
implement the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Institute of
Standards and Technology.123 Most of the institutions involved had
taken or were taking steps to implement NIST principles, but the
application of those principles varied across institutions.124 Ultimately,
the report concluded that banks were taking steps to increase
cybersecurity, although progress varied depending on an institution’s
size and type.125
On September 13th, 2016, New York Governor Andrew
Cuomo announced “first-in-the-nation” regulations to protect New
York financial institutions from cyber-attacks.126 In his remarks,
Governor Cuomo said:
“New York, the financial capital of the world, is leading the
nation in taking decisive action to our consumers and our financial
system from serious economic harm that is often perpetrated by
state-sponsored organizations, terrorist networks, and other criminal
enterprises. This regulation helps guarantee the financial services
Id.
Banks Likely to Remain Top Cybercrime Targets, SYMANTEC (last accessed
Nov. 30, 2016), available at https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us
/enterprise/other_resources/b_Financial_Attacks_Exec_Report.pdf. See also, Press
Release, CitiGroup Inc., Updated Information on Recent Compromise to Citi
Account Online for Our Customers, (June 15, 2011), available at
http://citigroup.com/citi/press/2011/110610c.htm.
122 Id.
123 Press Release, NYS Department of Financial Services, Update on Cyber
Security in the Banking Sector: Third Party Service Providers, NYS DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCIAL SERVICES, (April 2015), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/reportpub/
dfs_rpt_tpvendor_042015.pdf [hereinafter “2015 Report”].
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Governor Cuomo Press Release, supra note 8.
120
121
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industry upholds its obligation to protect consumers and ensure that
its systems are sufficiently constructed to prevent cyber-attacks to the
fullest extent possible.”127
The proposed regulation includes proposals designed to
balance “certain regulatory minimum standards while maintaining
flexibility so that the final rule does not limit industry innovation and
instead encourages firms to keep pace with technological
advances.”128 Although this article is not intended to provide a
thorough analysis of the components contained within either the
cyber-security rule, or the AML rule, a brief overview nonetheless
provides helpful context in regards to the certification rules.
The cybersecurity program requires every covered entity129 to
establish and maintain a cybersecurity program to ensure
confidentiality, integrity, and the availability of its Information
Systems,130 which, among other things, means “a discrete set of
electronic information resources organized for the collection,
maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination or disposition of electronic
information.”131 Covered entities are to implement and maintain a
written cybersecurity policy setting forth policies and procedures in
order to protect Information Systems and private information stored
on those systems. The minimum policy standards require covered
entities to address:
1.

Information security;

2.

Data governance and classification;

3.

Access controls and identity management;

Id.
Id.
129 “[A]ny [individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other entity]
operating under or required to operate under a license, registration, charter,
certificate, permit, accreditation or similar authorization under the banking law, the
insurance law, or the financial services law.”
130 Press Release, Proposed Regulations: Section 500.00, N.Y. DEP’T FIN.
SERVS. (September 2016), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations
/proposed/rp500t.pdf(last accessed Sept. 2016).
131 Id.
127
128
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4.

Business continuity and disaster recovery planning and
resources;

5.

Capacity and performance planning;

6.

Systems operations and availability concerns;

7.

Systems and network security;

8.

Systems and network monitoring;

9.

Systems and application development and quality
assurance;

10. Physical security and environmental controls;
11. Customer data privacy;
12. Vendor and third-party service provider management;
13. Risk assessment; and
14. Incident response.132
This requires the board of directors or an equivalent
governing body to review the policy as frequently as necessary (but
no less frequently than annually), and a senior officer to approve of
the policy’s contents.133
The proposed regulation also contained an annual
certification of compliance requirement.134 Every covered entity135
must certify that it follows the requirements of the regulation. 136 The
Id.
Id.
134 Press Release, Maria T. Vullo, Notice of Final Regulations’ Promulgation
under Part 500 Title 23 of the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and
Regulations of the State of New York: Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial
Services
Companies,
500.17(b),
(Feb.
13,
2017),
available
at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/adoptions/dfsrf500txt.pdf.
135 Id.
136 Id.
132
133
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language of the certification is found in Appendix A and reads as
follows:
The Board of Directors or a Senior Officer of the
Covered Entity certifies:
(1) The Board of Directors (or name of Senior
Officer(s)) have reviewed documents, reports,
certifications and opinions of such officers,
employees, representatives, outside vendors and other
individuals or entities as necessary;
To the best of the (Board of Directors) or (name of
Senior Officer(s)) knowledge, the Cybersecurity
Program of (name of Covered Entity as of ___ (date
of the Board Resolution or Senior Officer(s)
Compliance Finding) for the year ended ____ (year
for which Board Resolution or Compliance Finding is
provided) complies with Part __.
Signed [and dated] by the Chairperson of the Board
of Directors or Senior Officer(s).
Failure to certify will be enforced under “any
applicable laws,” including civil and criminal
penalties.137
NYDFS’s final cybersecurity regulations went into effect
March 1st, 2017.138 In a February 16, 2017 press release, New York
Governor Andrew M. Cuomo said:

Id.; see also PwC, AML monitoring: New York regulator gets prescriptive,
FINANCIAL
CRIMES
OBSERVER
PWC,
(July
2016),
available
at
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/financial-crimes/publications/asse
ts/aml-monitoring-nydfs-2016.pdf [hereinafter “PwC”].
138 Press Release, Governor Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Announces First-inthe-Nation Cybersecurity Regulation Protecting Consumers and Financial
Institutions from Cyber-Attacks to Take Effect March 1, (February 16, 2017),
available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1702161.htm.
137
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New York is the financial capital of the world, and it
is critical that we do everything in our power to
protect consumers and our financial system from the
ever increasing threat of cyber-attacks . . . These
strong, first-in-the-nation protections will help ensure
this industry has the necessary safeguards in place in
order to protect themselves and the New Yorkers
they serve from the serious economic harm caused by
these devastating cyber-crimes.139
The final regulation includes
•

Controls relating to the governance framework for a
robust cybersecurity program including requirements for
a program that is adequately funded and staffed,
overseen by qualified management, and reported on
periodically to the most senior governing body of the
organization;

•

Risk-based minimum standards for technology systems
including access controls, data protection including
encryption, and penetration testing;

•

Required minimum standards to help address any cyber
breaches including an incident response plan,
preservation of data to respond to such breaches, and
notice to DFS of material events; and

•

Accountability by requiring identification and
documentation of material deficiencies, remediation
plans and annual certifications of regulatory compliance
to DFS.140

Section 500.20, which covers enforcement, says that “This
regulation will be enforced by the superintendent pursuant to, and is

139
140

Id.
Id.
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not intended to limit, the superintendent’s authority under any
applicable laws.”141
So far - so good. However, in June 2016, NYDFS had issued
a similar final rule regarding AML compliance certification. 142 This
issuance was a result of multiple NYDFS investigations into
compliance at “regulated institutions” (“all banks, trust companies,
private bankers, savings banks and savings and loans associations
chartered under New York Banking Law, New York-licensed
branches and agencies of foreign banking corporations, as well as
New York-licensed check cashiers and money transmitters[]”143) with
applicable money laundering rules.144 The investigation identified
shortcomings in these financial institution’s transaction monitoring
and filtering programs, which was in turn attributable to a lack of
governance, oversight, and accountability at senior levels.145 Based on
this investigation and other factors, NYDFS believed financial
institutions had systemic shortcomings in their AML programs and
wanted to not only clarify AML program requirements, but also have
the Board of Directors or a Senior Officer submit a Board Resolution
or Compliance Finding. 146
The final AML rules require every regulated institution to
maintain a Transaction Monitoring Program that should contain,
where applicable, the following attributes:
1.

Based on the institution’s Risk Assessment;

Supra note 10.
Publication, Shearman & Sterling LLP, NYS Department of Financial
Services Outlines Requirements for Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Programs of NY StateLicensed Institutions, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP CLIENT PUBLICATIONS (Jul. 20,
2016), available at http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/
Publications/2016/07/NYS-Department-of-Financial-Services-Outlines-Requirem
ents-FIAFR-072016.pdf [hereinafter “Shearman and Sterling”].
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
141
142
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2.

Periodically reviewed and updated to reflect and account
for changes to BSA/AML laws and other relevant
information;

3.

Match BSA/AML risks to the firm’s business, product
and service lines, and customers;

4.

BSA/AML detection scenarios with values and amounts
that detect potential money laundering, suspicious
activity, or other illegal activity;

5.

A full scope testing of the Transaction Monitoring
Program, including governance review, data mapping,
transaction coding, detection scenario logic, model
validation, data input and Program output;

6.

Documentation articulating the institution’s current
detection scenarios and the assumptions, thresholds, and
parameters of those scenarios;

7.

Protocols outlining how the firm will investigate the
Transaction Monitoring Program’s alerts, how the
Regulated Institution will decide which alerts will result
in a filing or other action, who is responsible for
deciding, and how the investigative and decision-making
process is to be documented; and

8.

Be subject to on-going analysis in order to determine
whether detection scenarios, underlying rules, threshold
values, parameters, and assumptions are still relevant.147

The Regulated Institution’s Filtering Program’s requirements
are similar to the Monitoring Program in that they are only to be
implemented where applicable, and are as follows:
1.

147

Be based on the institution’s Risk Assessment;

Id.
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2.

Be based on technology, processes, or tools that will
match names and accounts consistent with the
institution’s risks, transaction, and product profiles;

3.

Full scope testing of the Filtering Program, including
relevant reviews of data matching, determining whether
the OFAC sanctions list and threshold settings
synchronize to an institution’s risks; assessing the logical
fit of technology or tools, model validation, and data
input with the Program’s output;

4.

On-going analysis to assess technology and tool’s logic
and performance in matching names and accounts, as
well as the OFAC sanctions list and threshold settings to
see if they map the institution’s risks, and

5.

Documentation articulating the Filtering Program’s
intent and design for tools, processes, and
technology. 148

Both the Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Programs are
required to have, where applicable:

148

1.

ID of all data sources with relevant data;

2.

Validation of data’s accuracy, integrity, and quality,
ensuring accurate and complete data flows through the
Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program;

3.

Processes for data extraction and loading to ensure a
complete and accurate data transfer from source to
system (provided automated systems are used)

4.

Governance and management oversight, including
policies and procedures that govern changes to the
Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program ensuring
that changes are managed, reported, audited, defined, and
controlled;

Id.
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5.

Vendor selection processes where third-party vendors are
used in the Transaction Monitoring and Filtering
Program;

6.

Funding for the Transaction Monitoring and Filtering
Program;

7.

Qualified personnel or third-party consultants
responsible for various aspects of the Transaction
Monitoring and Filtering Program, including design,
implementation, ongoing analysis, planning, operation
testing, and

8.

Periodic training of all Transaction Monitoring and
Filtering Program stakeholders.149

When Regulated Institutions identify areas, systems, or
processes needing material improvements, updates, or redesigns, the
Regulated Institutions are required to document the identifications
made, and the corresponding planned remedial efforts. The
Superintendent of NYDFS must be able to view these
documents.150
Either the board or the senior officers of a company must
certify that the company has followed these rules outlined above. The
Board Resolution or Compliance Finding requirement dictates that:
[E]ach Regulated Institution “shall adopt and submit
to the Superintendent a Board Resolution or Senior
Officer(s) Compliance Finding in the form set forth
in Attachment A by April 15th of each year. Each
Regulated Institution shall maintain for examination
by the Department all records, schedules and data
supporting adoption of the Board Resolution or

149
150

Id.
Id.
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Senior Officer(s) Compliance Finding for a period of
five years.151
The language of the aforementioned certification is as
follows:
The Board of Directors (or name of Senior
Officer(s)) has reviewed documents, reports,
certifications and opinions of such officers,
employees, representatives, outside vendors and other
individuals or entities as necessary to adopt this Board
Resolution or Senior Officer Compliance Finding.
The Board of Directors or Senior Officer(s) has taken
all steps necessary to confirm that (name of Regulated
Institution) as of ___ (date of the Board Resolution
or Senior Officer(s) Compliance Finding) for the year
ended ___ (year for which Board Resolution or
Compliance Finding is provided) complies with
[Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Requirements].
Signed [and dated] by each member of the Board of
Directors or Senior Officer(s).152
In the final rule, these requirements are to “be enforced
pursuant to, and is not intended to limit, the Superintendent’s
authority under any applicable laws.”153 Thus, the scope of the
Superintendent’s authority is both civil and criminal. However, the
original wording of the rule was harsh, as illustrated below:
All Regulated Institutions shall be subject to all
applicable penalties provided for by the Banking Law
and the Financial Services Law for failure to maintain
a Transaction Monitoring Program, or a Watch List
Id.
Banking Division Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program
Requirements and Certifications, 3 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 504 (Mar. 2017), available at
http://docs.dos.ny.gov/info/register/2016/july20/pdf/rulemaking.pdf and
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/adoptions/dfsp504t.pdf.
153 Shearman and Sterling, supra note 142.
151
152
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Filtering Program complying with the requirements of
this Part and or failure to file the Certifications
required under Section 504.4 hereof. A Certifying
Senior Officer who files an incorrect or false Annual
Certification also may be subject to criminal penalties
for such filing.154
It is unclear why the original language was worded as it was.
More than likely, the language intended to serve two purposes: (1) to
underline the seriousness of the offense, and (2) to warn potential
officers certifying the Annual Certification of the consequences
resulting from a failure to certify the company’s program.
Regardless, due to industry feedback that language was struck
out entirely and replaced with new language for the finalized rule. In
the final rule, NYDFS removed the threat of criminal penalties for
incorrect or falsified filings.155
Thus, there are meaningful distinctions between the
requirements of the cybersecurity rule and the AML rule. However,
the reality of modern financial institutions means that AML is a
significant component of cybersecurity, such that AML measures
cannot be effective without cybersecurity, and cybersecurity in
financial institutions cannot be fully effective without AML measures.
In the following section, I will explain why the current rules require
some form of harmonization in their application and enforcement,
and further, why those rules need to establish a specific standard for
the imposition of criminal liability in specific instances.
IV.

SUGGESTIONS AND RATIONALE

Both the cybersecurity rules and the AML rules should have
the same language, however, they do not. Unfortunately, both rules
lack much-needed language allowing for the imposition of criminal
liability in appropriate situations. This problem could be addressed
154
155

Id.
PwC, supra note 137.

104

MAINTAINING INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY - REFERENCES?.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

Dixon

4/27/2017

5:1

through a number of ways and considerations. First, one must
consider that by softening the language in both rules, the NYDFS
was not responsive to institutions’ vocalized concerns, and likely only
further confused individuals trying to comply. Second, if both rules
contain the same language, the possibility of corporate directors
avoiding liability in one function, while negating liability in another
for the same act, will likely lessen. Third, by emphasizing the
potential of corporate criminal liability the rule will more properly
reflect the principles outlined by the Yates memorandum. Even
though the Yates memorandum is not an official policy of the New
York Attorney General’s Office, aligning the language of the rules
with the spirit of the Yates memorandum could eliminate the
complexity created by the current compliance rules for company
directors.
A. Changing the Language of the Statute but not the Underlying
Enforcement Mechanism is Unresponsive to Concerns and Only
Confuses Firms Trying to Comply with the Rule
In response to public comments regarding the rule, the
NYSFDS changed the AML rule’s language so that the regulation
“[would] be enforced pursuant to, and [] not intended to limit, the
Superintendent’s authority under any applicable laws.”156 Although
the laws are not explicitly mentioned, the language of the AML rule
presumably refers to legislation relating to Banking, Insurance, and
Financial law. However, if this is true, the NYSFDS is committing
two errors.
First, by not changing the underlying penalties of the law, the
NYSFDS is not being responsive enough to the concerns of
commenters. Secondly, by stating only that regulators will pursue
enforcement under “any and all applicable laws,” individuals are left
“in the dark” about specific applicable law. If we were to assume that
a law’s ability to be interpreted directly influences the law’s likelihood
of being followed, then one must also consider the vagueness of this
rule and its resultant effect on compliance.
156

Shearman and Sterling, supra note 142.

105

MAINTAINING INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY - REFERENCES?.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

4/27/2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:1

This problem of vagueness in compliance can also be found
in the proposed cybersecurity rule. Like the AML rule, the
cybersecurity rule only states that the Superintendent will enforce the
Regulation pursuant to “authority under any applicable laws.”157 One
can only speculate why the rule is phrased this way. Perhaps this
phraseology was a response to the public comment regarding the
AML rules and was intended to preemptively address similar
complaints about the AML rule. Again, however, this language is
ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. This lack of clarity
could feasibly hinder corporations from ensuring which laws are
applicable, and consequently, what standards to adhere to when
certifying their cybersecurity programs.
Furthermore, rule-makers determined that the prior language
was not precise enough to warrant inclusion. As we have seen,
cybersecurity breaches and AML risks are frequent. Thus, this
arguably makes individual penalization through criminal liability
unjust in certain situations, such as, for example, the filing of false or
incorrect Annual Certifications in good faith. Beyond that, a variety
of scenarios could occur: firms may have to start offering large
salaries to compliance officers just to attract quality talent, or, firms
may feel encouraged to structure their company in such a way that
does not require a New York state business charter, and thus
bypassing the rule. In a true nightmare scenario, firms could just
dissolve their charters, leave New York, and set up shop in
alternative financial centers such as San Francisco, Boston, Chicago,
Charlotte, or Washington, D.C.
B. Uniform Language as a Response to Dual Corporate Officer
Liability Loopholes
As the rules are currently written, it is entirely possible that an
individual could face criminal liability for a certification violation in
the cybersecurity context, yet simultaneously avoid criminal liability
under the AML rules. To be sure, in some situations this will not be
relevant. For example, suppose that there is a cybersecurity breach of

157

Vullo, supra note 134.

106

MAINTAINING INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY - REFERENCES?.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

4/27/2017

Dixon

5:1

a financial institution based on corporate espionage. If, after an
individual makes a bad faith cybersecurity certification, a hacker gets
into an employee’s email, he may learn of a new marketing campaign,
the valuation of a confidential M&A deal, or proprietary research
created by a firm’s research team. Cybersecurity breaches involving
financial institutions are often related to some form of money
laundering activity. Such breaches are cybersecurity breaches,
although they do not involve the laundering of money.
However, in situations where a cybersecurity breach does
involve money laundering, if both the cybersecurity policy and money
laundering policy were certified by an individual omission or outright
lie, it is possible that the individual could avoid liability under the
AML rule, but not the cybersecurity rule. A predictable argument
could be that criminal prosecution under the AML rule is unfair
because the language change from the proposed rule to the final rule
reflects a retraction in the intended harshness of the policy against
criminal prosecution. Thus, it is foreseeable that criminal liability was
not intended to be permissible for AML violations, and the rule is
thus arguably be unconstitutional for being overly vague.
However, if both rules were to have the exact same language,
two results would occur. First, loopholes are no longer present in
those situations where both rules apply, but with contrasting
language. Second, assuming all elements are met, it would be difficult,
if not impossible, for an individual to argue that it was unclear
whether their failure to comply with the certification mechanism
would allow for criminal liability sanctions.
C. The Yates Memorandum & Creating a Comprehensive Model
Having a rule that reflects the Yates memorandum not only
makes the rule easier to follow, but also sets good precedent for
further states’ adoption and implementation. Responding to industry
concerns, eliminating the possibility of loopholes, and creating
precise language are key aspects of the new language. The next and
final element is that the new language should reflect the tenor of the
Yates memorandum, such that it makes the rule easier to follow, but
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MAINTAINING INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY - REFERENCES?.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4/27/2017

5:1

also sets a good precedent for other states to copy should they
choose to implement their own state policies.
Again, it bears repeating that the Yates memorandum,
technically, has no bearing on the New York Attorney General’s
Office or the NYDFS. After all, the Yates memorandum is part of
the DOJ, and thus reflects federal policy. However, many New York
banks have not worked solely within the confines of New York for
quite some time: indeed, it is hard to recall when New York banks
operated solely within the United States. Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan
and Deutsche Bank are just a few New York chartered organizations
with international reach.158 As such, in their operations these
institutions are subject to not just New York law, but federal law as
well. Despite New York’s outsized influence within the financial
sector, common practice for these organizations is to channel their
resources towards federal law compliance.
There is another advantage to this. By making the rule
reflective of the Yates memorandum and easier to follow, it removes
an incentive for an organization to move its banking charter from
New York to another state with more relaxed banking standards.
V.

THE NEW RULE

If the current language and the proposed language of both
the cybersecurity and AML certification policies are not adequate,
then what is? This author proposes the following rules for the
cybersecurity and AML programs, respectively. For cybersecurity:
All Regulated Institutions shall be subject to all applicable
penalties provided for by the Banking Law and the Financial Services
Law for failure to maintain a cybersecurity program complying with
the requirements of this Part and or failure to file the Certifications
required under Section 500.17 hereof. A Certifying Senior Officer
See generally Report, New York State Chartered Institutions as of
December 31, 2012, N.Y. DEP’T FIN. SERVS. (Dec. 31, 2012), available at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/reportpub/annual/annualbanklist.htm.
158
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who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly files an incorrect or false
Annual Certification also may be subject to criminal penalties for
such filing.
Then, for the AML:
All Regulated Institutions shall be subject to all applicable
penalties provided for by the Banking Law and the Financial Services
Law for failure to maintain a Transaction Monitoring Program, or a
Watch List Filtering Program complying with the requirements of
this Part and or failure to file the Certifications required under
Section 504.4 hereof. A Certifying Senior Officer who intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly files an incorrect or false Annual Certification
also may be subject to criminal penalties for such filing.
This proposed language achieves two purposes. First, by
giving explicit standards, the language makes clear that a criminal
enforcement will only be triggered where an individual’s behavior
manifests a level of intent beyond mere negligence. The Haider case,
described supra, provides a clear example of when an individual
director’s failure to provide adequate internal controls was a result of
mere negligence. As illustrated by the Haider case, it would be unfair
to punish all individuals for negligence or strict liability offenses and
could lead to unintended consequences in an industry where
complete prevention has proven impossible. Second, and relatedly,
this proposed rule reflects the reality that AML and cybersecurity
divisions at certain financial institutions face extraordinary difficulties
and overlapping functions. The proposed rule is narrowly tailored to
prevent the behavior seen in Haider, or rather, violations conducted
by individuals intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly; but not the
behavior of otherwise good-faith individuals who mistakenly certify a
compliance program. Distinguishing between negligent and reckless
conduct may be difficult at times, but nonetheless, this proposed rule
provides a minimum standard and guide for enforcement agencies to
adhere to.
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CONCLUSION

AML and cybersecurity are separate policies, yet, closely
intertwined and critical as a defense for financial institutions. These
institutions are constantly under attack from outsiders, and
unfortunately, bound to fall victim to a breach at some point. After
all, even if 10,000 attacks occur and 9,999 of them fail, all it takes is
one; hackers may still be successful in damaging a targeted institution,
even when the breach is minimally intrusive.
The New York State Department of Financial Services made
a mistake in weakening the language of its proposed rules. The
NYDFS was not responsive to industry concerns and the rules were
not written clearly enough to meaningfully advise parties affected by
the consequences of a failure to comply. By strengthening the
language so that clear consequences are understood and established,
and by setting a clear standard of what will trigger potential criminal
liability, this Author’s proposed language will serve the dual purpose
of reassuring individuals at firms of what actions would impose
criminal liability, and would further ensure the New York State
Department of Financial Services that its goal of increasing
cybersecurity and AML regulations has been met.
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INTRODUCTION

On September 4th, 2014, Officer Sean Groubert of the South
Carolina State Police pulled his police cruiser behind the vehicle
driven by Levar Jones at a gas station in South Carolina. Officer
Jones would later state the reason he pulled behind Jones was
because he observed Jones was not wearing his seat belt. Jones would
later state he removed his seat belt upon pulling into the gas station
to exit his vehicle and enter the station. All of the following events
were captured by the dash-cam in Officer Groubert’s car.1
Levar Jones exited his vehicle and, with his car door still
open, noticed the police vehicle behind him. His face exhibited
surprise and confusion. 2 Officer Groubert requested Jones’ license in
a controlled speaking voice. 3 Jones pats his pocket, and realizing his
wallet is not there, does a rapid shoulder shift from facing Groubert
to facing the inside of his vehicle.4 He then leans into the vehicle as
an ordinary place to secure his wallet, which he had left sitting on the
front seat.5 However, Officer Groubert (apparently) viewed the rapid
shoulder shift as an aggressive and hostile act. In the next three
seconds of film, he shouts “Get out of the Car!” twice, runs to cover
behind Jones’ vehicle and fires four shouts at Jones. 6 The first shot
hits Jones while he is turning around with the wallet in his hand. He
drops the wallet and backs away from the officer while putting his
hands up while three more shots hit him. In the same dash-cam
video, Groubert later describes the events to his supervisor.7
Groubert describes Jones’ surprise and confusion as an act of
“staring him down”; Jones’ leaning into his vehicle to secure his
This video can be found in many places on the internet. The one we will
reference is available at: The State Newspaper, Sept 4 Groubert traffic stop, YOUTUBE
(Sept. 24, 2014), https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=RBUUO_VFYMs.
2 Id. at time stamp :40.
3 Id. at time stamp :42.
4 Id. at time stamp :43 - :44.
5 Id. at time stamp :45.
6 Id. at time stamp :46 - :49.
7 This longer video can be found at: Tony Santaella and Steven Dial, Trooper
on Shooting: ‘He Kept Coming Towards Me’, WLTX19 (Sept. 27, 2014),
http://www.wltx.com/story/news/local/2014/09/26/sean-groubert-gives-hisaccount-of-shooting-levar-jones/16295527/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
1
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wallet as an act of “diving into his vehicle”; Jones’ acts of walking
backwards while putting his hands up as “he kept coming at me”; and
Jones’ wallet as a perceived weapon.8
On the one hand we could assume these to be self-serving
and dishonest statements by Officer Groubert. This assumption is
not necessary and it is far more probative to view them as the honest
(mis)perception of a shooter in a perceived hostile environment.
Under that lens, Groubert’s statements reflect a perception of an
African American male as a potential hostile in an asymmetric
battlefield-like environment,9 and give a rare insight into a shooter’s
psyche – a rapid, stress-filled situation.
The landscape of modern asymmetric conflicts, such as the
war in Afghanistan, is also murky. The Soldier, like the police officer,
is burdened with the reality that he does not know who the bad guy is
and who the innocent is. But the rules governing the Soldier are
starkly different than those governing the police officer for sound
and logical reasons. In a New York Times editorial, U.S. Marine Corps
Captain Timothy Kudo discusses his own use of force in
Afghanistan.10 While a commander, he was asked permission by his
Marines to kill two Afghans: “The voice on the other end of the
radio said: ‘There are two people digging by the side of the road. Can
we shoot them?’” The presumption is the two were implanting an
improvised explosion device – known as an IED – to kill or injure
Afghan or coalition Soldiers. Captain Kudo gave permission and the
two diggers were killed.11 There was an ever-present possibility the
diggers were merely irrigating their farm land and not sowing seeds of
violence toward Captain Kudo, his Marines, and the Afghan State.

Id.
The attitude of police in the United States towards African American
males has been the subject of much commentary and literature and is not the
subject of this piece. We mention it as a basis of comparison to the view of Soldiers
towards potential threats in the modern asymmetric battlefield.
10 Timothy Kudo, Editorial, How We Learned to Kill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2015, New York Edition at SR1.
11 Id.
8
9
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How we assess the use of force and whether force is
appropriate in any given situation is instrumental to how we function
as a deliberative democracy. While we might all agree Officer
Groubert’s actions are reprehensible and probably criminal, Captain
Kudo’s are less open to clear judgment. Should the judgment depend
on whether Captain Kudo was ultimately correct; that is, the diggers
were, in fact, bad guys, rather than innocent farmers making a living?
If Levar Jones had held up a gun rather than a wallet upon exiting his
vehicle, the authorities would probably have viewed Officer
Groubert’s actions differently. But the true (rather than perceived)
battlefield is a significantly different legal reality where far greater
uses of force have been permitted, including knowingly causing the
death of innocents.12 Evaluating Captain Kudo’s actions is made
problematic by the blending of warfighting with peacekeeping and
even battlefield law enforcement mandated by asymmetric warfare.
Among the volumes written on when force can be exercised
by Soldiers during armed conflict in the name of the State, the trend
over the last century has been to curtail a Soldier’s use of force and
rightfully so. The adoption by virtually every State13 of The Hague
Conventions in 1907,14 the Geneva Conventions 15 in the wake of
World War II, along with their Protocols in 1977,16 has been with a
Under the concept of proportionality, lawful combatants can knowingly
cause the incidental death of innocent noncombatants if the military advantage
gained exceeds their loss. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 52, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
13 The International Committee of the Red Cross [hereinafter “ICRC”] tracks
the current signatories to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols
at
https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/genevaconventions (The Geneva Conventions of 1949 have been ratified by every
member state of the United Nations).
14 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat.
2277, October 18, 1907.
15 Jean S. Pictet, The New Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, 45
AM. J. INT’L. L. 462 (1951).
16 Additional
Protocol I and Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter “Additional Protocol II”].
12
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singular purpose: to limit the devastation inflicted by armed conflict.
Armed conflict, however, persists. Whether it is the war in
Afghanistan or the crisis in the Ukraine, bloodshed of both innocent
civilians and lawful combatants/privileged belligerents 17 is a
persistent reality. In the modern era, complicating the calculus of
how to limit the destruction of war, many of these armed conflicts
are fueled by actors who refuse to wear military uniforms, carry their
arms openly, and become privileged belligerents; these actors lurk
amongst civilians and never show their true intent until they strike.
In the last decade, the trajectory of some courts, academics,
and even military leaders of States18 is to limit the force States’
militaries can use during conflict. The intent of these limits on what
force, including lethal force, militaries can use to accomplish the
mission is quite noble. The logic is the less force used by a Soldier,
the less death and destruction inflicted upon innocents. However,
these limitations are tainted by misunderstandings and mistakes
concerning the principles and goals of the Just War Theory,
particularly in the evaluation of battlefield conduct: jus in bello.
Academics and jurists have extrapolated familiar concepts
from criminal law jurisprudence, those used to evaluate Officer
Groubert’s conduct, such as intent, necessity, and proportionality,
and attempted to apply them to evaluate the acts of the privileged
belligerent. 19 The attempt to make the dissimilar into the similar is
understandable because man habitually tries to characterize the
unfamiliar by extrapolating from a familiar paradigm. However, while
the same terms may be used,20 the meaning of those terms differ

“The term “privileged belligerent” means an individual belonging to one
of the eight categories enumerated in Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. 10 U.S.C. § 948a(6).
18 Examples of each are discussed later in this chapter.
19 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING
HUMANITY: WHEN FORCE IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press,
2008) [hereinafter “Defending Humanity”] for an extrapolation of criminal law
concepts to jus ad bellum, an extrapolation that makes much more sense than to jus
in bello.
20 Both the criminal law and the jus in bello paradigms include common
terms such as self-defense and necessity, but the meanings can vary significantly.
17
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significantly between law enforcement and war. 21 This extrapolation
manifests itself in applying human rights law norms and the universal
reach of an individual’s right to life. Criminal law exists to preserve
the peace, whereas jus in bello works to end conflict.22
Exacerbating the problem is the other half of the Just War
Theory, jus ad bellum. Jus ad bellum is a set of international principles
regulating when the State can initiate armed conflict. Extrapolating
criminal law jurisprudence to evaluate jus ad bellum actions is rational
because the goals and core concepts of the two paradigms are nearly
identical:23 In both systems, the “citizens” (individuals in criminal law,
States in jus ad bellum) lose the ability to use violence to achieve their
aims except in rare circumstances where the violence is legally
authorized (law enforcement and U.N. Security Council Resolution)
or justified (self-defense of the individual and the state). Further,
both share a common fundamental goal: preserving the peace.
Therefore, using criminal law concepts and jurisprudence to evaluate
jus ad bellum action, as proposed by George Fletcher and Jens Ohlin in
Defending Humanity, is proper.24 The reason: the words and meaning are
the same. What is not defensible, morally or legally, is using this
similarity as a gateway to then apply criminal law concepts to jus in
bello where these substantive and goal similarities do not exist. The
words may be the same, but the meaning is different.

21 A good example of this divergence is the concept of self-defense. In the
criminal law paradigm, the individual’s right of self-defense is limited by, among
other things, the responsibility to not cause the death of anyone but the aggressor,
and the ability to use force in self-defense is limited to the timeframe of the
aggression. In contrast, on the battlefield, a lawful combatant can knowingly cause
the death of an innocent in self-defense, provided the death is incidental and that it
is exceeded by the military advantage of staying alive. Further, the lawful combatant
can engage in status rather than conduct based self-defense.
22 “The object of war has been understood to be the submission of the
enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible.” The Department of DOD LAW OF
WAR MANUAL, June 2015, [hereinafter “DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL”] paragraph
1.4.1 citing 1940 RULES OF LAND WARFARE ¶22 (“The object of war is to
bring about the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible by means of
regulated violence.”); 1914 RULES OF LAND WARFARE ¶10 (same).
23 Id.
24 Id.
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This extrapolation of criminal law concepts to the battlefield
is not defensible because in armed conflict a commander’s calculus
revolves around military necessity--defined as “the necessity of those
measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war,
and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of
war.”25 The commander must balance, on one hand, the necessary
precautions to protect civilians with, on the other hand, the
commander’s conclusion of military necessity. Imbedded in this
conclusion is military judgment. This concept simply does not exist in
domestic criminal law. And with any judgment, especially one which
stems from whether necessary precautions were taken in light of the
military action in the name of military necessity, there is the element
of subjectivity. The modern trend has been to extend “the domestic
law of negligence to the battle zone – where civilian norms of duty of
care” are applied to military decisions.26 This means civilian criminal
standards are being applied to decisions made in war. The
manifestation of this trend is to focus on the results of the military
decision after the fact (e.g., were civilians killed?), rather than focus on
the rationale of the military act under current International
Humanitarian Law (IHL).27
Conflating civilian criminal standards with the rationale of a
military act under IHL comes at a high cost for democratic armies
and has, in these authors’ opinion, not been fully debated. The
biggest cost is to the effectiveness of a State’s military to bring an end
to armed conflict. Efforts to protect the enemy belligerent and
innocent civilians by limiting the Soldier’s lethality acts to defeat a
DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL paragraph 2.2.1 citing, among multiple
other sources, General Order No. 100, the Instructions for the Government of
Armies of the United States in the Field, commonly known as the Lieber Code art.
14 (“Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the
necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the
war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.”).
26 Thomas Tugendhat & Laura Croft, The Fog of Law: An Introduction to the
Legal Erosion of British Fighting Power, Policy Exchange (2013) at 11,
https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/the-fog-of-law.pdf
(last visited Mar. 31, 2017).
27 International Humanitarian Law is synonymous with the Law of War and
the Law of Armed Conflict. This body of international law regulates the conduct of
forces when engaged in war and armed conflict.
25
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fundamental goal of jus in bello, bringing about an end to the war;
therefore causing an increase, rather than decrease, of violence.
Unrealistic limitations on the Soldier means there are rules he
can never overcome. If the acid test is to kill no civilians, for
example, then closing with and killing or capturing an amorphous
enemy who looks and acts like a civilian is profoundly difficult, if not
impossible. Placing limitations on the Soldier limits their ability to
exercise the principle of military necessity and, therefore, defeats one
of the core principles of the Just War Theory.
This article will argue the right of the Soldier to engage and
destroy military objectives is inherent to warfare; efforts to stem or
limit this force need to be fully understood and carefully considered
within jus in bello instead of the criminal law paradigm. Failure to do
so may actually increase violence rather than decrease it, as well as
violate the State’s sacred obligation to its designated belligerents:
Soldiers.
Even though the Soldier is legally and morally blameless for
his presence on the battlefield, he loses the protections of the civilian
criminal law against violence. In exchange for this sacrifice, the
Soldier gains the right to use violence to execute the mission and
bring about an end to the war. Forcing the Soldier to waive his right
to the protections of the law while simultaneously denying him the
ability to effectively accomplish his mission reduces him to nothing
more than a designated target for those who oppose his State.
This article will start with a brief introduction to the core
principles of the Just War Theory and use these to identify its
fundamental goals. This section will examine the differences between
privileged belligerents and civilians and highlight why the rights of
privileged belligerents cannot tether to the concepts or goals of
domestic criminal law. The second part of the article will then
examine five specific trends which are part and parcel to the
pervasive wave against the use of force and the actual or potential
cost to how Soldiers behave in conflict; that is, jus in bello. The
authors will ultimately conclude that until war itself is fully eliminated
from the human experience, the lex specialis of jus in bello within the
Just War Theory is pragmatically justified and a morally mandated
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duty of the international community of States to privileged
belligerents.
II.

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION OF THE JUST WAR THEORY AND A
COMPARISON TO TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

The Just War Theory has traditionally 28 been divided into the
morality of a State or group’s decision to engage in armed conflict, jus
ad bellum, and the manner in which armed conflict is conducted, jus in
bello.29
Jus ad bellum has evolved from the right of states to use war to
achieve political ends, enforce treaties, and in reprisal, to the far more
restrictive modern approach of Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter, which requires States to “…refrain from the threat or use of
force against .. any state” in order to “…maintain international peace
and security.”30 The only commonly recognized exceptions to this
prohibition are the use of force authorized by the Security Council 31
and the use of force in self-defense under Article 5132 of the same
charter. In this regard, jus ad bellum mirrors the paradigm of civilian
criminal law in both goal (preserving peace) and substance (the
Modern academics have posited a third area of concern within the Just
War Theory, that of jus post bellum, or the responsibility of belligerent states after the
conclusion of armed conflict.
29 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT
WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 21 (Basic Books, 3RD ed. 2000) [hereinafter
“Walzer”]: “War is always judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states
have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt. The first kind
of judgment is adjectival in character: we say that a particular war is just or unjust.
The second is adverbial: we say that a war is being fought justly or unjustly.”
30 Charter of the United Nations, Jun. 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 article 2(4)
[hereinafter “UN Charter”].
31 Id. at article 24(2) “The specific powers granted to the Security Council
for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.”
These powers include the ability to use force for Chapter VI peacekeeping, or
Chapter VII peace enforcement.
32 Id. at article 51 “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security.”
28
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individual’s ability to use force is limited to situations justified by an
external imminent threat).
A. The Uniqueness of Jus in bello
Unlike jus ad bellum, which evolved almost entirely based on
international agreement,33 jus in bello is primarily the product of
custom. Modern treaties, such as the four Geneva Conventions and
its Protocols, have acted to codify rules evolved from core principles
developed by the practice of professional warfighters over centuries.34
These principles include Distinction, Military Necessity, and
Proportionality.
1. The Principle of Distinction.35
Any analysis of jus in bello should begin with the principle of
distinction, because it is the springing condition for the lex specialis.
Said another way, without the application of the principle of
distinction, the substance of traditional criminal law is an entirely
adequate tool to determine the legality of a given act. The principle
subdivides into: A) the responsibility of combatants to distinguish
themselves from civilians; and B) the responsibility to target only
enemy combatants and military objectives with attacks.36

33 Prior to its conclusion in the U.N. Charter, the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremburg identified the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1929 as a source of
restrictions on the power of jus ad bellumjus ad bellum for signees.
34 The Lieber Code is often cited as the first documentation of the modern
laws of war. This code was not a creative work, but rather the result of Francis
Lieber working on a committee of military professionals to codify existing
customary practice that had been developed over centuries.
35 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL paragraph 2.5.
36 Id.
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(i) The Responsibility of Combatants to Distinguish Themselves from
Civilians.
International law grants combatants the legal and moral
authority to commit violent acts that would otherwise be abhorrent
and punishable under traditional criminal law.37 This privileged
belligerency allows them to shoot and kill enemy Soldiers based on
their mere status as members of the enemy military force.38 Criminal
law would only allow this attack if properly imposing a death
sentence on the victim39 or if the victim was posing an imminent
threat to the shooter (or another) and the shot was a proportional
response to that threat40 (e.g., without a current imminent threat,
Officer Groubert could not shoot Levar Jones even if Jones was the
worst criminal in history).
Further, except in the case of a death sentence and in
preventing the escape of an individual who poses a significant threat
of death or serious bodily harm to the officer or others, 41 law
enforcement officers have no greater privilege to use deadly force
than an ordinary citizen. The privileged belligerent does not suffer
any of these limitations. She can kill her victim while he sleeps from
one thousand miles away, facing no imminent threat whatsoever.42
For this privileged belligerent to gain this legal authority to target and
do violence to others, however, she must first set herself out as a
37 The specific language used denotes privileged belligerency as a ‘right.’
“Members of the armed forces…have a right to participate directly in hostilities.”
Additional Protocol I, Art. 43(2).
38 ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocol I 1453 (¶4789) “Those
who belong to armed forces or armed groups may be attacked at any time.”
39 In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) the United States Supreme
Court overturned its decision of four years earlier in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972), and held that capital punishment was a lawful use of force and not
prohibited by the 8th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
40 Model Penal Code [MPC] §3.04 “…the use of force upon or toward
another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately
necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by
such other person.” & 3.05 “…the use of force upon or toward the person of
another is justifiable to protect a third person when…the actor would be justified
under Section 3.04 in using such force to protect himself.”
41 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 2 (1985).
42 Tugendhat & Croft, supra note 26.
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lawful target,43 such that she can also legally be killed while sleeping
by an enemy she has never met, let alone threatened. Combatants
that distinguish themselves from civilians are the only individuals
authorized to commit these violent acts of war authorized by jus in
bello; 44 all others must comply with the mandates of criminal law.
(ii) The Responsibility to Target only Enemy Combatants and Military
Objectives.
Though it may seem counterintuitive, the restriction to limit
attacks to enemy combatants and military objectives applies only to
combatants – privileged belligerents. This does not mean civilians –
noncombatants – can target other civilians at will. It means if they are
not a combatant, a civilian cannot target anyone, except when their
conduct would be justified by traditional criminal law. Only the
privileged belligerent can step outside the constraints of traditional
criminal law, but when they do so, they must limit the targets of their
attacks to enemy combatants and military objectives.45
B. The Principle of Military Necessity46
In addition to the principle of distinction, the concept of
privileged belligerency is inextricably linked to a second principle of
jus in bello, military necessity. Distinction clarifies what one must do to
qualify for the privilege, and military necessity identifies what violent
powers one is granted. In simplest terms, the principle of military
necessity authorizes the combatant to do acts of violence against the
enemy military that are needed to bring about the complete
submission of that enemy and an end to the war.47 Once again,
43 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva,
12 August 1949 [hereinafter “Geneva III”] at Art. 4.
44 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, paragraph 5.5.8.
45 It is this second part of the Principle of Distinction that prohibits
indiscriminate attacks. Thus, it is often referred to as the Principle of
Discrimination. The authors view this as a subset of Distinction rather than a
separate Principle.
46 See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 25.
47 Id.
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however, this does not apply to civilians or civilian law enforcement.
Officer Groubert may have the mission to apprehend a violent felon,
but without probable cause of a significant threat to the officer or
others, he is authorized to only use ordinary force to make an arrest.48
The principle of military necessity has both a permissive and a
restrictive aspect, as well as providing the lawful combatant a moral
foundation for his acts of violence.
1. The Privilege of Strategic Justification for Acts of Violence.
A civilian is authorized to do limited violence to rebuff an
imminent threat. A civilian must justify each act of violence based on
contemporaneous and proximate danger to themselves or others. 49
For the combatant, eliminating a threat to themselves is merely
ancillary to their duty to win the war as rapidly as possible. Therefore,
a combatant’s acts must be evaluated in the much broader context of
how they affect the war effort and not just the narrow frame of time
and place the act occurred. A combatant can blow up a bridge built
by farmers to get to their fields, not because of any threat posed by
those farmers, but because she has reason to believe the enemy plans
to use the bridge to transport troops across the river two weeks in
the future.
2. The Restrictive Side of Military Necessity.
This principle is both permissive, allowing the combatant to
do all acts necessary to win the war, and restrictive, prohibiting
violent acts which would otherwise be lawful, if they are not needed
for victory. On the restrictive side is the prohibition against attacks
that cause unnecessary suffering.50 Putting glass shrapnel in a grenade
so subsequent surgery will be more difficult is an example of violence

See generally Gregg, 428 U.S. (This is the rule of Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1 (1985)).
49 MPC §3.04 & 3.05.
50 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 70.
48
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that goes beyond the principle of necessity.51 A second part of the
restrictive side of military necessity (as well as the discrimination
aspect of distinction) is the concept of humane treatment.52 Once
Soldiers become hors de combat by being injured, surrendering, or
evacuating a sinking boat or crashing plane, they are no longer lawful
targets. Further, the capturing party has a plethora of responsibilities
for their welfare.53
3. The Combatant’s Raison d’Etre.
Perhaps the most important aspect of military necessity is
that it is inextricably linked to bringing about an end to hostilities.
The lawful combatant is not a mercenary performing a service for a
fee. Instead, she is the designated agent of the State sent to engage in
and be the target of horrific violence. The lawful combatant loses the
protections of the law and in exchange is offered immunity for their
acts of combat. The moral individual would never stomach this loss
merely so they can do greater acts of violence against strangers. They
sacrifice, sometimes involuntarily,54 the protections of the law for the
higher purpose of bringing about an end to the armed conflict
through victory over the enemy. The principle of military necessity
protects their ability to achieve victory and thus provides the
foundational explanation for the very existence of the military.

Unnecessary Suffering is often cited as a separate Principle of jus in bello,
but since it is merely the negative corollary of Military Necessity (One can do only
that violence which is necessary, so causing suffering that is not is prohibited) we
prefer to view it as a subset.
52 Humanity or Humane Treatment is also often viewed as a totally separate
Principle, but the authors view it as a subset of both Military Necessity and
Distinction since its fundamental principles are again a limitation on unnecessary
violence against noncombatants and the suffering thereof.
53 Geneva III, supra note 43.
54 The Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 201-214 (1917) required
registration for a draft, or the governmental act of forcing an individual into the
military.
51
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C. The Principle of Proportionality
The principle of proportionality requires the anticipated result
of any attack to bring about a military advantage exceeding the
collateral damage to civilians and civilian property. 55 Like military
necessity, this principle is both permissive and restrictive.
As noted above, the lawful purpose of a combatant’s acts of
war is not to secure their personal safety, but to bring about the end
of the conflict. The latter is much more difficult to achieve as well as
significantly more important to the international community. As
such, the combatants have been granted far greater leniency than
civilians when the effects of their violent acts are legally analyzed. If a
civilian knowingly brings about the death of a non-aggressing person,
this is considered intentional homicide even if the actor did not desire
death to occur.56 If Officer Groubert, while chasing a group of
fleeing violent felons, knowingly drives his vehicle over and kills a
bystander civilian to avoid losing his targets, this is murder regardless
of his benevolent motive to stop the violent felons from escaping. 57
However, if a combatant blows up the enemy commander’s car,
purposefully killing him and knowingly killing his three-year-old
daughter who is riding with him, the attack would be perfectly legal
under jus in bello if the concrete military advantage gained by the
commander’s death outweighed the death of the innocent girl. As
noted in the discussion of the principle of distinction, above, the
combatant could never target the little girl, but under the principle of
proportionality, her collateral death could be legally acceptable under
jus in bello. Like military necessity, this concept of legally acceptable
collateral damage is limited to the privileged belligerent. The civilian
is not authorized to attack the enemy commander even if the girl is
not present.

55
56
57

Additional Protocol I, art. 52.
MPC §210.2.
Id.
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1. The Goals of the Just War Theory.
The two sides of the Just War Theory, jus ad bellum and jus in
bello, have significantly different, though sequential and convergent
goals. Both strive to limit the costs of armed conflict. The former
attempts to achieve this by the singular goal of preventing the
occurrence and existence of armed conflict. If jus ad bellum fails and
armed conflict begins, it falls to jus in bello to limit the violence
through three goals: ending the conflict, limiting the cost to lawful
combatants, and limiting the violence done to noncombatants.
The goal of jus ad bellum is overt – to maintain international
peace and security by preventing armed conflict. 58 This parallels the
civilian government’s law enforcement mission of maintaining peace
and security by preventing violent (and nonviolent) crime.
The goals of jus in bello, though less obvious, can be gleaned
from the three core principles discussed above. When viewed
together, the requirement to distinguish oneself under the principle
of distinction, the ability to do violence strategically motivated under
military necessity, and the increased lenience towards collateral
damage encapsulated within proportionality, coalesce into the
purpose of bringing about a rapid end to the armed conflict. The
concepts of privileged belligerency and humane treatment combine
to evince a second purpose – limiting the cost of war paid by its
participants. A third purpose, shown by the requirement of
discrimination, is to limit the cost of war paid by the innocent
civilian.
Each of these is a noble and laudable purpose integral to the
Just War Theory. However, it appears that in the modern asymmetric
environment, some want to prioritize the third goal to the detriment
of the first two. Comments and decisions by leaders, academics, and
jurists who desire to prevent military violence, while laudable, reflect
a lack of appreciation of the first two purposes in the jus in bello
paradigm as well as the core legal concepts within this lex specialis.

58

Preamble to the UN Charter.
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2. The Required Gap Between Civilians and Privileged Belligerents
Under the Lex Specialis of Jus in bello.
The foundation of all jus in bello is the concept of privileged
belligerency. The legal gap between the privileged belligerent and the
civilian is arguably greater than any other that could be drawn
between two people. While the police officer may have more legal
authority to use some force than the citizen, it pales in relation to the
Soldier’s license to kill. The death-row convict may have forfeited his
fundamental right to life based on his prior acts, but he still stands
closer to the ordinary citizen than the Soldier whose life becomes
legally forfeit through no act of his own. 59 This gap is why the first
and most important question of evaluating the legality of any act of
combat is: was the actor a privileged belligerent?
If the answer to this antecedent question is no, there is no
need to look to the lex specialis of IHL to evaluate their conduct;
criminal law is fully capable of this adjudication. However, if the
answer is yes, the actor was a privileged belligerent, then criminal law
is irrelevant and only IHL should be used to evaluate their acts of
combat.60
If a person is unprivileged (i.e., a civilian), he is prohibited
from the use of violence against persons or property of another
except when that conduct is legally justified or excused and a
proportional response to an imminent threat. This prohibition is the
product of the comparatively consistent jurisprudence of criminal law
developed over millennia. In contrast, the privileged belligerent (i.e.,
the Soldier) is permitted to use violence to destroy property and kill
people. Further, these acts of violence can be grossly disproportional
to a threat that is distant in both time and place. For example, a
privileged belligerent controlling a piece of field artillery in an armed
conflict can use the weapon to kill 1,000 enemy Soldiers 20 miles

As stated above, even involuntary membership in the armed forces makes
you a lawful target of the enemy privileged belligerent.
60 The legal maxim is “lex specialis derogat legi generali” so the lex specialis of
IHL takes precedence over the more general criminal law.
59

128

DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

4/27/2017

Maxwell & Meyer

5:1

away even if they are sitting down to dinner and have no plans to
attack him.61
For the civilian, the battlefield, in and of itself, does not grant
him any additional legal authority to use force. Legally, a citizen on
the battlefield operates under the same restrictions as one caught in a
gunfight between police and a group of bank robbers. The situation
may give rise to the legal ability to use violence based on justification
(self-defense) or excuse (necessity), but this will be factually
dependent and temporarily linked to the existence of a given
imminent threat.62
The Soldier goes through a dramatic legal conversion once
armed conflict begins. The Soldier morphs from a civilian legally
indistinguishable from any other concerning the use of force, to a
new type of legal entity authorized by the world community to use
deadly force. As noted above, the Soldier is even authorized to
knowingly kill innocent civilians, provided their deaths are
outweighed by the concrete military advantage gained.
Criminal law prohibits a civilian from using force or violence
except in narrow circumstances such as self-defense. Therefore, the
principles embedded in jus in bello – military necessity, proportionality,
and distinction – do not provide any additional legal guidance with
which to evaluate their acts. A civilian is not allowed to use violence
to achieve his goals, military or otherwise, so the principle of military
necessity never applies. A civilian is prohibited from knowingly or
recklessly causing the deaths of innocent civilians, or damage to their
property, so any argument that the loss was proportional to what he
hoped to gain will fall on deaf ears. Concerning distinction, a civilian
is not authorized to use unjustified violence against any target,

61 The concept of proportionality limit collateral damage to civilians and
civilian property, it does not limit damage to lawful targets. Members of the enemy
military are lawful targets at all times unless they become hors d’combat by
surrendering, being wounded to the point they can no longer fight, becoming
unconscious, entering the water after their warship is sunk, or parachuting from a
destroyed aircraft for safety.
62 MPC §3.
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whether it be military or civilian, so limiting his strikes to military
targets is legally insignificant.63
A Soldier can be killed on the battlefield, but she is immune
from prosecution or punishment for her lawful acts of combat, (i.e.,
as long as her battlefield acts do not violate jus in bello she cannot be
criminally judged even if her side loses the war). The rationale is
Soldiers have no control over if or when they will be sent to armed
conflict; therefore, it is patently unjust both to punish them for that
collective decision (jus ad bellum) and to use rules which are applicable
domestically (criminal law instead of jus in bello).
III.

PART II – CONFLATION & MISUNDERSTANDING ERRORS IN
THE TREND AGAINST THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE

The errors in the trend against the use of military force fall
into five general categories: 1) a conflation of jus in bello with jus ad
bellum; 2) a morphing of the military mission away from traditional
war-fighting responsibilities, thereby frustrating the jus in bello goals of
a rapid end to the conflict and limiting the cost to the warfighter; 3) a
conflation of jus in bello concepts with similar terms in the traditional
criminal law paradigm; 4) an attempt by some academics to revise
time-tested principles in IHL that are the product of centuries of
customary practice, and, 5) a general lack of military deference in
modern courts by jurists with no military experience or valid frame of
reference.
The costs of these errors are high: an ineffective military
prolongs armed conflict through impotence and indecision, and
victimizes the modern warfighter by leaving her outside the
protections of the law; denying her the higher purpose of ending the
armed conflict; and, reducing her to the legal peer of the criminals 64
she is forced to oppose.
Id.
This refers to the enemy combatants that disregard the principles of jus in
bello by failing to distinguish themselves by wearing a uniform and carrying arms
openly, among other violations. They can be labeled as criminals because they do
63
64
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A. Trend 1: the Jus ad bellum’s Veneer Over Jus ad bello
As already outlined and discussed throughout this article, jus
ad bellum and jus in bello are separable concepts. The public is
comfortable and familiar with evaluating the merits of a given side in
an armed conflict; it is a regular part of the political discourse and the
fundamentals of jus ad bellum are similar to the restrictions on the use
of force they face in everyday life. Public discourse is a good thing
and the decision to enter an armed conflict should be widely and
publicly debated. However, politicians, commentators, jurists, and
academics then allow this jus ad bellum decision to enter an armed
conflict to color and affect how they discuss and evaluate the legality
of the combatant’s acts in jus in bello. The conflation of jus ad bellum
and jus in bello is both legally and morally problematic.65 The two
concepts are distinct but can become blurred when the reasons
behind why a State entered an armed conflict are suspect or without
merit.
World War II is a perfect example to compare one State’s
Soldier with another: the German Soldier and his American
counterpart. The German Soldier was a product of an evil State. But
the rules governing the German Soldier in combat are identical to the
rules that govern the U.S. Soldier in combat. The validity of a jus ad
bellum claim that a war is unjust is totally irrelevant to the legality of a
given warlike act of a Soldier. As the Just War Theorist Professor
Michael Walzer notes, just wars can be fought unjustly and unjust
not possess privileged belligerency and therefore all of their acts of violence, to
include the killing of uniformed enemy, are subject to criminal prosecution.
65 This issue has been identified in the DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL:
“As a general matter, jus in bello and jus ad bellum address different legal issues
and should not be conflated. Conflating jus in bello and jus ad bellum risks
misunderstanding and misapplying these concepts. For example, in jus ad bellum,
proportionality refers to the principle that the overall goal of the State in resorting
to war should not be outweighed by the harm that the war is expected to produce.
However, proportionality in jus in bello generally refers to the standard that the
expected incidental harm to the civilian population and civilian objects should not
be disproportionate to the anticipated military advantage from an attack. Therefore,
although a jus ad bellum proportionality analysis might consider the harm suffered by
enemy military forces in the fighting, a jus in bello proportionality analysis would
not.” Id. at 3.5.1.
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wars can be fought justly.66 While politics are a necessary part of jus
ad bellum,67 we should be careful to keep politics from affecting any jus
in bello legal determinations and adjudication just like we try to keep
politics out of our domestic criminal law decisions.
This task is difficult enough without being linked to the
modern international criminal tribunal whose jurists do not share a
common polity with the defendant or even with each other. While
these same conditions existed at Nuremberg, many of those judges
were military officers fully aware that the decisions they made would
affect their profession. Conversely, few judges at the international
tribunals have any military experience.68 This lack of military
experience is evident in many of our politicians, commentators,
jurists, and academics; the result is that they tend to be far more
familiar with and accepting of the criminal law and jus ad bellum goals
of maintaining the peace rather than the jus in bello mission of rapidly
ending the war.
B. Trend 2: The Current Mindset for War: From the Management
of Violence to the Management of Governance
The role of the modern military is changing and today’s
militaries face great uncertainty. New technologies and capabilities to
inflict harm are not only held by States but are in the hands of nonState actors.69 In War From the Ground Up, Emily Simpson divides
modern conflict into two categories: war fought “to establish military

WALZER supra note 29, at 21.
For example, the Article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution give the
power to declare war to the most political of the three branches of the Federal
Government: Congress.
68 For a discussion of the cost of a lack of military experience among
Tribunal judges, see Richard V. Meyer, Following Historical Precedent: An Argument for
the Continued Use of Military Professionals as Triers of Fact in Some Humanitarian Law
Tribunals, 7 J. OF INT’L CRIM. JUST. 43 (2009).
69 A byproduct of the post-industrial information age is that the raw
materials and the knowledge to manufacture or develop potent weapons are both
readily available to the general populace.
66
67
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conditions for a political solution;”70 and war fought to “directly seek
political, as opposed to military, outcomes.”71 The Gulf War from
1990 to 1991 is a modern example of the first type while Afghanistan
is an example of the second. The reality of having a strategy that
needs “to consider military actions in terms of their likely political
interpretations”72 will persist. As Simpson correctly notes, General
Stanley McChrystal, the Commander of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2009, restricted the use of
both indirect fires and air-delivered bombs not because “they are . . .
effective in military terms; they are. However, their political effect is
often more harmful than their military value.”73 McChrystal put it in
more general terms in his tactical directive: “the carefully controlled
and disciplined employment of force entails risk to our troops – and
we must mitigate that risk wherever possible. But excessive use of
force resulting in an alienated population will produce far greater
risk.”74 The political and the military become blurred: “A policy
decision only to fight wars with clear military solutions would mean
to decline involvement in several situations in which enemies,
especially non-state actors, refuse to engage in conventional battle
against Western military forces.”75
In 1957, Professor Samuel Huntington wrote The Soldier and
the State, in which he outlined what constituted a professional
Soldier.76 Professor Huntington opined the Soldier’s purpose was
“the management of violence.”77 But the modern Soldier is asked to
do much more. Today’s Soldier is asked to manage governance:
Soldiers build schools, teach judges, manage power plants, grow

Sir Michael Howard, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (Apr. 13, 2013)
(reviewing ERNIE SIMPSON,’ WAR FROM THE GROUND UP: TWENTY-FRISTCENTURY COMBAT AS POLITICS (2013 [hereinafter “Simpson”]).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 4.
73 Id. at 234.
74 Declassified excerpt from NATO’s Tactical Directive, 2 July 2009,
released by NATO ISAF Headquarters, 6 July 2009.
75 Howard, supra note 70, at 11
76 SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE (1957).
77 Id. at 16.
70
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crops.78 Even in non-permissive environments, Soldiers are expected
to mitigate violence. In concept, mitigating violence is attractive, but
in practice, the asymmetric enemy is unlikely to give the Soldier any
indication that he or she is a belligerent.
One example of this thinking is the U.S. Army and the U.S.
Marine Corps manual for counterinsurgency (COIN).79
Understanding the asymmetric reality of both Iraq and Afghanistan,
the military decided in the mid-2000s to redraft the COIN manual. In
particular, the situation in Iraq had deteriorated and the insurgency
was gaining momentum. The manual, published in June 2006,
acknowledged “[a]t its core, counterinsurgency warfare is a struggle
for the support of the population. Their protection and welfare is the
center of gravity for friendly fire.”80 One of the enumerated
‘unsuccessful practices’ in the counterinsurgency manual was the
warning not to place a “priority on killing and capturing the
enemy. . .”81 The goal instead is to engage and protect the population.
Counterinsurgency is an example of the second form of
warfare discussed by Simpson; Counterinsurgency’s core mission is
to make a political reality happen. This means political factors are
primary. In the case of Afghanistan, it was the popular legitimacy of
the government. In the words of Ambassador Karl Eikenberry,
“[b]roadly stated, modern COIN doctrine stresses the need to protect
civilian populations, eliminate insurgent leaders and infrastructure,
and help establish a legitimate and accountable host-nation
government able to deliver essential human services.”82
The COIN doctrine allows the use of force, to include lethal
force, but the entire narrative of the manual is to constrain the use of
force:

78 Dominic Tierney, Op-Ed., Jefferson’s Army of Nation Builders, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2010.
79 Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting
Publication 3-33.5, December 2006 [hereinafter “COIN Manual”], at Preface.
80 Id. at 1.1.
81 Id.
82 Karl W. Eikenberry, The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan:
The Other Side of the COIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2013, at 59, 63.
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[a]ny use of force generates a series of
reactions. . . .the type and amount of force to be
applied, and who wields it, should be carefully
calculated by a counterinsurgent for any operation.
An operation that kills five insurgents is
counterproductive if the collateral damage or the
creation of blood feuds leads to the recruitment of
fifty more. 83
This rationale and logic was clear in the 2011 tactical directive
of the Commander of ISAF, General John R. Allen, which stated:
[c]onsider all use of force carefully. Ensure that the
use of force is necessary and proportionate to the
threat faced, and when applied it is precisely
delivered. We must never forget the center of gravity
in this campaign is the Afghan people; the citizens of
Afghanistan will ultimately determine the future of
their country.84
During the same time frame the COIN concept was being
developed within the Department of Defense, the Office of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff enacted a breathtaking change
to the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE): individual Soldiers no
longer enjoyed the personal right of self-defense.85 Individual selfdefense became a subset of unit self-defense and exercised by the
unit commander: “unit commanders may limit individual self-defense
by members of their unit.”86 The theoretical foundation of individual
self-defense is premised on three pillars: the force used is necessary;
the amount of force used is proportional; and the threat is imminent.
In the previous editions of the SROE, the U.S. recognized each

COIN Manual, paragraph 1-141
ISAF Tactical Directive, 30 November 2011, found at
http://www.rs.nato.int/images/docs/20111105%20nuc%20tactical%20directive%
20revision%204%20(releaseable%20version)%20r.pdf.
85 Joint Chief’s of Staff Instruction 3121.01B, Standing Rules of
Engagement, 13 June 2005 at para. E.2.a.
86 Id.
83
84
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Soldier possessed the “inherent right to use all necessary means
available and to take appropriate actions to defend oneself. . . .” 87
The suspension of an individual Soldier’s right of self-defense
and the ascent of the COIN doctrine are inextricably related; the
concept of limiting the use of force is woven throughout the
counterinsurgency manual.88 The suspension and ascent are related by
time, effect, and circumstances on the ground in both Afghanistan
and Iraq in 2004 and 2005. There was a conclusion that military
commanders could not use violence to win the conflict. And the
COIN doctrine, by its very nature, and the suspension of selfdefense, limits the use of force.
The COIN doctrine during an insurgency is not ill-advised;
this doctrine is a legitimate means to execute a war. But the desire to
limit force has a profound effect on a State’s military. The
management of violence by the Soldier under COIN is the exception;
now, under Simpson’s second paradigm, the Soldier is focused on
managing governance. The military activity is no longer clearly
distinguishable from the political activity by the Soldier on behalf of
State. This means we enter a conflict where military violence is
eschewed. Conditions allowing the use of force to be confined and
constrained is, however, a policy decision. Counterinsurgency policy
does not change the law that applies to combatants in conflict. It
does, however, change the public’s mindset of what war constitutes.
The public begins to think we can produce results with limited force.
It then becomes the expectation – especially from the public, via the
press – that any force which results in a death of an innocent is the
exception. It drives the public to believe the resultant damage or
death is the salient factor in considering if a force was justified to
begin with.
In other words, civilian criminal law standards start to apply
to privileged belligerents on the battlefield. Terms like self-defense,
necessity, and proportionality exist both within criminal law and jus in
bello. This leads some to think the jus in bello standards imbedded in
Joint Chief’s of Staff Instruction 3121.01A, Standing Rules of
Engagement, 15 January 2000 at Enclosure A, para. 5.a.
88 COIN Manual, supra note 79.
87
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IHL are the same language: the same concepts and meaning
extrapolated from civilian criminal law. The media, commentators,
and even jurists are guilty of this mistake. The fact is, although the
vocabulary may be similar, the meaning of these terms is tectonically
different. This category of conflation error has recently arisen within
the decisions of the international tribunals.
C. Trend 3: Criminalization of the Use of Force by International
Courts
Military objectives are central to the use of violence by a
military commander. Military objectives are “limited to those objects
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time,
offers a definite military advantage.”89 The sad reality is that civilians,
who are protected by IHL, will inevitably be in areas of armed
conflict and exposed to harm. It is therefore universally recognized,
in the words of Professor Geoffrey Corn, “that the principle of
military objective is insufficient to provide adequate protection for
civilians from the harmful effects of hostilities.”90 With this reality in
mind, military professionals, through customary practice, developed
the jus in bello principles of distinction and proportionality. These
were recorded by the drafters of the Geneva Conventions Additional
Protocol, which prohibits 1) attacks that are intentionally against
civilians and 2) attacks that produce excessive civilian casualties in
relation to the concrete military objective.91
The first prohibition is intent based; the second is a balancing
of military objectives and the civilian casualties and determining if the
latter was excessive. The first violates the principle of distinction,
while the second violates the principle of proportionality. Distinction,
as noted earlier, is the obligation of military personnel to delineate
Additional Protocol I, 52(2).
Expert Report of Professor Geoffrey Corn to the ICTY for the case of
The Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Ivan Cermak and Mladen Markac, IT-06-90, at
12.
91 Additional Protocol I, 48 & 51(5)(b).
89
90

137

DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

4/27/2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:1

between combatants and civilians. Proportionality is a much more
ambiguous concept because it is subjective; proportionality is
violated, in essence, when it is determined that the harm to civilians
was excessive to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated from attacking a lawful military objective. Professor Jens
David Ohlin of Cornell University concludes, “that there are almost
no examples of [proportionality-based] prosecutions before
international tribunals that might provide guiding precedent on the
nature of proportionality.”92 Professor Ohlin maintains that
proportionality “has so rarely been applied by international tribunals”
because prosecutors “squeeze almost all of the targeting cases into
the first [prong], thus accusing the commander in question of directly
targeting civilians. . . .”93
Outlining a series of cases with the International Tribunal of
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Professor Ohlin concludes the
common law concept of intent—acting with purpose or
knowledge—required under the first prong of intentionally attacking
civilians within the ICTY has morphed to the lower standard of
recklessness. In other words, the court never has to grapple with the
murky world of proportionality found in the second prong. The case
that crystallizes this lower standard is The Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar.94
In Strugar, the defendant, Lieutenant General Strugar, was a
leader in the then Yugoslav Peoples’ Army.95 The Yugoslav
government, in an attempt to hold Yugoslavia together, was
attempting to suppress the Croatian people from breaking away.96 As
part of this suppression, General Strugar shelled areas of Dubrovnik,
Croatia in late 1991.97 These artillery attacks killed several civilians

Jens David Ohlin, Targeting and the Concept of Intent, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 79
at 86 [hereinafter “Ohlin”].
93 Id.
94 Id. citing Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia (Jan. 31, 2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/strugar/tjug/en/str-tj050131e.pdf.
[hereinafter
“Strugar”].
95 Id. at 1.
96 Id.
97 Id.
92
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and destroyed many historic buildings.98 The defendant was charged
with murder and the intentional attacks on civilians. He was found
guilty and sentenced to eight years.99 The Trial Chamber held:
. . . where a civilian population is subject to an attack
such as an artillery attack, which results in civilian
deaths, such deaths may appropriately be
characterized as murder, when the perpetrators had
knowledge of the probability that the attack would cause
death.100
The mere probability the attack would cause death is enough
to trigger a charge of an intentional harming of civilians. The concept
of intent—acting with either purpose or knowledge—under Strugar
expanded to recklessness. This lower standard means a commander
who launches an attack where there is a probability civilians might be
injured or killed is violating IHL; in other words, the commander
launching the attack is a war criminal because of mere probability and
the accompanying result that the harm occurred. In war, it would be
hard to fathom a situation where harm might not befall the civilian
population, especially in an age of asymmetric warfare where the
enemy refuses to distinguish himself from the civilian population.
What is occurring is that the law is being driven by the
results, not the intent. War causes death and destruction and some of
those harmed will be civilians. To minimize those losses is of
paramount import, but to make the standard of culpability one of
recklessness subject to an after-the-fact review is to impose an
unrealistic limitation on the military. And conceptually, it flips IHL
on its head. Professor Ohlin states the conceptual underpinnings of
IHL: “envisioning the killing of civilians and coming to some
conclusion as to whether the number of deaths will be proportionate
or not disproportionate – does not violate the principle of
distinction. Simply envisioning the deaths of civilians does not mean
the commander has directed the attack against the civilians.”101 If that
Id.
Id. at 198.
100 Id. at 110.
101 Ohlin, supra note 92, at 113.
98
99
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were the case, no Soldier would be immune from the reality that in
war civilians will be killed and thereby making Soldiers criminally
liable to this reality.
Even the mental element in Article 30 of the Rome Statute of
1998—the Statute that established the International Criminal Court
(ICC)—states “[u]nless otherwise provided, a person shall be
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within
the jurisdiction of the Court [ICC] only in the material elements are
committed with intent and knowledge.”102 A plain reading of Article
30 seems to suggest the defendant must act with purpose or
knowledge to be culpable. In fact, recklessness as a standard to meet
culpability was considered by the drafters of the Rome Statute and
squarely rejected: the mental element of recklessness was banished
from the Statute.103 Put differently, even if an accused foresees the
possibility of his or her act causing death and still persists, regardless of
the possible consequences, the person is not guilty of a war crime
unless the accused had knowledge civilians would be killed and he or
she meant to kill those civilians.
But some judges and commentators cite Article 30 and the
“unless otherwise provided” clause to conclude recklessness is
enough to find culpability. Recklessness, they argue, is a level of
intent that is an acceptable standard under customary international
law and therefore, otherwise provided; that is, it is an acceptable
mental state for war crimes.104 Professor Ohlin notes, however, “it is
not clear how customary international law could provide a basis to
support a lower mental element.”105 This revisionist interpretation of
what Article 30 means is critical because it changes the focus from
what the Soldier thinks will happen to what an objective person
thinks might happen. Those are two starkly different perspectives. The
former is a mental state possessed by the Soldier when he uses force,
while the latter is about the degree of risk the Soldier takes. Any
military mission will have risks that the Soldier’s acts could cause the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (entered into force
July 1, 2002) at Article 30 [hereinafter “Rome Statute”].
103 Id.; Ohlin supra note 92, at 101.
104 Strugar, supra note 94, at 110.
105 Ohlin, supra note 92, at 108.
102
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death of a civilian – if that is the acid test, however, then any mission
will be judged under the first prong of willfully targeting civilians.
Under this analysis, the courts approach a strict liability: the dead
civilian is presumptively a war crime.
The courts’ decisions and even the far better justified opinion
of Professor Ohlin both make the same conflation error; attempting
to use traditional criminal law concepts to explain terms in jus in bello.
Professor Ohlin falls for the trap of using the common law definition
of intentional (including purpose and knowledge) to define the term
within the Protocol and opening this door invites the subsequent step
down to recklessness. This first prong actually has two parts: A) who
or what was targeted, and B) were they or it a legitimate military
target?
Part A is entirely subjective. Who were you targeting?
Combatants are prohibited from conducting indiscriminate attacks.
Instead, each attack must have a specific legitimate military target.
Thus, for the first prong, the standard is that of motivated purpose.
As the then Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
noted, “International humanitarian law and the Rome Statute permit
belligerents to carry out proportionate attacks against military
objectives even when it is known that some civilian deaths or injuries
will occur.”106 To use any other standard would be to completely
eliminate the principle of proportionality. That principle forces the
attacker to balance the military advantage with the collateral damage,
meaning the attacker has knowledge a civilian target will be damaged
and yet can still strike if the military advantage outweighs the
collateral cost. The crux is who or what did they plan for the
projectile to hit?
For part B, if the target was a valid military target, this part
has not been violated even if the strike (knowingly) killed dozens of
innocent civilians collaterally, though this would probably violate the
second prong of proportionality. More problematic is if the shooter
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, letter concerning the situation in Iraq, Office of
the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, February 9, 2006, p. 5, available at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February
_2006.pdf.
106
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subjectively believed the target to be a valid military target, but in fact
it was not. For example, Captain Kudo shot the two diggers on the
side of the road in Afghanistan believing they were planting a bomb,
but afterwards we determine they were only digging an irrigation
canal. It is in this second prong that a level of intent less than
purpose might be appropriate. On a static battlefield (e.g., trench
warfare) segregated from the civilian population, it might be
justifiable to issue an order to shoot anything moving in the no man’s
land between the trenches since there is little or no chance it is a
civilian and taking the time to verify it is an enemy may place the
Soldier at risk. This would be in contrast to a modern asymmetric
nonlinear global battlefield. Given these opposite poles of possibility
and correlative responsibility, the sliding scales of recklessness or
negligence seem to provide the best vehicle to balance the myriad of
factors and concerns. However, post hoc evaluation of any such
decision must give full credence to the factual situation for that
belligerent: would a reasonable privileged belligerent with the
knowledge, training, time, resources, and experience of the defendant
have believed the target was lawful? Note this does not open the door
to question if the attack was tactically required at that time under this
prong, but only if the belief of the shooter that the target was a
military target was reasonable under the circumstances.
On at least one occasion, the ICTY grappled with the second
prong: attacks that produce excessive civilian casualties in relation to
the concrete military objective. In the case of The Prosecutor v. Ante
Gotovina, et al.107, Colonel General Ante Gotovina, a Croatian
commander, was indicted for ordering an illegal artillery attack
against four towns—Knin, Obrovac, Gracic and Benkovac.108 Each
city was in the Croatian Serb break-away region of Krajina. Croatia
launched an offensive—Operation Storm—in 1995 to bring this
region back under Croatian control. The Croatian forces commenced
to put the towns of Knin, Obrovac, Gracic and Benkovac under
fire.109 The objective of Operation Storm was to expel Serbian forces
from the region. The Croatian forces succeeded under General
The Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Ivan Cermak and Mladen Markac, IT06-90 [hereinafter “Gotovina”].
108 Id. at 9.
109 Id. at 601.
107
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Gotovina; they seized Knin, the capital of Krajina, on August 5,
1995.110
The Tribunal’s indictment of General Gotovina for violations
of the laws and customs of war hinged on his shelling of the four
towns. The Trial Chamber found General Gotovina guilty of
violating these laws and customs. As one academic concluded,
“Gotovina’s conviction turns on the lawfulness vel non of the
artillery fires against targets in the[se] Krajina towns. . . .”111
The Trial Court’s judgment of Gotovina appears to be
premised on both prongs of liability: the attacks were intentional (i.e.,
deliberately toward civilians), and the attacks were indiscriminate (i.e.,
an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated).112 As Major General Walter B.
Huffman, the former Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army,
noted, “the court apparently embraced a hybrid theory of both
deliberate and indiscriminate targeting in violation of Protocol I,
Articles 51(2) and 51(5)(a).113 Under Article 51(2), the first prong—
”civilians [] shall not be the object of attack”—Gotovina “deliberately
targeted civilian areas.”114 Under Article 51(5), the second prong—the
balancing of the military advantage gained to the amount and severity
of civilian casualties —Gotovina’s shelling “constituted an
indiscriminate attack on these towns. . .”115
Both prongs are premised on an inference that shells that
landed more than 200 meters from a known military objective were
deemed unlawful (deliberate or indiscriminate) attacks on civilian

Id.
Walter B. Huffman, Margin of Error: Potential Pitfalls of the Ruling in the
Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, 211 MIL. L. REV. 1, 13 (2012) [hereinafter “Huffman”].
112 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 12; Additional
Protocol I, Art. 51(5)(b).
113 Huffman, supra note 111, at 28.
114 Gotovina, supra note 107, at 973
115 Huffman, supra note 111, at 28.
110
111
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areas.116 With little evidentiary support, the Trial Chamber concluded
“a reasonable interpretation of the evidence that those artillery
projectiles which impacted within a distance of 200 meters of
identified artillery targets were deliberately fired at that artillery
target.”117 The court then extrapolated from this norm that any
projectile falling outside the 200-meter range was disproportionate.118
The Trial Chamber’s decree of a 200-meter rule—without
receiving any evidence on this point—is deeply troubling: “the court
had to make broad assumptions, treat the absence of evidence as
evidence of absence, and resolve ambiguities in favor of the
prosecution to be able to apply its 200 meter standard.”119 The logic
in the Gotovina case extends the trend outlined by Professor Olin that
the threshold of liability is lowered, but in this case, it goes to the
second prong. International Tribunals’ attempt to shoehorn all
civilian deaths into an intentional act, even if reckless, under the first
prong (the military commander knew there would be civilians
casualties), is driven by the prosecutor’s theory of the case. Opening
the aperture to recklessness is concerning and fraught with dangers.
In essence, the court’s focus is on the post-hoc effects of the
military’s attack instead of what is required by IHL; that commanders
act in good faith to do all within their capabilities and limitations to
minimize civilian casualties while accomplishing their mission.120 The
Gotovina Court, however, introduces a per se rule into the subjectivity
of proportionality. The court dictates that since the commander
exceeded the 200-meter rule, he is per se excessive under the second
prong.
When triggering a per se rule, an international tribunal never
has to contend with the commander’s intent and examine his goodfaith precautions to spare innocence. Like reducing intentionality to
mere recklessness, the court sidestepped the rigorous balancing
116 Gotovina,
supra
note
107
(Summary
at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/tjug/en/110415_summary.pdf).
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Huffman, supra note 111, at 36.
120 ICRC Commentary on International Humanitarian Law, note 22 at para.
2215.
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analysis required under the principle of proportionality. Instead, the
Gotovina Court relied on a strict liability of violating some abstract
rule of distance to find liability. To abandon this balancing test is
problematic to say the least.
As General Huffman concludes, “[a] hallmark of international
humanitarian law is its consistency with the actual practice of warfare
by civilized nations.”121 The court’s per se 200-meter rule, made out
of whole cloth, alters the timeframe to be examined; in other words,
the moment in time for consideration is shifted from the time of
attack to the time the collateral damage occurs. This is contrary to
IHL in that the question of whether the commander killed or injured
civilians becomes the locus of judgment instead of examining the
commander’s military necessity at the time of attack. Even the
commentary to the Additional Protocols acknowledges that under the
second prong, when determining if the harm to civilians is excessive
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from an
attack of a lawful military objective, the perspective to be examined is
the military commander’s before the attack.122 It is the prosecution’s
obligation under the customs and laws of war to show there was a
criminal intent by the commander when he ordered the attack. The
destructive results are evidence but nothing in the law requires, nor
should it, the results be the driver. It is the commander’s intent at the
time.
The Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber’s
conviction and found the 200-meter rule to be arbitrary; it further
concluded the civilian casualties were not excessive compared to the
military advantage from shelling the four towns. 123 As one military
and artillery expert opined, “I can state unequivocally that a circle of
200 m[eters] around a target could never serve as a realistic or proper

Huffman, supra note 111, at 45.
Commentary to the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions at
pp. 683,684.
123 Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia (Nov.. 16, 2012) at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/acjug/en/121116_judgement.pdf at pp.
19-21.
121
122
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standard for a sound assessment of cannon and rocket fire. . . .”124
Although set aside, the Gotovina Trial Court opened the door for
international tribunals to stitch new rules out of whole cloth that
impose criminal liability on commanders. As General Gotovina’s
appeal correctly asserts the judgment “has far-reaching significance
beyond [his] case. . . . The Judgment is an unreasonable and
unrealistic precedent that undermines that credibility and relevance of
[international] humanitarian law. It imposes a standard so exacting
that it renders lawful warfare impossible for military commanders.”125
Professor Corn submitted an expert report before the trial
court and in subsequent writings opined that the Tribunal was left
with differing opinions on the reasonableness of General Gotovina’s
judgment.126 Professor Corn’s concern is that the International
Tribunal seemed to base its reasonableness of Gotovina’s actions on
an assessment of whether a commander considered evidence in
support of his decision. 127 But this should not be the standard in a
criminal proceeding for reasonableness. Instead, the gravamen of the
proceedings should be “on the quality of the evidence that supported
the [commander’s] decision.”128 In a nutshell, Professor Corn makes
the point that, “[i]nstead of focusing on the question of whether the
commander reasonably believed the object of attack was a military
objective, the Tribunal has focused on the question of whether the
commander knew the object of attack was a civilian or civilian
property.”129
The reality is that any criminal judgment of a Soldier using
force will be after the fact—post hoc. The test must be one of
Huffman citing Comments and Conclusions by GenMaj (ret.) Rolf Th.
Ocken, German Army, on the Subject “Croatian Army use of Artillery in KNIN,
CROATIA on 4-5 August 1995,” (Nov. 19, 2011).
125 Notice of Appeal of Ante Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-A, May 16,
2011, found at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/custom6/en/110516.pdf at
pp 4-5.
126 Geoffrey S. Corn, Targeting, Command Judgement, and a Proposed Quantum of
Information Component: A Fourth Amendment Lesson in Contextual Reasonableness, 77
Brook. L. Rev. 437, 456-457.
127 Id. at 458.
128 Id.
129 Id.
124
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reasonableness, but the analysis should start with what information
did the commander have at the time? Professor Corn was “struck by
the inherent arbitrariness of [the court’s] assessment.”130 Professor
Corn writes, “[w]hile it seemed relatively apparent that the Presiding
Judge was determined to critique the reasonableness of General
Gotovina’s judgments by carefully considering all the facts and
circumstances prevailing at the time, there was never any discussion
of the amount of proof required to render those judgments
reasonable.”131
This lack of standard will inevitably drive a judicial appraisal
to make determinations on what occurred after the fact vice the
considerations and deliberations of the Soldier before the fact. The
real question is: do the military actions have a reasonable basis in
military necessity? The presumption must be yes. To presume
otherwise would lead to the post hoc critiquing of a commander’s
actions based on what occurred, instead of the commander’s intent as
expressed by his orders.
D. Trend 4: Revising Jus in bello Without Considering the Effect on
the Innocent Warfighter
Jus in bello is the evolved product of centuries of customary
practice. Professional warfighters with battlefield experience have
balanced humanitarian goals with the moral and legal mandate to end
the conflict as quickly as possible and the rights and respect owed the
individual warfighter to create the principles of jus in bello. By
developing through customary practice, these principles were able to
evolve without threatening the military mission or unjustly
victimizing the warfighter. The battlefield is so dissimilar to everyday
life because its denizens operate outside the protections of the law.
The battlefield is not the place for external academic, untested, newidea-driven change. Sadly, this has not dissuaded some from
attempting exactly that.

130
131

Id. at 457.
Id.
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In 2009, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) sent a shock wave across the international legal community.
The ICRC published its Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of
Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian
Law. In this Interpretive Guidance, written by Nils Melzer, the
following recommendation was proposed:
Restraint on the use of force in direct attack
In addition to the restraints imposed by international
humanitarian law on specific means and methods of
warfare, and without prejudice to further restrictions
that may arise under other applicable branches of
international law, the kind and degree of force which
is permissible against persons not entitled to
protection against direct attack must not exceed what
is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate
military purpose in the prevailing circumstances.132
It was the phrase “must not exceed what is actually
necessary”133 that caused the firestorm. The ICRC recommended a
use-of-force continuum theory, or as some academics refer to it, the
‘least harmful means rule.’ In the Interpretive Guidance, the ICRC
goes on to explain what it meant by necessary:
[i]n sum, while operating forces can hardly be
required to take additional risks for themselves or the
civilian population in order to capture an armed
adversary alive, it would defy basic notions of
humanity to kill an adversary or to refrain from giving
him or her an opportunity to surrender where there
manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force. 134

ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, adopted February 26, 2009. at
996.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1043.
132
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The footnote substantiating this claim quotes the writings of
Jean Pictet, once the President of the ICRC and the lead editor of the
authoritative commentary of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Pictet
opined: “[i]f we can put a Soldier out of action by capturing him, we
should not wound him; if we can obtain the same result by wounding
him, we must not kill him. . . .”135
Other academics have also advanced a ‘least harmful means
rule.’ Professor Goodman of New York University used the ICRC
Interpretive Guidance as a springboard to argue a ‘least harmful
means rule,’ “should be understood to have a solid foundation in the
structure, rules, and practices of modern warfare.”136 His argument is
grounded in Article 41(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, which
mandates the safeguarding of hors de combat—those combatants
outside the fight. 137 Goodman argues, like the Interpretive Guidance,
“a Soldier who is rendered defenseless or incapable of resistance
should not be subject to attack.”138 He expands the conceptual
definition of hors de combat and argues an enemy combatant should
be treated like a hors de combat when “there is clearly no military
benefit (including any risk to one’s own forces) to be gained from
killing rather than capturing an individual.”139 This includes situations
where the enemy combatant could still physically engage in hostilities
but does not. Like the Interpretive Guidance, Professor Goodman
suggests that considerations of military necessity and humanity
should guide the determination of how to conduct an engagement. 140
His theoretical basis for abandoning the well-entrenched rule that
members of an enemy belligerency qualify as lawful objects of attack
at all times and all places for as long as they remain under the
operational command and control of enemy leadership and are
physically capable of acting on that authority 141 is to limit the scope of
Id. at 1044
Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EUR. J.
INT’L .L. 819 (2013) [hereinafter “Goodman”].
137 Id. & Additional Protocol 1, Art. 85(3).
138 Goodman, supra note 136, at 830.
139 Id. at 839.
140 Id.
141 Geoffrey S. Corn, Laurie R. Blank, Chris Jenks & Eric Talbot Jensen,
Belligerent Targeting and the Invalidity of a Least Harmful Means Rule, 89 INT’L L. STUD.
536, 538 (2013) [hereinafter “Corn et al.”].
135
136
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military necessity.142 In other words, an enemy belligerent who would
do no harm; that is, defenseless, is not militarily necessary to kill.
Other academics echo this conclusion:
[T]he current interpretation of ‘necessary’ as including
what is less costly or less risky or even merely
convenient allows too broad a discretion for forces to
attack available—rather than clearly ‘necessary’—
targets. To bring the term ‘necessary’ closer to its
literal meaning, it should include a least-harmful
means component; it is entirely possible to conceive
of ‘necessary’ as the least measure of harm by which
to achieve a desired end.143
The challenges with the ICRC’s rationale, along with the
scholarship of Professor Goodman, are fourfold. First, there is
absolutely no requirement under state practice or international law,
namely the 1977 Additional Protocol of the Geneva Conventions, for
a combatant to do a ‘military necessity’ analysis of an enemy
belligerent; the Soldier need not to look to a ‘least harmful means
rule’ as to whether the Soldier should capture the enemy belligerent
or kill him. Given that military necessity “justifies those measures not
forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing
the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible,”144 killing
an enemy belligerent is per se permissible. The enemy belligerent takes
a status under IHL of being a military target. The rationale is simple:
“military necessity admits of all destruction of life or limb of armed
enemies.”145 As noted Law of War expert Hays Parks concluded,
“[t]here is no ‘military necessity’ determination requirement for an
individual Soldier to engage an enemy combatant or a civilian

Goodman, supra note 136, at 830.
Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 115,
161 (2011).
144 See Note 25.
145 W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study:
No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769, 804
(2010) [hereinafter “Parks”].
142
143
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determined to be taking a direct part in hostilities, any more than
there is for a Soldier to attack an enemy tank.”146
The second challenge is one of shifting burdens. Under
current international law, the burden is on the enemy belligerent to
indicate his surrender affirmatively. This assumes the enemy
belligerent is not a hors de combat—”rendered unconscious or is
otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is
incapable of defending himself.”147 Professor Michael Schmitt of the
Naval War College makes the point, “[a] rule that prohibits an attack
whenever the individual can be captured would shift the burden from
the fighter to the attacker in a way that warfighting states would have
been, and remain, unlikely to countenance.”148 These States would
not adhere to such a shift in burden because it would add a layer of
complexity to military operations—training, implementation,
accountability—that is simply unsustainable. The reality is, “the
historic consequence of combat is that combatants lawfully may kill
their enemies and are at constant risk of being killed by them.”149
Related to the shifting burden States would eschew, the third
troubling point about the ICRC’s proposal is its lack of practicality.
In the words of Professors Geoffrey Corn, Laurie Blank, Chris Jenks,
and Eric Talbot Jensen:
once the law requires that Soldiers assess the actual
threat an enemy combatant poses, the inevitable
consequence of a rule that requires less harmful
means based on the absence of an actual threat, the
effectiveness of combat capability risks dilution, and
tactical clarity will be degraded. . . . [and] [d]iluting
tactical clarity will inevitably dilute . . . moral clarity.150

Id.
Additional Protocol 1, Art. 41.
148 Michael N. Schmitt, Wound, Capture, or Kill: A Reply to Ryan Goodman’s
‘The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants’, 24 EUR. J. INT’L .L. 855, 858 (2013).
149 Parks, supra note 145, at 829.
150 Corn et al., supra note 141, at 567-568.
146
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Once the element of subjectivity enters the equation, moral
clarity—whether it is at the tactical, operational, or strategic level—
exits. Professors Corn, Blank, Jenks, and Jensen make a compelling
case that not giving the Soldier the clarity of whether he can engage
and shoot an enemy belligerent will result in hesitation, confusion, or
create a chilling effect on what the Soldier is asked to do: engage with
and destroy the enemy. The second-guessing with the benefit of
20/20 hindsight will cripple a Soldier’s certainty that when he
engages with the enemy, his mission, as has been the mission of
Soldiers for centuries before him, is to kill the enemy. And “the
assurance and knowledge that the always difficult decision to take
another human life was legally and operationally justified. . . .”151 is
critical to a Soldier’s mental and moral compass. The authors of this
article go one step further: the ‘least harmful means rule’ would
eviscerate moral clarity in the fog of war.
The fourth concern is that the ‘least harmful means rule’ is
actually the conflation of two legal regimes: IHL and domestic law
norms outlined within human rights law (HRL). Under HRL, known
as the law enforcement regime, the use of lethal force is one of last
resort. When a law enforcement officer has reasonable alternatives,
he or she must exercise them. The criminal suspect in a domestic
context never takes a status of a military target; in laymen’s speak, the
criminal cannot be killed merely because of what he is suspected of
having done criminally. The compact in the law enforcement
paradigm is “to protect individuals from abuse by their State”152 of
which the suspect is a member. And when lethal force is used in the
domestic setting, it must be necessary, proportional, and imminent;
that is, the officer triggers a right of self-defense for himself or others
in the vicinity.
In the U.S. context, the Supreme Court has held that the use
of deadly force is reasonable under the Constitution and therefore
authorized when the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect
Id. at 620.
ICRC, The Use of Force in Armed Conflicts: Interplay between the
Conduct of Hostilities and Law Enforcement Paradigms at 7, found at
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4171.pdf [hereinafter
“Interplay”].
151
152
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is dangerous and can escape and a verbal warning, if feasible, is
given.153 On the other side of the equation, the Court has held that
“[w]here a suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no
threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him
does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.”154 It is the
criminal’s conduct that will drive the actions of the police officer.
The moral compact of the officer with the society they serve is the
basis for their authority: “human rights law regulates the resort to
force by State authorities in order to maintain or restore public
security, law and order.”155 Minimum force or a ‘least harmful means
rule’ in this context makes sense—lethal force is a measure of last
resort because of what the police officer is entrusted to accomplish.
This is not the logic behind IHL. The driving force behind
IHL is not to ensure public security, although that could be one the
military’s tasks; the main goal is to set parameters for Soldiers as
agents of the State on how to destroy the enemy. The cardinal rule of
the combatant is distinction—”parties to an armed conflict must at
all times distinguish between civilians and civilian objects on the one
hand, and combatants and military objectives on the other hand and
direct their attacks only against the latter.”156 Given this limitation on
the use of force, the Soldier, as an agent of the State, is told by the
State how to accomplish the goal of destroying the combatants and
military objectives. The use of force to accomplish the mission is
driven by the State. This collective action by the State uses the Soldier
to effectuate this goal because the State tells the Soldier what are the
policy limits of ‘military necessity’ to accomplish the mission. The
role and purpose of the police officer is fundamentally different, and
it is why the law enforcement paradigm is troubling in an armed
conflict scenario.

153
154
155
156

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985).
Id.
Interplay, supra note 152, at 7.
See note 33.
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E. Trend 5: Challenging the Use of Force by the Military in Civil
Courts that Lack Subject Matter Competence
Scholars and international organizations that would make it
more difficult for Soldiers to engage the enemy are but one prong of
the trend against the use of military force. The other prongs stem
from the legal profession: one of those prongs is the access litigants
have to the courtroom to challenge decisions made by military
personnel. The civil litigation exposure prong is best evidenced by a
string of recent cases emerging from the United Kingdom.
Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), drafted in 1950, states signatories “shall secure to everyone
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in . . . this
Convention.”157 The Convention, in its first substantive article,
Article 2, outlines a central pillar of human rights law: the right to
life.158 The Convention mandates that “[e]veryone’s right to life shall
be protected by law.”159 It does, however, give its signatories a caveat:
“[d]eprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in
contravention of this article when it results from the use of force
which is not more than absolutely necessary. . . .”160 To judicially
enforce these rights and freedoms, the convention established a
court: the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).161 This court,
which virtually all European countries have ratified, to include the
UK, can and has trumped the rulings of domestic courts.
The real battle line of when States have violated one’s right to
life has been the elasticity of the concept of jurisdiction; in other
words, does the right to life provision contained in Article 2—or any
other provision within the Convention, for that matter—have
extraterritorial application outside Europe? Of particular import is
whether this human rights norm applies to conflict areas like
Afghanistan and Iraq. In late 2001, the case of Bankovic et al. v. Belgium
et al was brought before the ECtHR by six citizens from the Federal
157
158
159
160
161

Article 1, European Convention on Human Rights (2010).
Id. at Article 2.
Id. at Art. 2(1).
Id. at Art. 2(2).
Id. at Art. 19-51.
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Republic of Yugoslavia against 17 European members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).162 The claim flowed from
NATO’s Operation Allied Force. This operation was an air campaign
directed at Yugoslavia in an effort to force Yugoslavia to remove its
forces from Kosovo.163 In the morning raid of April 23, 1999, NATO
bombs killed and injured scores of Yugoslavians.164 The claimants,
whose relatives died, alleged a violation of the right to life under
Article 2.165 The question for the ECtHR was whether there was
jurisdiction to allow the case to go forward. The ECtHR said
individuals killed by missiles or bombs fired from an aircraft outside
an area under the effective control of a State were not within the
State’s jurisdiction.166
The defendants in the Bankovic Case, the 17 NATO States,
argued that the term “jurisdiction” meant an “assertion or exercise of
legal authority, actual or purported, over persons owing some form
of allegiance to that State or who have been brought within that
State’s control.”167 The ECtHR seemed to agree. It proclaimed that
“the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial.”168
The Court went on to articulate that “Article 1 of the Convention
must be considered to reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial
notion of jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional
and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of
each case.”169 If extra-territorial jurisdiction was to exist, then the
State must militarily occupy or exercise all or some of the public
powers normally to be exercised by that territory’s government.170

Bankovic, Stojanovic, Stoimedovski, Joksimovic and Sukovic v. Belgium,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom, App. No. 52207/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), available at 41 I.L.M.
517 [hereinafter “Bankovic v. Belgium”].
163 Id. at pp 518-519.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 522.
166 Id. at pp. 523-524.
167 Id. at 522.
168 Id. at 526.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 528.
162
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In other words, a fair reading of Bankovic is that the
Convention’s extraterritorial jurisdiction must be exceptional.
Professor Marko Milanovic of the University of Nottingham,
however, traces the ECtHR’s slow abandonment of this norm. 171 In
2007, for example, the ECtHR in Pad and others v. Turkey found
jurisdiction when an Iranian family living near the Turkish-Iranian
border was killed by a missile.172 It was disputed where the attack
occurred but “the Court clearly thought that it would have been
entirely arbitrary for the application of the [European Court of
Human Rights] to hinge on the applicants’ location within a few
hundred metres.”173
Ten years after Bankovic, the ECtHR heard the case of AlSkeini v. United Kingdom.174 In Al-Skeini, six Iraqis brought suit against
the United Kingdom. The six claimants asserted the British failed to
conduct a full and thorough investigation into the deaths of their
family members; this, they maintained, was a procedural violation of
Article 2, the right to life.175 Five of the dead Iraqis died in fire fights
with the British troops. According to the British Government, British
troops were patrolling the streets of Basra one evening in August
2003 when they heard gunfire. As the Soldiers approached the
gunfire, the patrol leader saw several Iraqi men, including Mr. AlSkeini, with weapons; one of the Iraqi men pointed his weapon at
him and his unit. In self-defense, the British Soldier shot and killed
the Iraqi men. A subsequent investigation found that the Soldiers’
actions were a valid exercise of self-defense.176 The Iraqi testimony is
starkly different: the British Soldiers killed the Iraqis without
provocation and the reason one of the deceased Iraqis had a weapon
was because he was walking to a funeral and discharge of weapons at

171 Marko Milanovic, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, 23 EUR. J. INT’L
.L. 121 (2012) [hereinafter “Milanovic Al-Skeini”].
172 Id. at 124.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 121.
175 Id. at 125.
176 ECtHR, Al-Skeini et al. v. UK, App. No. 55721/07,7, 7 July 2011 at para.
34-62.
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funerals is common.177 In other words, the Iraqis maintained that
those killed never threatened the British Soldiers.
The sixth claimant in Al-Skeini drew the most scrutiny. Like
the other claimants, Mr. Baha Mousa’s father, on behalf of his son,
claimed that there had been an inadequate investigation. For Mr.
Mousa, however, is was for the asphyxiation death of Mr. Mousa in a
British detainment facility in Basra.178
The British House of Lords dismissed the claims of the five
Iraqis involved in the firefight.179 The majority applied an “effective
control” test. The United Kingdom never exercised effective control
over Basra, even though the British were an occupying power in
Basra and southern Iraq. The insurgency and the limited number of
British troops made effective control in Basra not possible. The Law
Lords cited Bankovic for the notion that the mere killing of an
individual does not trigger extraterritorial jurisdiction.180 The House
of Lords did find jurisdiction regarding the death of Baha Mousa, but
on the grounds that a British prison was like an embassy and
jurisdiction attached.181
The question before the ECtHR was what does “within their
jurisdiction” mean: when and where do the obligations outlined in
the ECHR—specifically the right to life under Article 2—apply? The
ECtHR, in essence, expanded Bankovic and opened the jurisdictional
aperture as follows:
. . . following the removal from power of the Ba’ath
regime and under the accession of the Interim
Government, the United Kingdom (together with the
United States) assumed in Iraq the exercise of some
of the public power normally to be exercised by a
sovereign government. In particular, the United
Id.
Id. at paras. 63-71.
179 R (on the application of Al-Skeini and others) v. Secretary of State for
Defense (2007) UKHL (2008) AC 153.
180 Id. at para. 83.
181 Id. at paras. 97 & 132.
177
178
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Kingdom assumed authority and responsibility for the
maintenance of security in South East Iraq. In these
exceptional circumstances, the Court considers that
the United Kingdom, through its Soldiers engaged in
security operations in Basrah during the period in
question, exercised authority and control over
individuals killed in the course of such security
operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional link
between the deceased and the United Kingdom for
the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. 182
This holding is extraordinarily expansive and can be read to
mean that when there are boots-on-the-ground Soldiers conducting
security operations, the reach of the ECTHR will extend to that
battlefield. Every army has “public power.” One principle mission of
a Soldier is to engage in security operations, especially in light of
COIN operations. The Al-Skeini Case extends jurisdiction, allowing
individual claimants to challenge the conduct of how the military
conducts its operations. This ability to second-guess a military’s
operations will have profound impact on how a nation’s military
conducts its operations worldwide. But there are second and third
order effects, as well. The United Kingdom felt the brunt of Al-Skeini
in two ways: one tactical and one strategic. The claims were allowed
to go forward, costing the British Government a handsome sum of
money. But more fundamentally, it opened the floodgate of claimants
that would challenge how the British Army does business on the
battlefield. This second point was acutely realized with the case of
Smith (No. 2) v. The Ministry of Defence.183
The facts of Smith are chilling both factually and legally—in
large measure because the claimants are members of the British
military.184 The claimants alleged a violation of Article 2—right to life.
They claimed the equipment they were provided while deployed to
Iraq was not suitable.185 On 15 July 2005, a British squad-sized unit
Note 171 at paras. 143-148.
R (on the application of Smith and others) v. Secretary of State for
Defense (2013) UKSC 41.
184 Id.
185 Id. at paras. 9-12.
182
183
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patrolled Al Amarah in Iraq. The vehicle used by the patrol was a
“Snatch Land Rover.” This vehicle had not been fitted with an
electronic countermeasure to protect it from improvised explosive
devises, known as IEDs. While on patrol, the Snatch Land Rover hit
an IED; three Soldiers died and two were injured. Seven months
later, in the same town, another Snatch Land Rover hit an IED and
two more Soldiers lost their lives. The second vehicle had been
outfitted with an electronic countermeasure, but there was a part
missing to the system and therefore it did not work.186
The families of the fallen Soldiers sued Her Majesty’s
Government, asserting that the Ministry of Defence breached the
right to life under the ECtHR because the government neglected its
duty for care. The government’s legal defense centered on combat
immunity.187 This legal concept, developed through case law, stands
for the proposition that “while the armed forces are in the course of
actually operating against the enemy, they are under no ‘actionable’
duty of care as defined by common law to avoid causing loss or
damage to their fellow Soldiers, or indeed to anyone who may be
affected by what they do.”188
The UK Supreme Court did not agree. The salient issue
before the Court was whether the European Convention on Human
Rights applies extraterritorially to protect British troops abroad, to
include in combat areas of operation like Iraq.189 The Court had
already answered this question in the negative. But in light of the
ECtHR ruling in Al-Skeini, the British High Court reversed itself and
made a marked departure from its precedence. The Court, in a 4-to-3
decision, allowed the claim to proceed under Article 2 of the ECtHR
as its basis. The majority opinion, written by Lord Hope, took great
efforts to make its legal trepidations known:
[the battlefield] is a field of human activity which the
law should enter into with great caution . . . [i]t risks
undermining the ability of a state to defend itself, or
186
187
188
189

Id.
Id. at para.13.
Tugendhat, supra note 26, at 31.
Supra note 178.
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its interest, at home or abroad. The world is a
dangerous place, and states cannot disable themselves
from meeting its challenges. Ultimately democracy
itself may be at risk.190
The Court, however, held that the claims may go forward and
granted jurisdiction to the families of the fallen Soldiers to pursue
their Article 2 claims. The Court found jurisdiction under these facts,
but it limited jurisdiction “in connection with the planning for and
conduct of military operations in situations of armed conflict which
are unrealistic or disproportionate.”191 In other words, the egregious
facts of this case drove the result. This ‘middle ground,’ a word
choice of Lord Hope,192 was a direct extension of the expansive
scope of Al-Skeini.
Lord Hope’s sentiment that “operations conducted in the
face of the enemy are inherently unpredictable”193 is a truism. This
judgment allows individuals, Soldiers in this case, to question and
challenge the decisions of the military’s leadership. The middle
ground is no ground at all. The reality must be clear: legal mission
creep will occur. The law and its profession is a product of examining
events after the fact—ex post facto. The profession of arms and the
law that supports it under IHL are not; International Humanitarian
Law is a product of using judgment before force is used. This is why
Soldiers train and prepare for conflict knowing the moment they see
conflict, all plans will morph once there is contact with the enemy. As
Lord Hope acknowledges:
[t]hings tend to look and feel very different on the
battlefield from the way they look on such charts and
images as those behind the lines may have available to
them. A court should be very slow indeed to question

190
191
192
193

Id. at para. 66.
Id. at para. 76.
Id.
Id. at para. 64.
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operational decisions made on the ground by
commanders, whatever their rank or level seniority.194
However, the door has been opened and with it, an inevitable
breed of military officer who is hesitant and timid. War is foggy and
unpredictable. If courts, through litigants, are allowed to secondguess military decisions that ultimately lead men and women to their
deaths, then conservatism and restraint will descend upon military
decisions. Both concepts are and should be an anathema to the
warrior ethos.
IV.

CONCLUSION

International Humanitarian Law was created so that Soldiers
did not bear the responsibility of the actions of the public; it allows
the Soldier to commit acts on behalf of the State that would be illegal
otherwise. When we narrow what the Soldier can do, we eliminate
their ability to effectuate the end of the war. The five trends
discussed, if brought to fruition and taken collectively, suffocate the
Soldier. They leave a Soldier virtually helpless. The advantage goes to
the actor who fails to follow the rules and is asymmetric in his
infliction of violence. Instead of probing how to hold the hostile
civilian accountable, the trend is to impose rules on the lawful
combatant that mirror what would be imposed on a police officer.
The trend is pushing jurisprudence in the wrong direction. The
asymmetric fighter will not change tactics, and, in fact, limiting the
Soldier will embolden these fighters. Giving such a profound
advantage to the enemy, limits a Soldier’s ability to determine what is
militarily necessary and in the process, prolongs the war and prolongs
the Soldiers’ exposure to harm.
Jus in bello is the evolved product of centuries of customary
practice by countless military professionals. Its core principles of
distinction, military necessity, and proportionality provide the proper
balance between mission and humanity in an armed conflict. They are
entirely separate and morally and legally distinct from the concept of
194

Id.
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jus ad bellum. If properly applied, they protect the warfighter from the
blending of the management of governance and the management of
violence. They do not require supplement by the very dissimilar
jurisprudence of traditional criminal law to properly analyze actions
on the battlefield. They continually evolve, but in a careful, deliberate
manner as the cost of error is too great for not only the warfighter
but also the community of international States. However, because the
principles are concepts rooted in the totally unique human
experience, they should only be adjudicated by courts with a level of
military competence and experience, not any criminal court that
extends its jurisdiction in order to make a public statement about a
given conflict.
Returning to our two incidents from the introduction – one
in South Carolina, one in Afghanistan -- the rules that govern the two
are profoundly different. In armed conflict, the three core principles
of jus in bello in the Just War Theory are effective in analyzing the
legality of Captain Kudo’s decision; these principles are simply
irrelevant for judging Officer Groubert’s actions. For Captain Kudo’s
scenario, his subjective belief was that the two diggers were either
Taliban or civilians directly engaged in armed conflict because they
were actively planting an IED in the road. If the belief is true, they
are lawful military targets and the attack would also comply with
military necessity and proportionality since there is no evidence of
any collateral damage to civilians. Even if it turns that Captain Kudo
was incorrect and the diggers were civilian farmers, the attack would
still be lawful if his belief was objectively reasonable when viewed
through the eyes of a professional warfighter in a same or similar
situation.
In armed conflict, unlike the law enforcement situation in
South Carolina, when the attacks are done by members of uniformed
military as part of an armed conflict, privileged belligerency would
apply to those acts. Those privileged belligerents are authorized by
the principle of military necessity to make attacks based on the status
of the targeted victim as a military target. As members of a force
engaged in armed conflict with the coalition, the diggers would
qualify as lawful military targets. The elimination of enemy forces is
an integral part of the mandate from military necessity to secure “the
162
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complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible”195 and
thereby end the conflict. Therefore, an attack would turn on a
question of proportionality: did the concrete military advantage
exceed the collateral cost in terms of damage to civilian lives and
property? However, it is important to limit the proportionality
analysis to the facts known by the attackers at the time of the attack.
Any post hoc judgment based upon the results of the attack is unjust.
The principle of proportionality is based upon the expected concrete
military advantage gained and the expected collateral damage, not the
result. Even if the attackers knew that civilians would die in the
attack, the attack would still be lawful if the expected military
advantage outweighed the expected collateral damage to civilians.
These protection under IHL have no relevancy for Officer
Groubert; his situation requires a self-defense analysis under
common criminal law. Captain Kudo’s situation is not nor should it
be subject to the same analysis.
War is arguably the evilest practice of mankind and all of
humanity should work to prevent any and all future wars. Until that
day arrives, however, we must be careful to preserve and enforce all
three goals of jus in bello. The goals of bringing about a rapid end to
the conflict and limiting the cost to the belligerents are every bit as
important as the goal of avoiding civilian deaths and property
damage.

See GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 277 (2010) (citing U.S.
Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1956)
para. 3. a. at 4).
195
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INTRODUCTION

In the twenty-first century, the use of drones in military
combat operations is one of the most legally controversial issues
confronting international humanitarian law (IHL) and the law of
armed conflict (LOAC).1 This article argues that drones should be
treated as any other component of the United States’ (U.S.)2 arsenal.
A drone can be considered to be a weapons platform or singular
weapon system. This article further argues that drones indeed offer
extensive and enhanced opportunities for compliance with LOAC
and other relevant laws governing the use of certain weapons.
Particularly, drones are well suited to execute theories of self-defense
in international affairs. In fact, drones can be used for a wide variety
of tasks other than kinetic operations, such as: observation and
reconnaissance, intelligence collection, target acquisition, search and
rescue, delivery of humanitarian aid, and transportation of
equipment.3 The appearance of new and advanced weapons in
warfare is hardly a new challenge in the history of armed conflict. 4
The epic poem Mahabharatha, [200 B.C.-200 A.D.] forbids the use of
‘hyper-destructive’ weapons: the warrior Arjuna, observing the law of
war, refrained from using the pasupathastra5 because when the fight
was restricted to ordinary conventional weapons, the use of

Michael W. Lewis, Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield, 47 TEX. INT'L.
L. J. 294 (2011-12).
2 Hereinafter, United States referred to as U.S.
3 David Turns, Droning on: some international humanitarian law aspects of the use of
unmanned aerial vehicles in contemporary armed conflicts, CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES
TO THE LAWS OF WAR, 199 (2014).
4 Rayan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y, 103 (2010-2011).
5 See
generally, Section XL, http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/m03/
m03040.htm, Pasupathastra: capable of destroying all beings and creation itself, this
weapon should not be hurled without adequate cause; for if hurled at any foe of
little might it may destroy the whole universe. In the three worlds with all their
mobile and immobile creatures, there is none who is incapable of being slain by this
weapon. And it may be hurled by the mind, by the eye, by words, and by the bow.
1
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extraordinary or unconventional weapons was not even moral, let
alone in conformity with religion or recognized rules of warfare.6
At different times in history, developments such as the
crossbow, gunpowder, machine guns, tanks, airplanes, noxious
gasses, nuclear bombs, and a number of other deadly inventions
irreversibly changed the landscape of warfare and required
combatants to reassess the laws governing armed conflict. 7 Drones
have become a central instrument in armed conflict, and an
increasing number of states and even non-state actors have deployed
them in some way or another – although Western armies clearly have
a significant technological advantage in this respect. 8 Legal scholars
have expressed a variety of opinions on the use of drones.9 On one
hand, scholars argue that drones are lawful weapons under
international law in a time of armed conflict, while on the other hand,
critics argue that drones are being used in ways that violate
international law.10 The legality of drones has been questioned for a
variety of reasons, some more grounded in fact than others, but
despite this criticism there is little question that the use of drones in
surveillance and combat roles is on the rise.11
The recent proliferation of drones has spawned intellectual
debate on whether a country has the right under the LOAC and
international law to unilaterally deploy these remotely controlled
aircrafts abroad for military purposes. The use of drones in support
of combat operations – particularly striking distant terror operatives –
has become the most controversial legal topic. 12 Many of the mostfrequently expressed criticisms about drones and drone warfare do
not hold up well under serious scrutiny or, at any rate, there’s nothing
6 GRAY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 7 (2010).
7 Vogel, supra note 4 at 103.
8 Ferderic Megret, The Humanitarian Problem with Drones, 5 UT. L. REV. 1284
(2013).
9 Shani
Dann, Drone Strikes and IHL, (Nov. 6, 2014)
http://humanityinwarblog.com/2014/11/06/drone-strikes-and-ihl/.
10 Id.
11 Lewis, supra note 1, at 294.
12 Heeyong Daniel Jang, The Lawfulness of and Case for Combat Drones in the
Fight Against Terrorism, 2:1 NAT'L L.J. 2 (2013-2014).
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uniquely different or worse about drones when compared to other
military technologies.13 Consider the most common anti-drone
argument: drones kill a disproportionate number of civilian noncombatants.14 However, drones kill fewer civilians, as a percentage of
total fatalities, than any other military weapon. 15 According to the
U.N.’s mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)16 2012 report, the number
of Afghan civilian casualties caused by the United States and its allies
did not increase in 2012, in fact, they decreased by 46 percent. More
specifically, civilian casualties from 'aerial attacks' fell 42 percent. 17
The UNAMA report found that drones released 506 weapons in
2012, compared to 294 from the previous year.18 Five incidents
resulted in casualties with sixteen civilians killed and three wounded,
up from just one incident in 2011.19 Even as drone attacks increased,
the U.N. reported an overall decrease in civilian deaths by airstrikes
with the U.S.-led coalition implementing stricter measures to prevent
innocent people from being killed.20 In another empirical report
concerning drone strikes cited by The New York Times, 522 strikes
have killed an estimated 3,376 militants and 476 civilians, decimating
al-Qaida leadership even as the loss of innocent life intensifies antiAmerican sentiment in nations where strikes occur.21 Further,
according to The Long War Journal, an estimated 801 militant deaths in
Rosa Brooks, The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted
Killing: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Subcomm. On the Constitution, Civil Rights, and
Human Rights, 113TH CONG., 2 (April 23, 2013) (Statement by Professor Rosa
Brooks, Geo. U. L. Center), http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewconte
nt.cgi?article=1114&context=cong
14 Id.
15 William
Saletan, In Defense of Drones, SLATE, (Feb. 2013)
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/2013/02/dron
es.
16 Hereinafter, U.N.’s mission in Afghanistan referred to as “UNAMA” or
“UNAMA’s”.
17 Saletan, supra note 15.
18 Kim Gamel, UN: Drones killed more Afghan civilians in 2012, YAHOO NEWS,
(Feb. 19, 2013) https://www.yahoo.com/news/un-drones-killed-more-afghancivilians-2012-145931602.html?ref=gs.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Steven Simon, In Defense of Drones, MSNBC (Apr. 26, 2015),
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/defense-drones.
13
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Pakistan occurred from U.S. drone strikes in 2010.22 This figure is
significantly higher than the 195 drone-caused deaths occurring from
2004 to 2007.'23
In contrast, several claims of civilian casualties caused by
conventional aircrafts and weaponry have gone underreported. For
example, an interview conducted by The Economist with twenty
residents of the Pakistani tribal areas confirmed that many residents
view individual drone strikes as preferable to the artillery barrages of
the Pakistani military.24 The residents insisted that the drones do not
kill as many civilians—a view starkly at odds with mainstream
Pakistani opinion.25 An elder from North Waziristan stated, “No one
dares to tell the real picture. Drone attacks are killing the militants
who are killing innocent people.”26 Jet planes, artillery attacks, and
bombings are the problem, not drones. Critics often assert that U.S.
drone strikes are morally wrong because they kill innocent civilians. 27
This is undoubtedly both true and tragic, but nonetheless, it does not
validate the arguments against drone strikes.28 War kills innocent
civilians, period.29 But the best evidence currently available suggests
that U.S. drone strikes kill fewer civilians than most other common
means of warfare.30 The operational effectiveness of drones is
undisputed. Martha McSally, former fighter pilot and drone squadron
commander for the U.S. Air Force, stated in her April 23, 2013
testimony to the Senate Judiciary Sub-Committee on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, “once a decision has
been made that it is a legal and wise strategy to conduct a target
strike, the [drone] platform is usually the hands-down best choice to
maximize precision, persistent intelligence, responsiveness, and
Jang, supra note 12.
Id.
24 Kenneth Anderson & Benjamin Wittes, Three Deep Flaws in Two New
Human-Rights Reports on U.S. Drone Strikes, NEW REPUBLIC, (Oct. 24, 2013)
https://newrepublic.com/article/115329/amnesty-international-human-rightswatch-drone-reports-are-flawed
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Brooks, supra note 13.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
22
23
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oversight by commanders, intelligence and legal experts. It also has
the benefit of minimizing civilian casualties without risk of U.S.
casualties and at relatively low cost.”31 Additionally, drone pilots
located in air-conditioned trailers on secure bases are far less likely to
err than fighter pilots, who have to deal with numerous other factors
while on missions.32 According to one international legal expert:
There is little reason to treat drones as distinct from
other weapons systems with regard to the legal
consequences of their employment. Nor is there a
sound basis for heightened concern as to their use.
On the contrary, the use of drones may actually, in
certain cases, enhance the protections to which
various persons and objects are entitled under
LOAC.33
The use of drones must therefore be carefully weighed
against the fact that it creates enemies, even as it destroys them.
Under that logic, the same argument might as well be used against all
airstrikes, or for that matter, artillery strikes.34 Both of these
alternatives tend to be more indiscriminate in their effects than
drones.35
This article argues that drones should be treated as any other
component of the U.S. arsenal. A drone can be considered a weapons
platform or a single weapon system. In addition, this article argues
that drones indeed offer extensive and enhanced opportunities for
compliance with LOAC and laws governing the use of certain
weapons. Particularly, drones are well-suited to execute theories of
self-defense in international affairs.

Martha McSally, Should the United States Continue Its Use of Drone Strikes
Abroad?, PROCON.ORG, (last updated Apr. 29, 2015)
http://drones.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=001894.
32 Simon, supra note 21.
33 MICHAEL S CHMITT, YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 313 (2010).
34 Simon, supra note 21.
35 Id.
31
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The first part of the article provided a general overview of
drones and their modern day implications. The second section will
discuss the definition of drones and the technological capabilities of
an armed drone. The third section will discuss the legality per se of
drones as a weapon system in association with general principles of
LOAC (i.e. military necessity, humanity, distinction and
proportionality). In addition, the third portion will also explore the
application of just war theory and its two components, jus as bellum
and jus in bello. In the fourth section, this article demonstrates how
effective drones can be in executing self-defense operations,
illustrated by a case study of the U.S. drone strategy during the War
on Terror. Generally, this article examines the legality of drone strikes
under LOAC based upon the geographical location of a given target.
Finally, the article will conclude by exploring military command
responsibility for the violations of LOAC during drone operations
and the legal status of the drone operator.
II.

DRONES

The term “drone” is consistently and materially employed
throughout this article, as such, there is a need to stipulate to a
working definition because of the term’s importance here.
A. What Exactly is a Drone?
To ensure the same basic understanding of the term from the
outset, this preliminary definition should help readers in addressing
the legal issues that underlie the use of drones. Categorically, "drone"
refers to any unmanned, remotely-piloted, flying craft ranging from
something as small as a radio-controlled toy helicopter, to the 32,000pound, $104 million Global Hawk military drone.36 In determining
what exactly constitutes a drone under this language one considers
whether the vehicle or flying craft at issue (1) flies and (2) is
Kelsey D. Atherton, Flying Robots 101: Everything You Need to Know About
Drones, POPULAR SCI. (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/
2013-03/drone-any-other-name.
36
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controlled by a pilot on the ground; if the vehicle meets this criteria it
falls under the everyday-language definition of drone.37 The U.S.
Army officially defines a drone as “a land, sea, or air vehicle that is
remotely or automatically controlled.”38 Military drones are also
referred to as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Unmanned
Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), or hunter-killers.39 The history of
drones is that of a watchful eye turned weapon. 40 The drone is not a
projectile, but a projectile-carrying machine.41
B. Technology Used in Armed Drones & their Capabilities
Before learning about the legal aspects governing drones, it is
important to discuss the relevant technology used in armed drones
for a better understanding of their legality. The key difference
between human soldiers on the ground and a drone hovering above
is that humans have to distinguish and make targeting decisions
instantly. In contrast, drones give commanders “tactical patience” the ability to see, think, and act in a controlled manner. Drones are
controlled by a crew often miles away from the dangers of combat,
and are capable of acting as both a combatant and a combat support
vehicle in the hairiest of battles.42 Drones combine several
complimentary technologies on a single platform. 43 For example, a
single drone can contain highly advanced surveillance systems, livefeed video cameras, infrared cameras, thermal sensors and radar, and
various types of other equipment including global positioning
systems (GPS), and precision munitions.44 The high-tech cameras on
Id.
Department of defense, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS
109 (Aug. 2011). (Original Gregoire Chamayou, Translated by Janet Lloyd, A
THEORY OF THE DRONE 27 (2015).
39 Lewis, supra note 1, at 294.
40 GREGOIRE CHAMAYOU, A THEORY OF THE DRONE 11 (2015).
41 Id.
42 Robert Valdes, How the Predator UAV Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, (Apr.
1, 2004) http://science.howstuffworks.com/predator.htm.
43 James Igoe Walsh, The Effectiveness of Drone Strikes in Counterinsurgency and
Counter terrorism Campaigns, STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE AND U.S. ARMY WAR
COLLEGE PRESS, V (Sep. 2013).
44 Surveillance
Drones,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUNDATION,
https://www.eff.org/issues/surveillance-drones.
37
38
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drones can scan entire cities, or alternatively, zoom in and read a milk
carton from 60,000 feet.45 Surveillance data gathered by a drone can
be relayed to satellites that then send it down to ground forces to
help form attack strategies and identify enemy vulnerabilities. 46
Armed drones carry highly accurate missiles that have the capacity to
target individuals, automobiles, and sections of structures such as
rooms in a large house.47 These missiles can be guided by the
intelligence obtained by the sensors discussed above or through realtime, on-ground intelligence.48 Drones’ low profile and relative fuel
efficiency combine to permit them to spend more time on target than
any other manned aircraft.49 Some military drones can stay airborne
for hours or days at a time.50 Drones also carry Wi-Fi crackers and
can act as fake cell phone towers to determine a target’s location or
intercept texts and phone calls.51 Given the ongoing convergence of
drones and emerging technologies, it may even become possible for
drones to perform facial recognition, identify behavior patterns, and
monitor individuals’ conversations.52
A typical drone is made of light composite materials to
reduce weight and increase maneuverability.53 Drones can fly at
extremely high altitudes to avoid detection54 and their navigational
systems can be programmed to operate autonomously, from takeoff
to landing.55 Drones have distinct advantages over manned aircraft
vehicles, cruise missiles, and Special Operations attacks.56 The use of
drones actually permits for far greater precision in targeting than
Id.
V. Shalem Pravas, Aerial Assassins: Drones, Read & Digest, (accessed Sept.
1, 2015), http://readanddigest.com/what-is-a-drone/.
47 Id.
48 Walsh, supra note 43.
49 Robert Valdes, supra note 42.
50 Surveillance Drones, supra note 44.
51 Id.
52 Chris Cole & Jim Wright, What are drones?, DRONE WARS U.K. (Jan. 20,
2010) wars.net/aboutdrone/" http://dronew
ars.net/aboutdrone/.
53 Pravas, supra note 46.
54 Id.
55 KENNETH R. HIMES O.F.M., DRONES AND THE ETHICS OF TARGETED
KILLING 12 (2016).
56 Id.
45
46
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most other traditional manned aircrafts.57 Further, drones can handle
what humans cannot: G-Force speed, tedium, and boredom. 58
Among the other “intrinsic benefits” of drones: they deprive the
enemy of human targets; they don’t get tired, thirsty, or hungry; and
are relatively inexpensive.59 In a worst-case scenario, if a drone is lost
in battle military personal can simply "crack another one out of the
box" and have it up in the air shortly without the trauma of casualties
or the fear of pilots becoming prisoners; both of which being
common concerns when more-traditional aircraft or operation
failures occur.60 Without a doubt, drones are of great benefit to the
counterterrorism effort.61
III.

THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

All warfare is governed by IHL, also known as the Law of
Armed Conflict (LOAC).62
A. What is the Law of Armed Conflict?
The LOAC comes from both customary international law
and treaties.63 Customary international law, based on a practice that
nations have come to accept as legally required, establishes the
traditional rules that govern the conduct of military operations in
armed conflict. 64 The Law of Armed Conflict “arises from a desire
among civilized nations to prevent unnecessary suffering and

Brooks, supra note 13.
Alan W. Dowd, Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings, U.S. ARMY WAR
COLLEGE (2013), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/Parameters/
Issues/WinterSpring_2013/1_Article_Dowd.pdf.
59 Id.
60 Valdes, supra note 42.
61 Himes, supra note 55.
62 James Foy, Autonomous Weapons Systems Taking the Human Out of
International Humanitarian Law, 23 DAL. J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 53 (2014).
63 Rod Powers, Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), THE RULES OF WAR,
http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/wars/a/loac.htm
64 Id.
57
58
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destruction while not impeding the effective waging of war.” 65
Indeed, modern LOAC is largely driven by humanitarian concerns. 66
As a part of public international law the LOAC regulates the conduct
of armed hostilities, but only among consenting nations.67 It also aims
to protect civilians, prisoners of war, the wounded, sick, and
shipwrecked.68 The LOAC regulates, among other things, the means
and methods of warfare – the weapons used and the tactics
employed.69 At its foundation, the LOAC is based on four key
principles: distinction, proportionality, unnecessary suffering, and
military necessity. All of which undergird the spirit and purpose of
the law and drive determinations in areas such as targeting, detention,
and treatment of persons.70 The legality of drones can also be
justified under the principles of weapon laws and targeting laws. The
four fundamental LOAC principles are discussed in detail in the
following section.
When determining the overall lawfulness of a weapon system
under LOAC, there are two distinct aspects of the law that need to
be analyzed: weapons law and lawful use of drones. 71 The former
verifies that the weapon itself is lawful. 72 Weapon laws determine
whether the use of the weapon system during hostilities might be
prohibited in some manner under the law of armed conflict.73 A
weapon must satisfy two legal aspects before it may lawfully be used
on a battlefield;74 the weapon should (1) prevent unnecessary
suffering, and (2) be capable of effectively distinguishing targets. The
overarching principle that pertains to weapon systems is the
Id.
Solis, supra note 6, at 7.
67 Powers, supra note 63.
68 Id.
69 Oren Gross, The New Way of War: Is There a Duty to to Use Drones?,
7 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 27 (2015).
70 Laurie R. Blank, After “Top Gun”: How Drone strikes impact the law of war?,
U. Pa. J. Int’l L. vol. 33:3, 681 (Feb. 14, 2012).
71 Jeffrey Thurnher, The Law That Applies to Autonomous Weapon Systems, 17
AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 4, (January 18, 2013), https://www.asil.org
/insights/volume/17/issue/4/law-applies-autonomous-weapon-systems.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
65
66
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prohibition of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. 75 Weapons
that cannot be directed at specific military objectives, or weaponry
considered overly dangerous by nature, can violate the principle of
76
distinction and found to be unlawful per se. Moreover, even if a
specific type of weapon is not unlawful per se, or is not specifically
prohibited by particular treaties, governments are prohibited from
improperly employing a weapon in a manner that would result in
unnecessary suffering or in the targeting of civilian populations. 77
Such use is also unlawful under the relevant rules of the LOAC.78
The two rules governing weapon laws are discussed in detail in the
following section.
1. General Principles of the LOAC.
In this section, the principles of the LOAC will be applied to
the use of drones in combat and combat support operations. This
analysis falls squarely within LOAC principles. Again, the LOAC
revolves around four core principles: distinction, proportionality,
preventing unnecessary suffering, and military necessity. Application
of any weapon depends upon these four general principles of the
LOAC. Additionally, targeting law governs the circumstances of the
use of lawful weapons and includes general principles of the LOAC.
The following arguments help establish a basis for the conclusion
that LOAC rules are sufficient to regulate drones.
(i) Distinction
“Distinction” means persons
distinguish between lawful military
combatants, equipment, or facilities),
civilians, medical personnel, chaplains, or

75
76
77
78

Gross, supra note 69.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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combat), property, and unlawful targets.79 Greater awareness of the
distinction principle has coincided with technological developments
that enable increasingly precise targeting. 80 According to Article 48 of
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention,
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to
the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the
civilian population and combatants, and between
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly
shall direct their operations only against military
objectives.81
Through its language, Additional Protocol I prohibits the use
of weapons that are “of a nature to strike military objectives and
civilians or civilian objects without distinction.”82
Far from bombing entire industrial valleys or cities, which
would inevitably lead to civilians being caught in the crosshairs, new
technology has allowed states to be far more discriminate.83 Indeed,
the adoption of drones equipped with precision-guided munitions is
the most recent improvement.84 Drones equipped with modern
imaging technologies enable operators located thousands of miles
away to view details as fine as individual faces; this allows operators
to distinguish between civilians and combatants far more effectively
than most other weapons systems.85 According to General (Ret.)
James E. Cartwright, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, "advances in high band-width satellite communications, sensing
79 Christopher P. Toscano, “Friend of Humans”: An Argument for Developing
Autonomous Weapons Systems, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 189 (2010).
80 JOHN KAAG & SARAH KREPS, DRONE WARFARE 81 (2010).
81 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), ICRC (8 June 1977)
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/4e473c7bc8854f2ec12563f60039c738/8a9e7e14c63c7f30
c12563cd0051dc5c?OpenDocument,.
82 Rule 71, ICRC, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/
v1_rul_rule71.
83 Kaag & Kreps, supra note 80, at 81.
84 Id.
85 Brooks, supra note 13.
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technologies – particularly full motion video – combined with
existing aircraft technology has allowed armed drones to emerge as
the platform of choice in this counter terror mission space.”86 On
April 30, 2012, CIA Director John Brennan, said, “with the
unprecedented ability of remotely piloted aircraft to precisely target a
military objective while minimizing collateral damage, one could
argue that never before has there been a weapon that allows U.S. to
distinguish more effectively between an al-Qaida terrorist and
innocent civilians…[.]”87 Therefore, because drones can effectively
distinguish between targets, it can be concluded that drones meet the
standard of distinction under the LOAC.
(ii) Proportionality
The LOAC principle of proportionality requires that the
expected loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property
incidental to attack not be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated from striking the target.88 Article
35 of Additional Protocol I declares that “in any armed conflict, the
right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of
warfare is not unlimited[;]” this basic principle was officially codified
by the 1907 Hague Convention, however, studies suggest that similar
albeit informal principles were commonly observed by combatants
prior to the Hague Convention. 89 The principle focus of
proportionality seeks to minimize incidental casualties during war and
operationalizes the LOAC’s fundamental premise that the means and
methods of attacking the enemy are not unlimited.90 The key here is
the word “incidental,” meaning outside of the military target. 91
Importantly, however, the law does not prohibit all civilian deaths—
John Brennan, Should the United States Continue Its Use of Drone Strikes
Abroad?, PROCON.ORG (Apr. 29, 2015), http://drones.procon.org/view.a
nswers.php?questionID=001894.
87 Id.
88 Basic Principles of LOAC and their Targeting Implications, CURTIS E. LEMAY
CENTER, https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-60-D33-Target-LOAC
.pdf (last updated Jan. 10, 2014).
89 Blank, supra note 70, at 681-82.
90 Id.
91 Id.
86
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and in fact accepts some incidental civilian casualties.92 Armed drones
offer the advantage of less destructive weapons and greater command
and control over firing decisions. Drones can employ Hellfire
missiles that weigh one-hundred pounds with a warhead of
approximately thirty five pounds.93 That is one-twentieth the size of a
standard laser-guided bomb or cruise missile and less than half the
size of the smallest precision ordnance dropped from conventional
aircraft.94 Proportionality inherently covers the notion to control and
limit collateral damage to civilians and civilian property. This is a
venerable concept. Grotius writes, “one must take care of, so far as is
possible, to prevent the death of innocent persons, even by
accident.”95 Even when a target is purely militant, the element of
proportionality is still considered when prosecuting a target.
Proportionality brings with it an obligation to consider all options
when making targeting decisions: verification of the target; timing of
the attack; the chosen weapon of choice; and warnings and
evacuations for civilian populations.96 Drones, with their ability to
see, think, and act in a controlled manner, provide ample opportunity
to consider all options before engaging a target. Drone operators,
after duly considering all options and taking all mitigating maneuvers
into account, are able to minimize damage to civilian life and
property.
(iii) Unnecessary suffering
The principle of humanity, also commonly referred to as the
principle of unnecessary suffering, aims to minimize suffering in
armed conflict.97 The core LOAC concept of unnecessary suffering, a
concept created to limit damage to civilians while killing combatants,
is codified in Additional Protocol 1, Article 35(2) “it is prohibited to
employ weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of
Id.
Michael W. Lewis and Emily Crawrord, Drones and Distinction: How IHL
Encouraged the Rise of Drones, 44 Geo. J. INT'L L. 1151(2012-2013).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 275.
96 Id.
97 Blank, supra note 70, at 682.
92
93
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a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering” 98 Once
a military purpose has been achieved, the infliction of further
suffering is unnecessary.99 A weapon is not banned on the ground of
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering merely because it causes
great, or even horrendous suffering or injury. 100 There is nothing
unique about the armaments and munitions carried by drones and
used by their pilots. Thus, Alston, who served as the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
acknowledged in his Study on Targeted Killings that, "a missile fired
from a drone is no different from any other commonly used weapon,
including a gun fired by a soldier or a helicopter or gunship that fires
missiles."
Compliance with the principle of unnecessary suffering
depends upon the kind of weapon used and the kind of suffering that
it might cause. Weapons can be specifically chosen to satisfy this
principle; however, compliance with the LOAC depends upon the
features of the weapon used and the competency of those employing
the weapon to carry out a particular mission. Also, it is difficult to
determine what constitutes “unnecessary suffering” because there is
no globally accepted standard.
(iv) Military Necessity
Finally, “military necessity” means that combatants may only
employ force against legitimate military objectives.101 The principle of
military necessity recognizes that a military has the right to use any
measures not forbidden by the laws of war that are indispensable for
securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as
possible.102 Military necessity requires combat-forces to only engage

98 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note 80.
99 Blank, supra note 70, at 682.
100 Solis, supra note 6, at 270.
101 Toscano, supra note 79.
102 Blank, supra note 70, at 682.
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in acts necessary to accomplish a legitimate military objective. 103 It
further permits the killing of enemy combatants and other persons
whose death is unavoidable.104 The principle of military necessity is a
principle of controlled violence. 105 Military necessity permits the
destruction of property if that destruction is imperatively demanded
by the necessities of war.106 Destruction of civilian property as an end
in-itself is a violation of international law.107 There must be a
reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the
overcoming of enemy forces.108 International humanitarian law also
prohibits weapon systems that cannot be directed at a specific
military target.109 Over the past few years several U.S. Government
officials have confirmed that drones are an invaluable tool against AlQaeda, the Islamic State, Taliban, and associated terrorist forces.110 In
some areas, drones are particularly useful because of their ability to
find and identify targeted persons, and then reach into territory that
ground forces cannot enter due to either military or political
reasons.111 In one reported case, the United States targeted a senior
Taliban official in the impenetrable border region of Pakistan while
he was resting on the roof of a house with his wife and hooked up to
an IV-drip for kidney problems.112 The Taliban member was wanted
for his involvement in a number of suicide bombings and the
assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.113
ANTHONY FINN & STEVE SCHEDING, DEVELOPMENTS AND
CHALLENGES FOR AUTONOMOUS UNMANNED VEHICLES: A COMPENDIUM 172
(2010).
104 Id.
105 Gross, supra note 69, at 28.
106 Finn & Scheding, supra note 103.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International
Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics, HARVARD NAT’L SECURITY J., 10 (2013),
http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Schmitt-AutonomousWeapon-Systems-and-IHL-Final.pdf.
110 Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL’Y, 115 (2010-2011).
111 Id.
112 Id; See also, Peter Finn & Joby Warrick, Under Panetta, A More Aggressive
CIA, THE WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wpdyn/content/article/2010/03/20/AR2010032 003343.html.
113 Id.
103
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In such situations, and others like it, drone strikes offer a "definite
military advantage."114 Drones, because of advanced technology can
be very precise in targeted killing. Commanders and their legal
advisors have ample to make informed decision to go after a target.
They can easily assess the situation, and are capable of controlling the
violence.
B. Drones as Lawful Weapons
This section is intended to determine whether current
weapon laws of LOAC are capable of regulating drones. In modern
times, LOAC governs the choice of weapons and prohibits or
restricts the use of certain weapons. Rule 71 of Customary IHL,
which applies to both international and domestic conflicts,
establishes the norm that the use of weapons which are
indiscriminate by nature is prohibited; this norm of customary
international law is applicable in both international and noninternational armed conflicts.115 In addition, many of the basic rules
and specific prohibitions and restrictions on means and methods of
warfare may be found in customary intentional law.116 These
restrictions can be traced back to treaties and customary international
law, and are justified on the grounds that weapons which are either:
(i) indiscriminate in their effect, or (ii) cause unnecessary suffering
should be prohibited. 117
The Declaration of Saint Petersburg is the first formal
agreement prohibiting the use of certain weapons in war. “The
Declaration to that effect adopted in 1868, which has the force of
Id.
Rule 71 (Weapons That Are by Nature Indiscriminate), Customary
International
Humanitarian
Law,
ICRC,
(accessed
7
July
2015)
https://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter20_rul 71,
116 Kathleen Lawand, A Guide to Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and
Methods of Warfare, Measure to implement article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 (2006),
ICRC,
Revised,
Geneva,
(accessed
22
July
2015)
http://www.article36.org/wpontent/uploads/2011/12/icrc_002_0902.pdf.
117 A.G. Houston, Executive Series ADDP 06.4 Law of Armed Conflict,
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Ed. 1, 4.4, (2006) http://www.defence.gov.au/
adfwc/documents/doctrinelibrary/addp/addp06.4-lawofarmedconflict.pdf.
114
115
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law, confirms the customary rule according to which the use of arms,
projectiles and materials of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering is
prohibited.”118 Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 serves as a
further reference found in international treaties for the need to carry
out legal reviews of new weapons, means, and methods of warfare.
The Protocol provides that:
[I]n the study, development, acquisition or adoption
of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a
High Contracting Party (describes a party to any
international agreement which has both signed and
ratified the treaty) is under an obligation to determine
whether its employment would, in some or all
circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by
any other rule of international law applicable to the
High Contracting Party (HCP).119
“Means of warfare” are weapons and weapon systems,
whereas “method of warfare” refers to the tactics, techniques and
procedures by which hostilities are conducted.120 Also, international
law prohibits two categories of weapons in armed conflict:
indiscriminate weapons and weapons that cause unnecessary
suffering.121 The first prohibition appears in Article 51(4) of
Additional Protocol I, which defines indiscriminate attacks as: (1)
attacks “not directed at a specific military objective;” (2) attacks
“which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be
directed at a military objective;” or (3) attacks “which employ a
method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as
required by this Protocol.”122 It is prohibited to “use weapons that are
118 Treaties and State parties to such Treaties, DECLARATION RENOUNCING THE
USE, IN TIME OF WAR, OF EXPLOSIVE PROJECTILES UNDER 400 GRAMMES
WEIGHT. SAINT PETERSBURG, 29 NOVEMBER / 11 DECEMBER 1868, ICRC
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/130?OpenDocument.
119 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977,
TREATIES, ST., PARTIES & COMMENT. (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross), at Article
35, available at https://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750044?OpenDocument.
120 Schmit, supra note 109, at 27.
121 Blank, supra note 70, at 682.
122 Id.
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incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.”123
Examples of inherently indiscriminate weapons are the rockets that
Hamas and Hezbollah have fired into Israel for many years, cluster
munitions, and nuclear weapons that destroy all life within the area of
the detonation. 124 Additionally, weapons that cause unnecessary
suffering or superfluous injury are prohibited. 125 Expanding bullets
and blinding lasers offer two examples.126 Peter Maurer, the president
of the International Committee of Red Cross has stated:
[U]nder international humanitarian law the rules of
war, i.e. the set of laws governing armed conflict,
drones are not expressly prohibited, nor are they
considered to be inherently indiscriminate or
perfidious. In this respect, they are no different from
weapons launched from manned aircraft such as
helicopters or other combat aircraft. It is important to
emphasize, however, that while drones are not
unlawful in themselves, their use is subject to
international law.127
Therefore, it appears drones comply with the various weapon
laws, however, when a drone is acting as a “weapons platform,” the
ordinance carried by the drone is still governed by other specific areas
of weapons law. For example, if a drone is armed with chemical
weapons, the applicable law is the convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of Chemical
Weapons and their Destruction.128 Alternatively, if armed with
‘conventional’ munitions, then the general law of targeting would
apply (be that treaty law, customary international law, or both). 129
See, Id.
Id.
125 Id., at 685.
126 Id., at 686.
127 Peter Maurer (the president of the ICRC), The use of armed drones must
comply with laws, ICRC, (May 10, 2013) https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources
/documents/interview/2013/05-10-drone-weapons-ihl.htm.
128 M.N. SCHMITT, LOUISE ARIMATSU, & TIM MCCORMACK, YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 137 (Aug. 5, 2011), (Ian Henderson, chapter:
Civilian Intelligence Agencies and the use of Armed Drones).
129 Id.
123
124
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Usually, drones carry Hellfire missiles, which are not banned by any
international treaty or convention and do not have any characteristics
that cause unnecessary injury. By both measures of weapon laws —
indiscriminate targeting and preventing unnecessary suffering—
armed drones pass muster.130
As discussed above, a drone can have advanced technical
features and extensive surveillance capabilities, and when combined
with precision-guided Hellfire missile, drones should be considered a
discriminate weapon system. The ability to track a target for hours,
even days, before launching an attack facilitates accurate targeting and
enhances the protection of civilians by allowing drone operators the
ability to choose the time and place of attack with an intent of
minimizing civilian casualties or damage.131 Therefore, because armed
drones can easily target pure military objectives, and have effects that
can be limited, as much as possible, to military objects, drones thus
meet the standards of Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I.132
C. Lawful Use of Drones Under the LOAC
Drones, like any weapon, can be used for unlawful purposes,
especially outside a combat zone. However, because drones are
lawful weapons, the next step is to analyze their use according to the
principles of the LOAC; or more particularly, the principles of
distinction, proportionality, and precaution.
1. Distinction.
As discussed above, advanced technology places drones in a
better position to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants. Historically, distinction was fairly easy; combatants wore
uniforms and non-combatants did not. Now, the ‘global war on
terrorism’ has raised new concerns because terrorists do not wear
traditional uniforms, and it has become harder to distinguish between
130
131
132

Blank, supra note 70, at 686.
Id. at 687.
Id.
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civilians and terrorists. Terrorists often take advantage of civilian
populations and hide themselves among them. The situation has
raised new challenges for drone operators in regards to distinction.
State militaries wishing to assert compliance with a legal regime that
regards human shielding and intermingling with the civilian
population as unacceptable were pressured to ensure that their
attacks became increasingly more discriminate and that their
intelligence became more accurate.133 The challenge found in nonstate armed conflict is identifying the legitimate target. As discussed
above, Article 48 of Additional Protocol I states that:
in order to ensure respect for and protection of the
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to
the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the
civilian population and combatants and between
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly
shall direct their operations only against military
objectives.134
Distinction is also emphasized in Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol
I:
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate
attacks are:
(a) Those which are not directed at a specific
military objective;
(b) Those which employ a method or means of
combat which cannot be directed at a specific
military objective; or
(c) Those which employ a method or means of
combat the effects of which cannot be limited
as required by this Protocol; and
consequently, in each such case, are of a
Lewis & Crawrord, supra note 93, at 1153.
Additional Protocol I, available at https://www.icrc.org/ihl/4e473
c7bc8854f2ec12563f60039c738/8a9e7e14c63c7f30c12563cd00.
133
134
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nature to strike military objectives and
civilians or civilian objects without
distinction.135
Furthermore, Article 85 of Protocol I declares that nearly all
violations of distinction constitute “grave breaches”(foot note
explaining or one brief sentence) of the Protocol, and the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court similarly criminalizes
attacks on civilians and indiscriminate attacks.136 However, states
have historically virtually ignored the principle of distinction by
employing artillery, rocket launchers, and bombers in assaults on
irregular forces occupying densely populated areas, resulting in tens
of thousands of civilian casualties.137 However, in order to minimize
collateral damage and comply with the principle of distinction states
began to employ more precise weapons than those designed to defeat
a more traditional military opponent. 138 This is where drones enter
the picture.139
The United States has consistently asserted that it complies
with the LOAC in its battle against Al-Qaeda.140 Examining how the
U.S. responds to Al-Qaedas’ practice of hiding amongst the civilian
populations of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen serves as a
good illustration of how a state military may seek to comply with the
LOAC's distinction requirements.141 Persons who are members of an
organized armed group, but dress the same as civilians, either for a
lack of uniforms or specifically to blend into the civilian population
for protection, are legitimate targets at all times.142 The United State’s
need for more robust intelligence greatly increased the demand for
drones, which were first employed in the conflict with Al-Qaeda as
real-time intelligence gathering vehicles for distinction purposes.143
Article 51, Additional Protocol I,
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750065.
136 Blank, supra note 70, at 691.
137 Lewis & Crawrord, supra note 93, at 1152.
138 Id. at 1153.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Blank, supra note 70, at 692.
143 Lewis & Crawrord, supra note 93, at 1153.
135
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Drones are a better option as compared to boots on ground. Drone
strikes give militaries more time to analyze the situation; operators
and decision makers can use the ‘pattern of life’ method to pursue a
target (analysis, using evidence collected by surveillance cameras on
the unmanned aircraft and from other sources regarding individuals
and locations).144 Further, ground forces face the challenge of
distinguishing between civilians and terrorists more promptly than
drones, with less situational awareness. Drones may also reduce the
emotional element for the humans behind the “joy sticks” when
engaging targets.145
2. Proportionality.
Proportionality is closely linked with the principle of
distinction and correctly identifying objects as military and civilian. 146
For an action to be considered proportional, the anticipated military
gain must exceed the anticipated damage to civilians and their
property. 147 Article 51(b) of Additional Protocol I proscribes that “an
attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated” is disproportionate.148 Thus, a
commander must refrain from any attack in which the expected
civilian casualties will be excessive in light of the anticipated military
advantage gained.149 Loss of life and damage to property incidental to
attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage expected to be gained. 150 The key here is the word
144 Emptywheel, Pattern of Life drone strikes, SHADOW PROOF, (May 7, 2010)
https://shadowproof.com/2010/05/06/pattern-of-life-drone-strikes.
145 P.W. Singer, Military Robots and the Laws of War, NEW ATLANTIS, 25, 4041 (Winter 2009), available at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/20090203
_TNA23Singer.pdf/.
146 Kaag & Kreps, supra note 80, at 94.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Blank, supra note 70, at 682.
150 Four
basic principles, LOAC (accessed March 21, 2017)
http://loacblog.com/loac-basics/4-basic-principles/; See generally
U.S. Army Field Manual FM27-10: Law of Land Warfare.
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“incidental,” meaning outside of the military targets or more
commonly known as “collateral damage.”151 However, if a target is
purely military (i.e. no civilian component) proportionality is not a
requirement.152 Proportionality is a necessary consideration in attacks
on civilians, not on combatants.153 Proportionality brings with it an
obligation to consider all options when making targeting decisions:
verifying the target, timing the target, identifying the weapons used,
warning and evacuating civilian populations. 154 Grotius writes, “one
must take care of, so far as is possible, to prevent the death of
innocent persons, even by accident.”155 According to CIA Director
John Brennan:
Compared against other options, a pilot operating this
aircraft remotely, with the benefit of technology and
with the safety of distance, might actually have a
clearer picture of the target and its surroundings,
including the presence of innocent civilians. It’s this
surgical precision, the ability, with laser-like focus, to
eliminate the cancerous tumor called an al-Qaida
terrorist while limiting damage to the tissue around it,
that makes this counterterrorism tool so essential.156
3. Taking Precautions.
The principle of precaution is important because it provides
constant consideration and implementation of precautionary
measures that reinforces moral clarity for the warfighter thrust into
terribly complex tactical and operational environments.157 The
principle of precaution can be further understood by reviewing
Article 27 of the 1899 Hague Convention:
Id.
Id.
153 Solis, supra note 6, at 274.
154 Blank, supra note 70, at 275.
155 Id.
156 Brennan, supra note 86.
157 Geoffrey Corn, Precautions to minimize civilian harm are a fundamental principle
of the law of war, JUST SECURITY, (July 8, 2015) https://www.justsecurity.org
/24493/obligation-precautions-fundamental-principle-law-war/.
151
152
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In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps
should be taken to spare as far as possible edifices
devoted to religion, art, science, and charity, hospitals,
and places where the sick and wounded are collected,
provided they are not used at the same time for
military purposes. The besieged should indicate these
buildings or places by some particular and visible
signs, which should previously be notified to the
assailants.158
Also, Article 2(3) of the 1907 Hague Convention (IX) further
states, “[a] commander shall take all due measures in order that the
town may suffer as little harm as possible.”159 Article 57(2)(c) of
Additional Protocol I mandates that those who plan or decide upon
an attack "take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to
minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and
damage to civilian objects."160 Additionally, according to article 57 (3)
of Additional Protocol I, “when a choice is possible between several
military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the
objective to be selected shall be that the attack on which may be
expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian
objects.”161 The primary variables of Article 57 may be identified as
“the time necessary to gather and process the additional information,
the extent to which it would clarify any uncertainty, competing
demands on the intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance system in
question, and risk to it and its operators’.162 Finally, according to
article 58 of Additional Protocol I, the Parties to the conflict shall, to
the maximum extent feasible:
158 Article 27 of the 1899 Hague Convention, available at http://avalon.law.yale
.edu/19th_century/hague02.as#art27.
159 Article 2 of the 1907 Hague Convention, available at http://avalon.law.yale
.edu/20thcentury/hague09.asp.
160 Article 57 (2) (ii) of AP I, available at https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ih
l.nsf/9ac284404d38ed2bc1256311002afd89/50fb5579fb098faac12563cd0051dd7c.
161 Article 57 (3) of AP I, available at https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ih
l.nsf/9ac284404d38ed2bc1256311002afd89/50fb5579fb098faac12563cd0051dd7c.
162 Frederik Rosén, Extremely Stealthy and Incredibly Close: Drones, Control and
Legal Responsibility, J CONFLICT SECURITY L. (Oct. 16, 2013), http://jcsl.oxford
journals.org/content/early/2013/10/16/jcsl.krt02.
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(a) without prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth
Convention, endeavor to remove the civilian
population, individual civilians and civilian
objects under their control from the vicinity of
military objectives;
(b) avoid locating military objectives within or near
densely populated areas;
(c) take the other necessary precautions to protect
the civilian population, individual civilians and
civilian objects under their control against the
dangers resulting from military operations. This
principle of avoidance (also known as "taking
precautions") means that it is not enough not to
intend to kill civilians while attacking legitimate
targets.163
Indeed, a deliberate, affirmative effort has to be made not to
harm civilians.164 This may mean, for example, that certain targets
ought to be attacked only during certain hours (e.g., at night, when
no civilians may be around),’ that some attacks may need to be
conducted from a certain angle, and that advance warnings to the
civilian population must be issued by the attacker prior to the
strike.165 In this regard, drone technology removes a number of
classic dilemmas related to precaution. Drones leave plenty of time
for the consideration and execution of precautionary steps.166 Drones
allow commanders to incorporate precautionary measures in strategy
formulation, executing signature strikes, and targeted killings. 167
Hours, days, or weeks of surveillance may lie ahead of a drone
attack.168 It has been argued that there is “strong evidence that drones
are better, not worse, at noncombatant discrimination.” 169 The
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

Gross, supra note 69, at 30.
Id.
Id.
Rosén, supra note 162.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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factors mentioned above do not eliminate the risk of civilian
casualties, but they certainly represent feasible precautions that can
minimize incidental loss of civilian life.170 Conversely, drones may not
be used when other means or methods of warfare that would result
in less collateral damage with an equivalent prospect of mission
success are available.”171
The rules that govern targeting do not turn on the type of weapon
system used, and there is no prohibition under the laws of war on the
use of technologically advanced weapons systems in armed conflict-such as pilotless aircraft or so-called smart bombs—so long as they
are employed in conformity with applicable laws of war. 172 In all three
areas of distinction, proportionality, and precautions—drones’ unique
and advanced capabilities suggest great potential for adherence to
LOAC obligations.173 Drones are not automatons; they depend on
human operators, analysts, and decision makers to comply with the
laws of war.
D. Just War Theory
The Just War Theory formalizes the moral justifications for
war. It is a lens fixed in the Western philosophical tradition. 175
From the start, Just War theorists have focused on two central
174

Stuart Casey-Maslen, Drone strikes under jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and
international human rights law, 94 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, NO. 886 AT 601
(Summer 2012), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2012/irrc-886casey-maslen.pdf.
171 Blank, supra note 70, at 686
172 Galloway Family Foundation, Lawful Use of Drones by Non-State Actors:
Who can Kill, (Jan. 8, 2014) http://www.gallowayfoundation.org/lawful-use-ofdrones-by-non-state-actors-who-can-kill/.
173 Blank, supra note 70, at 701.
174 Ethan A. Wright, Of Drones and Justice: A Just War Theory Analysis of the
Unite States’ Drone Campaigns, URSINUS COLLEGE, at 12 (2015)
http://digitalcommons.ursinus.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&
context=ethics_essay.
175 Id.
170
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questions: (1) when is it appropriate to go to war (jus ad bellum), and
(2) how should the war be fought (jus in bello).176
1. Jus Ad Bellum.
Jus ad bellum means the legality of the use of force by a
territorial state. Jus ad bellum governs the legality of recourse to
military force (including drone strikes) by one state against another,
and against armed non-state actors.177 As a threshold matter, the jus
ad bellum inquiry depends on whether the territorial state has
consented to the drone strike.178 However, recent history has
demonstrated that consent of a state is not necessarily required when
conducting drone operations.179 Article 2(4) is properly interpreted as
prohibiting all uses of force above a certain minimal level.180 Minimal
uses of force such as firing a single shot across an international
boundary might violate the principle of non-intervention, but is
probably too minor to come within the purview of Article 2(4).181
The threshold for the occurrence of an armed attack by another state
thus appears to be relatively high, going beyond a mere frontier
incident between members of the armed forces of two states (or
armed groups operating in one state with limited support from
another state).182 It might even be argued by some that a very limited
and targeted drone strike by one state, against individuals located in
another state, would not constitute an armed attack under the UN
Charter or customary law.183 This argument is based on the highly
contested concept of anticipatory self-defense (self-defense will be
176 Erich Freiberger, Just War Theory and the Ethics of Drone Warfare, E-INT’L
REL., (July 18, 2013), http://www.e-ir.info/2013/07/18/just-war-theory-and-theethics-of-drone-warfare/.
177 Maslen, supra note 170, at 601.
178 Laurence Shore et al., The Legality Under International Law of Targeted
Killings by Drones Launched by the United States, COMMITTEE ON INT’L L., N.Y. CITY B.
ASS’N, at 8 (June 8, 2014)
179 Maslen, supra note 170, at 601.
180 Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones, A CASE STUDY
OF PAKISTAN, at 13 (2004-2009).
181 Id.
182 Maslen, supra note 170, at 602.
183 Id.
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discussed separately in a later section). 184 If there is consent, there is
no infringement on sovereignty. 185 Although a definitive answer to
this factual question is impossible without access to confidential
material, the publicly available information suggests that states186 have
given their consent to U.S. drone strikes.187 Because some state have
publicly withheld their consent, the U.S. must consider whether
alternative justifications provide a legal basis for continued U.S.
drone strikes under Just War theory.188
(i) Jus in Bello
Jus in bello analysis provides a legal basis for states in
determining who is an acceptable target, and who is not. The typical
distinction is between “combatants,” who may be the targets of
wartime operations, and “non-combatants,” who are exempt from
being targets of such attacks.189 In essence, jus in bello is the
foundation for the principles of distinction, proportionality, and
necessity discussed above. Most legal scholars agree that drone strikes
are legal under jus in bello as long as they occur during armed
conflict. 190 Nothing is inherently illegal about using drones to kill
during warfare, just as other airplanes are not forbidden.191 Drones by
themselves are not really weapons, and the armaments they do carry
are generally lawful.192

Id.
Shore et al., supra note 178, at 8-9.
186 With the apparent exception of Pakistan.
187 Shore et al., supra note 178, at 9.
188 Id.
189 Freiberger, supra note 176.
190 JAMES DESHAW RAE, JOHN CRIST, & PALGRAVE MACMILLAN,
ANALYZING THE DRONE DEBATES: TARGETED KILLINGS, REMOTE WARFARE,
AND
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY 62 (Mar. 12, 2014), available at
https://books.google.com/books?id=eFkJAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA62&lpg=PA62&d
q=Drones+as+Lawful+Weapons&source=bl&ots=mW3rmZwFPG&sig=I5mkvpBXyHmv3I0_Niv_jd1lU&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CDwQ6AEwBGoVChMIuIHuqZHayAIVi6SICh26wwK
-#v=onepage&q=Drones%20as%20Lawfu.
191 Id.
192 Id.
184
185
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SELF-DEFENSE THEORY

This section demonstrates the effectiveness of drones in
executing self-defense operations, illustrated by a case study of the
U.S. drone strategy during the War on Terror. U.S. national security
strategy has encompassed the pre-emptive self-defense doctrine since
the domestic attack that took place on September 11, 2001;
commonly referred to as “9/11.” This doctrine argues that it is legal
for a state to launch a pre-emptive attack when it reasonably believes
that another entity is planning an attack on the state.193 However, the
U.S. has long recognized the importance of defending its interests,
both domestically and abroad. In 1854, a U.S. diplomat was attacked
in the town of San Juan del Norte (Greytown) 194, Nicaragua.195 At the
time of the attack, Greytown had been forcibly seized by forces that
were politically unrecognized by the U.S., and engaged in other acts
of violence against U.S. nationals.196 The U.S. Secretary of the Navy
ordered the bombardment of the town after the enemy force’s refusal
to adhere to the U.S.’s demand for redress.197 The presidential
authorization of the military force used in Greytown was later
challenged in U.S. courts, with each ruling being appealed until the
case arrived at the Supreme Court.198 Justice Nelson of the U.S.
Supreme Court stated in the opinion that the President had the
power to order the responsive use of armed force as part of a power
of “protection” of U.S. nationals abroad against “acts of lawless
violence” and “an irresponsible and marauding community.”199 At the

193 Kate McCann & Christopher Hope, Are UK drone strikes in Syria legal?
THE TELEGRAPH, (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews
/middleeast/syria/11852228/Are-UK-drone-strikes- in-Syria-legal.html.
194 Hereinafter San Juan del Norte is referred as Greytown.
195 Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targeting of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of
U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19.2 J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POL’Y, at 245 (also
see, Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186). Due to lack
of recognition of the putative government, the community can be classified as a
non-state actor).
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 245.
199 Id.
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time of the ruling, the U.S. did not consider the ongoing conflict with
Nicaragua, Greytown, or its unrecognized government as “war”.200
The customary law of a state’s right to self-defense is
enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.201 Article 51 states:
[N]othing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the
present Charter to take at any time such action as it
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
Article 51 of the Charter expressly affirms the right of a state
to respond defensively “if an armed attack occurs.”202 “Armed
attack” is the operative phrase of the text; a state may use force
against both state and non-state aggressors under a theory of selfdefense. And further, nothing in the language of Article 51 or any
otherwise relevant customary international law requires consent of
the state from which a non-state actor attack is emanating, and on
whose territory a self-defense action takes place against the non-state
actor.203 Article 51 provides that nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.204 The United States has justified its

200
201
202
203
204

Id. at 246.
Schmitt, supra note 33, at 5.
Paust, supra note 195, at 241.
Id. at 249.
Schmitt, supra note 33, at 5.
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drone operations occurring outside the context of an armed conflict
with another state on the basis of this right.205
In fact, with respect to permissible measures of self-defense
under Article 51, a form of consent from each member of the United
Nations already exists in advance by treaty. 206 For example, with
respect to the U.S. use of drones in Pakistan to target Al-Qaeda and
Taliban forces, it is clear that the U.S. would not need the express
consent of Pakistan to carry out self-defense targeting.207 It is also
clear that the U.S. has the right to use drones in Pakistan under
Article 51 of the Charter in self-defense to protect U.S. interests from
continuous Al-Qaeda and Taliban attacks launched from Pakistan. 208
There is a growing body of law that generally recognizes the actions
taken by the U.S. as legal according to international standards.
According to public reports, U.S. officials have regularly consulted
with Pakistani authorities when drones have been employed for strike
operations in Pakistan.209 However, Pakistan maintains only limited
control over large swaths of its territory, and thus, as a result,
terrorists have used that ungoverned space to their advantage; in
response, President Trump and former-President Barack Obama
have made clear that the United States will act if and when Pakistan
cannot.210
V.

GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF DRONE STRIKES AND LOAC

Under the LOAC, in military operations, the location of a
strike matters. The LOAC cannot apply places where armed conflict
does not exist, and the determination of whether armed conflict does
in-fact exist is based upon the intensity of the violence occurring in
that given place, in addition to the level of organization employed by
the forces involved, as laid out in the Tadic opinion.211 The
205
206
207
208
209
210
211

Id.
Paust, supra note 195, at 239.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 250.
Vogel, supra note 110, at 131.
Id.
Lewis, supra note 1, at 301.
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appearance of drones in the arsenal of armed conflict has stimulated
renewed attempts to define the parameters of the modern
battlefield.212 The location in which military operations are actually
taking place at any given time is known as the ‘area of operations,’
“the theatre of war,” or simply, the ‘battlefield.’ 213 Conventional
LOAC contains references to “zones of military operations,” the
‘zone of combat,’ and ‘battlefield areas’ although these terms remain
ambiguous.214 The ever-increasing use of drones in the pursuit of the
“war on terror” has raised concerns over the emergence of a global
battlefield whereby the entire planet is subject to the application of
the LOAC.215
For the past several years, the geographical location of drone
attacks has expanded at a rapid rate; Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen,
Somalia, and Libya have all been subject to drone strikes under the
blanket justification of fighting terrorism. 216 Some of these strikes,
such as those in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Libya, fall within the
generally recognized parameters of an armed conflict. Others, such as
those in Yemen and Somalia, raise more complicated questions
regarding where force is being used and what that means in terms of
the application of the LOAC.217 These concerns primarily stem from
frequent drone strikes occurring outside the ‘active battlefields’ of
Afghanistan and into the bordering regions of Pakistan, Yemen, and
Somalia.218
Drone strikes blur the geographical boundaries of the
battlefield. In traditional conflicts, military operations were confined
to the territories of the actors and were not supposed to spillover to
neutral states.219 The law of neutrality generally “defines the
relationship under international law between states engaged in an

Noam Lubell & Nathan Derejko, A Global Battlefield? Drones and the
Geographical Scope of Armed Conflict, 1 J. INT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 8 (2013).
213 Id. at 9.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 See Blank, supra note 70, at 708.
217 Id.
218 Lubell & Derejko, supra note 212, at 11.
219 Blank, supra note 70, at 711.
212
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armed conflict and those that are not participating in that conflict.” 220
Neutrality law thus led to a geographic-based framework in which
belligerents can fight on belligerent territory or the commons, but
must refrain from any operations on neutral territory. 221 In essence,
the battle space in a traditional armed conflict between two or more
states is anywhere outside the sovereign territory of any of the neutral
states.222 However, because the U.S. drone program largely targets
non-state actors that freely move across borders, laws of neutrality
have become less effective.
The U.S. government operates two drone programs. 223 The
military’s version, which is publicly acknowledged, operates in the
recognized war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq, and targets enemies of
the U.S. military stationed there. As such, the program is an extension
of conventional warfare.224 The C.I.A.'s program is aimed at terror
suspects around the world, including countries where U.S. troops are
not based.225 The program is classified as covert, and the intelligence
agency declines to provide any information to the public about where
it operates, how it selects a target, who is in charge, or how many
casualties the program has led to. 226 It is contended that drone strikes
in places like Yemen and Pakistan violate international law because
there is no currently recognized conflict between these states and the
US.227
However, just a few weeks after the attacks of 9/11,
President George W. Bush laid the foundation for the notion of the
whole world as a battlefield when he pronounced, “our war on terror
will be much broader than the battlefields and beachheads of the
past. This war will be fought wherever terrorists hide, or run, or
plan.”228 The Obama Administration has not specifically adopted that
Id.
Id.
222 Id.
223 Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones, A Case Study of
Pakistan, NOTRE DAME L. SCH. LEGAL STUDIES RES. PAPER NO. 09-43, 4 (2010).
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Lewis, supra note 1, at 294.
228 Blank, supra note 70, at 712.
220
221
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same language calling for a global battlefield, but has actually
significantly expanded the use of drone strikes outside of
Afghanistan.229 Al-Qaeda maintains a strong presence in a number of
countries, most notably Yemen and Somalia, and uses such states to
recruit, train, and plan attacks against the United States and its allies.
The United States has repo1rtedly conducted limited drone
operations in such countries.230 Somalia and Yemen present an even
more compelling case (than say Pakistan) of a neutral status; both
states are considered “failed states” and are unable to consent or
object to U.S. actions and the U.S. has not formally acknowledged
the use of force in these states.231
However, according to Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF) passed by Congress in the days following 9/11:
the President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations,
or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred
on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations or
persons.232
If consent was given by a state and U.S. personnel engaged a
target authorized by the AUMF, the strike would arguably be covered
under AUMF authority and fall within the LOAC. 233 Therefore, the
U.S. is not territorially limited when conducting operations against
non-state participants.234 Moreover, there is no question that
Pakistan's territory falls within the greater AUMF theater of conflict.
U.S. officials have argued that the fight with AUMF enemies is
Id.
Vogel, supra note 110, at 132.
231 Id.
232 107th
Congress, PUBLIC LAW 107–40
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ40/pdf.
233 Vogel, supra note 110, at 132.
234 Id.
229
230

200
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global, not confined to the territory of one country. 235 In fact, most
of the leadership and many of the fighters intended to be covered by
the AUMF are located outside of Afghanistan and within Pakistan's
borders.236
Thus, location matters, but it is not overly prohibitive. 237 The
U.S. has consistently made the case that the war with Al-Qaeda and
its terrorist associates is of global reach. 238 The epicenter is in
Afghanistan (and to a lesser extent Iraq), but Al-Qaeda and its
offshoots, as transnational non-state actors, operate in and wage war
from states across the world.239
VI.

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY DURING DRONE OPERATIONS

Under the LOAC and international criminal law, military
personnel are criminally responsible for any war crimes they commit
during war.240 In the case of drones, the most controversial aspect of
a drone program is the legal status of the operator. 241 Military
commanders often consult their staff judge advocates (SJAs),
especially in the escalation of conflict. 242 Seeking legal advice is
increasing and has become prevalent, even in the battle space.243 “It is
also clear from the commanders . . . that legal advice is essential to
effective combat operations in the current environment—legal advice
is now part of the tooth not the tail.”244

Id.
Id.
237 Vogel, supra note 110, at 132.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Nathalie Weizmann, Autonomous Weapon System under International Law,
ACADEMY BRIEFING NO. 8, at 3 (Nov. 2014).
241 Vogel, supra note 110, at 134.
242 Edward Major, Law and Ethics in Command Decision Making, U. OF PENN.,
61 (June 2012), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl
/conferences/cyberwar/papers/reading/Major.pdf.
243 Id.
244 Id.
235
236
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Even those who support nearly every other aspect of drone
warfare find themselves uneasy with civilian personnel performing
combat functions.245 According to Peter Maurer, the president of the
ICRC:
Although the operators of remote-controlled
weapons systems such as drones may be far from the
battlefield, they still run the weapon system, identify
the target and fire the missiles. They generally operate
under responsible command; therefore, under
international humanitarian law, drone operators and
their chain of command are accountable for what
happens. The fact of their being thousands of
kilometers away from the battlefield does not absolve
drone operators and their chain of command of their
responsibilities, which include upholding the
principles of distinction and proportionality, and
taking all necessary precautions in attack. Drone
operators are thus no different than the pilots of
manned aircraft such as helicopters or other combat
aircraft as far as their obligation to comply with
international humanitarian law is concerned, and they
are no different as far as being targetable under the
rules of international humanitarian law.246
Military drone operators live and work in the US, leading
relatively normal civilian lives outside of their occupation. 247 Unlike
deployed personnel who remain in a combat environment
continuously, drone operators maintain more stereotypical
employment; they come in to work each day, gather intelligence,
execute strikes when required, and return home for dinner. 248 All the
while, military drone operators and their chain of command are
subject to the laws of war.

245
246
247
248

Vogel, supra note 110, at 134.
Maurer, supra note 123.
Wright, supra note 174, at 12.
Id.
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However, command responsibility is not as clearly defined
when drone operations are conducted by the CIA. The CIA follows,
or at least professes to follow, the laws of armed conflict. 249 As
discussed above, the CIA operates one of the two drone programs
for the U.S. The CIA program is not considered a military program,
is not operated as one, and is not governed “by the same
international protocols on the conduct of war” as the Department of
Defense.250 The clandestine and largely unaccountable nature of the
CIA program creates the most ambiguities for Just War theorists. 251
According to Philip Alston U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary, or arbitrary executions:
Intelligence personnel do not have immunity from
prosecution under domestic law for their conduct.
They are thus unlike State armed forces which would
generally be immune from prosecution for the same
conduct.... Thus, CIA personnel could be prosecuted
for murder under the domestic law of any country in
which they conduct targeted drone killings, and could
also be prosecuted for violations of applicable U.S.
law.252
Alston is not alone in this assessment of CIA drone pilots’
status. As noted by Rayan Vogel, a Foreign Affairs Specialist, and
member of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S.
Department of Defense:
The CIA is a civilian agency and not a branch of the
U.S. Armed Forces. Even under a liberal reading of
Article 4 from GC III, the CIA would not meet the
requirements of lawful belligerency as a militia or
volunteer corps because, while they do report to a
responsible chain of command (albeit not always a
military chain of command), as a group they do not
wear uniforms or otherwise distinguish themselves,
249
250
251
252

Lewis & Crawrord, supra note 93, at 1158.
Wright, supra note 174, at 7.
Id.
Lewis & Crawrord, supra note 93, at 1158.
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nor do they carry their arms openly. CIA personnel
are therefore unprivileged belligerents in this
conflict. 253
Gary Solis agrees with this assessment and has opined at
some length on the status of CIA drone operators as unprivileged
belligerents:
Those CIA agents are, unlike their military
counterparts but like the fighters they target, unlawful
combatants. No less than their insurgent targets, they
are fighters without uniforms or insignia, directly
participating in hostilities, employing armed force
contrary to the laws and customs of war. Even if they
are sitting in Langley, the CIA pilots are civilians
violating the requirement of distinction, a core
concept of armed conflict, as they directly participate
in hostilities...it makes no difference that CIA civilians
are employed by, or in the service of, the U.S.
government or its armed forces. They are civilians;
they wear no distinguishing uniform or sign, and if
they input target data or pilot armed drones in the
combat zone, they directly participate in hostilities-which means they may be lawfully targeted ....
Moreover, CIA civilian personnel who repeatedly and
directly participate in hostilities may have what recent
guidance from the International Committee of the
Red Cross terms "a continuous combat function."
That status, the ICRC guidance says, makes them
legitimate targets whenever and wherever they may be
found, including Langley. 254
When the laws of armed conflict were developed, there was
no technology such as drones used in the battlefield. Perhaps, new
laws should be developed, especially to protect and guide drone
operators. Drones are different than traditional forces that must react
promptly to various hostile situations and make decisions within their
253
254

Id. at 1159.
Id. at 1159-60.
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own judgment. In the case of drones, it is conceivable that the
President may become involved with the assistance of military and
legal advisors before authorizing a drone operator to engage a target.
Therefore, the laws delineating command responsibility in both
drone programs need to be updated and promulgated to ensure
operations conform with the LOAC.
VII.

CONCLUSION

This article has demonstrated that current laws are capable of
governing drone warfare. The fundamental principles of the law of
armed conflict, specialized weapons treaties, The Hague and Geneva
conventions, customary law, and the UN Charter all provide a
thorough legal backdrop to govern the usage of drones.255 As with all
weapons, it is essential to ensure that drone attacks are launched only
against legitimate military objectives in accordance with the laws
governing the use of force.256 The sole legal issue specific to drone
operations under both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello is weapon
choice.257 As correctly noted by Special Reporter Alston, “a missile
fired from a drone is no different from any other commonly used
weapon, including a gun fired by a soldier or a helicopter or gunship
that fires missiles. The critical legal question is the same for each
weapon: whether its specific use complies with LOAC.”258 Drones
provide a legally permissible use of force to support self-defense.259
Drone attacks can occur against state or non-state actors located in a
foreign country from which the armed attacks emanate even though
there is no special consent of the foreign state, no imputation of the
non-state actor’s attacks to the foreign state, no armed conflict
between the foreign state and the United States, and the foreign state

Vogel, supra note 110, at 137.
Blank, supra note 70, at 716-17.
257 Michael Schmitt, Drone Attacks Under the Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello:
Clearing the ‘Fog of Law’, at 13, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1801179.
258 Id.
259 Jordan Paust, Operationalizing use of drones against non-state terrorists under the
international law of self-defense, 8 ALB. GOV’T L. REV., 203 (2013), (last accessed in
2015).
255
256
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is willing or unable to stop the attacks.260 However, the legal status of
drone operators remains as a challenging legal question while the
field continues to develop.

260

Id.
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INTRODUCTION

Drone usage has been a topic of significant debate in recent
years. The use of drones has fostered discussions regarding their
privacy implications,2 public safety concerns,3 and even their use to
conduct military airstrikes in foreign nations.4 However, a unique
trend is emerging regarding drone use that raises novel policy
concerns: recent reports have concluded that drones are now being
used as a method of trafficking narcotics from Mexico into the
United States.5
1

While Mexican cartels have been known to utilize creative
methods when smuggling narcotics,6 the new method of using drones

Melanie Reid, ARTICLE: GROUNDING DRONES: BIG BROTHER’S
TOOL BOX NEEDS REGULATION NOT ELIMINATION, 20 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 9 (2014).
2 Robert Holly, States Restrict Drone Use Because of Privacy Concerns, MIDWEST
CENTER
FOR
INVESTIGATIVE
REPORTING
(Mar.
21,
2014),
http://investigatemidwest.org/2014/03/21/states-restrict-drone-use-because-ofprivacy-concerns/.
3 See Dan Loumena, Drone crashes into stands during U.S. Open match; N.Y.
teacher arrested, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Sep. 4, 2014, 4:10 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/sports/la-sp-sn-us-open-drone-crash-20150903story.html (drone crashes into stands at sporting event); see also, Kevin Cokely,
FAA to Consider New Restrictions for Drones, NBC DFW (Sep. 14, 2015, 11:33 PM),
http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/FAA-to-Consider-New-Restrictions-forDrones-327616521.html (describing a drone that nearly crashed into a private
aircraft.).
4 See i.e. Mehreen Zahra-Malik, U.S. drone strike kills 15 Pakistani Taliban in
Afghanistan,
REUTERS
(Sep.
11,
2015,
10:54
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/11/us-afghanistan-dronesidUSKCN0RB1OW20150911.
5 Nick Valencia & Michael Martinez, Drone carrying drugs crashes south of U.S.
border,
CNN
(Jan.
23,
2015,
3:00
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/22/world/drug-drone-crashes-us-mexico-border/
(“U.S. authorities acknowledge a new smuggling strategy may be emerging on the
border.”).
6 Drug delivery drone crashes in Mexico, BBC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30932395
(“Other
methods
[of
smuggling] included catapults, tunnels and ultra-light aircraft.”).
1

209

DOCUMENT3 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

4/28/2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:1

has important implications for a number of reasons.7 Notably, drones
are a rapidly growing industry with the potential to significantly
impact the economy. Domestic use of drones in the United States is
predicted to have an economic impact of over $82 billion between
2015 and 2025.8 The demand for drones is consistently increasing
among recreational users9 and businesses,10 causing a steady rise in
their supply as well. While supply and demand continues to increase,
the lack of drone regulations in the United States and Mexico is a
cause for concern. Further, those regulations that currently exist do
not account for the use of drones as trafficking tools at the border. It
is thus unsurprising that cartels are beginning to utilize drones to
traffic narcotics from Mexico into the United States.
Given the fact that the U.S.-Mexican border extends
approximately 1,933 miles,11 and that the cartels have used drones to

Such implications include a lack of drone regulations, anti-drone security
measures, and extradition issues regarding those using drones for drug trafficking
between nations.
8 Darryl Jenkins & Bijan Vasigh, The Economic Impact of Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Integration in the United States at 2, ASSOCIATION FOR UNMANNED VEHICLE
SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL (2013).
9 See Mitch Joel, The Booming Business of Drones, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 4,
2013),
https://hbr.org/2013/01/the-booming-business-of-drones
(Industry
analysts predict the drone market to double in less than a decade).
10 A number of companies, including Amazon, Facebook, and Google, have
invested in drone development for delivery of goods, sky-based computer
networks, and even crop dusting in the agricultural community. See Jillian D’Onfro,
Why Amazon Needs Drones More Than People Realize, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 30,
2014, 6:23 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-drones-2014-7; John
Naughton, Why Facebook and Google are Buying Into Drones, GUARDIAN (Apr. 19,
2014, 7:05 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/20/facebookgoogle-buying-into-drones-profit-motive; Mike Hanlon, Yamaha’s RMAX - The
World’s
Most
Advanced
Non-Military
UAV,
GIZMAG,
http://www.gizmag.com/go/2440/ (last updated Nov. 19, 2004) (discussing
Yamaha’s R-MAX drones which are used primarily used for crop-dusting in
Japan.); Jeremy Bradley, It’s one delicious drone—the Burrito Bomber, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/21/tech/innovation/drone-burrito-bomber/ (last
updated Jun. 21, 2013, 8:35 AM) (Discussing drones to be used to deliver burritos
to homes.).
11 JANICE CHERYL BEAVER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21729, U.S.
INTERNATIONAL BORDERS: BRIEF FACTS 2, (2006).
7
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traffic narcotics an estimated 150 times per year,12 there is a dire need
for a solution to this tactic before it becomes more prevalent. This
comment will focus on the rising use of drones at the border to
smuggle narcotics into the United States, and suggest possible
solutions to curb this new tactic being utilized by the cartels. By
taking steps to solve this problem before it becomes more recurrent,
the United States can hinder the use of drones as an efficient method
to smuggle narcotics across the border, and in doing so, decrease the
influx of narcotics trafficked into the United States. This comment
will also compare the current drone regulations of Mexico and the
United States with those from various other countries, and discuss
how such policies can be implemented at the United States-Mexico
border.
Part I of this comment has served as an introduction to the
issue. Part II will briefly discuss the current state of the war on drugs
at the border and how the United States and Mexico are working
together to prevent the trafficking of narcotics by Mexican cartels.
Part III will examine the current state of drone regulations in the
United States and Mexico. Together, Parts II and III provide a
background that exposes the severity of the issue of drones as
trafficking tools. Finally, Part IV proposes possible solutions to
prevent Mexican cartels from using drones to traffic narcotics. This
section will also discuss drone regulations in several other countries,
and which policies, if any, should be adopted and implemented at the
border.
II.

DRUG TRAFFICKING AT THE UNITED STATES – MEXICO
BORDER

According to a 2013 survey, approximately 24.6 million
Americans aged twelve or older (9.4 percent of the population) had
used an illicit drug in the past month - a number that has steadily
increased from 8.3 percent in 2002.13 This increase in demand for
See BBC NEWS, supra note 6.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, DRUG FACTS: NATIONWIDE
TRENDS at 1 (2015).
12
13
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illicit drugs has been a catalyst for the trafficking of narcotics across
the border, and has caused Mexico to become the number-one
supplier of illicit drugs in the United States.14 The majority of
methamphetamine available in the United States is produced in
Mexico,15 and a 2010 report stated that ninety percent of the cocaine
sold in the U.S. was transported across the border from Mexico. 16 In
fact, it has been speculated that more than eighty percent of all drugs
that enter the United States are trafficked across the border by
Mexican cartels.17
A. Mexican Cartels
The competing cartels at the United States-Mexico border
include the Sinaloa Cartel, the Gulf Cartel, and the Tijuana Cartel.18
Additionally, Los Zetas provide a dominant presence in the drug
violence and trafficking at the border.19 These drug cartels control the
14 S. Cody Barrus, Interview with Mexico Drug War Expert Sylvia Longmire,
ALLTREATMENT.COM
(Jan.
11,
2011),
http://www.alltreatment.com/blog/2011/interview-with-mexico-drug-war-expertsylvia-longmire/.
15 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION,
DEA-DCT-DIR-002-15, NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT SUMMARY 19
(2014), available at, http://www.dea.gov/resource-center/dir-ndta-unclass.pdf; see
also COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT: COORDINATION AT THE FEDERAL,
STATE, AND LOCAL LEVEL: HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON STATE, LOCAL,
AND PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS AND INTEGRATION OF THE S. HOMELAND
SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMM., 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (statement of
John Leech, Acting Director for the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Security) (“[Mexico] is the primary source of foreign marijuana
and methamphetamine, and a major source of heroin to the United States.”).
16 See William Finnegan, Letter from Mexico: Silver or Lead. The Drug Cartel La
Familia Gives Local Officials a Choice: Take a Bribe or a Bullet, THE NEW YORKER, May
31, 2010, available at, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/05/31/silveror-lead.
17 Ginger Thompson, U.S. Widens Its Role in Battle Against Mexico’s Drug
Cartels,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
7,
2011,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/world/07drugs.html?_r=0.
18 Callin Kerr, COMMENT: Mexico’s Drug War: Is It Really a War?, 54 S.
TEX. L. REV. 193 (2012).
19 Id.; See also, Zetas, INSIGHT CRIME, http://www.insightcrime.org/mexicoorganized-crime-news/zetas-profile (last visited Oct. 10, 2015) (The Drug
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territory surrounding the border and various drug routes it consists
of, including extensive underground tunnels, waterways, roads, and
walking paths.20 While the amount of narcotics trafficked into the
United States annually is difficult to quantify, it is estimated that these
cartels traffic between $19 and $29 billion in drugs each year.21 This
has caused both the Mexican and United States governments to
respond to the drug problem in a variety of ways.
B. Existing Statutes
1. United States.
A number of statutes have been enacted in both the United
States and Mexico to combat the trafficking efforts of the cartels. In
the United States, the Controlled Substances Act22 prohibits any
person from distributing or possessing with intent to distribute a
controlled substance.23 Additionally, 21 USC § 952 prohibits the
importation of controlled substances from outside of the United
States.24 In conjunction with this statute, the Drug Enforcement
Enforcement Administration has described Los Zetas as “the most technologically
advanced, sophisticated and violent of these paramilitary enforcement groups.”).
20 See Ken Stier, Underground Threat: Tunnels Pose Trouble from Mexico to Middle
East,
TIME
(May
2,
2009),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1895430,00.html (describing the
discovery of a tunnel financed by the Tijuana Cartel that is “2,400 feet long and
about nine stories deep”).
21 CNN
Library,
Mexico
Drug
War
Fast
Facts,
CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/02/world/americas/mexico-drug-war-fast-facts/
(last updated Sep. 23, 2015, 4:41 PM).
22 21 USC § 841.
23 Two men recently pled guilty under this statute for smuggling heroin
across U.S.-Mexican border using a drone. See Kristina Davis, Two plead guilty in
border drug smuggling by drone, Los Angeles TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015, 9:20 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-drone-drugs-20150813-story.html.
24 21 USC § 952(a) (“It shall be unlawful to import into the customs
territory of the United States from any place outside thereof (but within the United
States), or to import into the United States from any place outside thereof, any
controlled substance in schedule I or II of title II, or any narcotic drug in schedule
III, IV, or V of title II, or ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or
phenylpropanolamine…”).
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Agency (“DEA”) has established Federal Tracking Penalties for
numerous drugs based on their quantity and schedule.25 To further
increase security at the border and help prevent the trafficking of
narcotics President George W. Bush signed the Secure Fence Act in
2006.26 The purpose of this Act was to “establish operational control
over the international land and maritime borders of the United
States.”27 With regard to trafficking, the Act sought to prevent the
unlawful entry of narcotics and other contraband into the United
States.28 Under the Act, U.S. Border Patrol increased to
approximately 20,000 agents throughout President Bush’s
administration, essentially doubling the number of Border Patrol
agents at the time.29 Another important statute here is 21 U.S.C. §
881, which permits the seizure and civil forfeiture of a wide variety of
property associated with narcotics trafficking. 30 Relevant for purposes
of this comment, this statute permits any drone used to transport
narcotics to be seized by the United States. Finally, on January 25,
2017, President Donald J. Trump signed Executive Order Number
13,767: Border Security and Immigration Enforcement
Improvements.31 Under the Order, the Secretary of Homeland
Security is instructed to “immediately plan, design, and construct a
physical wall along the southern border”32 in addition to hiring “5,000
additional Border Patrol agents.”33 While the main focus of the order
is on immigration, it nonetheless recognizes the importance of
preventing drug trafficking at the border. Given the recent nature of
25 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION,
FEDERAL TRACKING PENALTIES, http://www.dea.gov/druginfo/ftp3.shtml, (last
visited Sep. 24, 2015).
26 Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638.
27 Id.
28 120 Stat. 2638 §2(b).
29 Bernd Debusmann, The U.S. Border and Immigration Reform, REUTERS (Oct.
21,
2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/21/idUS234388556220111021.
30 21 U.S.C. § 881 (Property that may be seized under this statute includes
the drugs themselves, materials and equipment used to make or deliver the drugs,
vehicles used to transport narcotics, real property used to facilitate drug trafficking,
and any firearms related to these same crimes.).
31 Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 25, 2017).
32 Id. at Sec. 4.
33 Id. at Sec. 8.
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this order, it remains unclear what effect it will have on narcotics
trafficking into the United States.
2.

Mexico.

In Mexico, the predominant source of the Country’s drug
laws is the Federal Criminal Code. 34 Article 194 of the Code provides
a twenty-five year prison sentence for the production, transportation,
trafficking, sale, and supply of narcotics. 35 Additionally, the Federal
Law Against Organized Crime, which was approved in 1996,
increased sentences for any crime committed as part of a criminal
conspiracy.36 This law also established the concept of “preventative
detention,” which has since been incorporated into Mexico’s
constitution.37 “Preventative detention” allows for the detention of
individuals on the basis of having suspected links to organized
crime.38 Suspected individuals may be detained for up to 80 days
without an arrest warrant or charge. 39 Despite these laws, various
critics believe the Mexican judicial system has failed to adequately
address the crime and violence the nation faces at the border. 40 In
particular, Mexico’s judicial system has been characterized as
corrupt,41 and generally weaker than the other branches of the

Código Penal Federal [CPF] [Federal Criminal Code], as amended, Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DO], 14 de Agosto de 1931 (Mex.).
35 Id. art. 194.
36 Ley Federal Contra la Delincuencia Organizada [LFCDO] [Federal Law
Against Organized Crime], as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO] 7 de
Noviembre de 1996 (Mex.).
37 Mexico,
DRUG LAW REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA - TNI,
http://www.druglawreform.info/country-information/mexico/item/205mexico#2 (last visited Oct. 10, 2015).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Deborah M. Weissman, The Political Economy of Violence: Toward an
Understanding of the Gender-Based Murders of Ciudad Juarez, 30 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 795, 808 (2005) (discussing the failure of the Mexican legal system to respond
to the murders of women in Ciudad Juarez).
41 Human Rights Watch, Mexico, in WORLD REPORT 380 (2015), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2015_web.pdf. (“The criminal
justice system routinely fails to provide justice to victims of violent crimes and
34
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Mexican government. 42 The threat posed by narcotics trafficking at
the border, in addition to the weak response by the Mexican
government, has caused the United States and Mexico to begin
working in a cooperative manner to address drug-related crime at the
border.
C. Cooperation Between United States and Mexico
The United States and Mexico signed an extradition treaty
that went into effect in 1980.43 The objective of this treaty is “to
cooperate more closely in the fight against crime and, to this end, to
mutually render better assistance in matters of extradition.”44 While
this treaty provides a general means for the nations to cooperate in
matters of extradition, the principal policy between the United States
and Mexico with respect to cartel drug trafficking and violence is the
Merida Initiative.45 This initiative is described as a “partnership
between the United States and Mexico to fight organized crime and
associated violence while furthering respect for human rights and the
rule of law.”46 The Merida Initiative contains four pillars: (1) Disrupt
Organized Criminal Groups; (2) Strengthen Institutions (e.g., the
judicial sector); (3) Build a 21st Century Border; and (4) Build Strong
and Resilient Communities.47 Under the Merida Initiative, the United
States has provided over $2.3 billion in aid to Mexico, and $1.4
billion in equipment and training. 48 Such equipment includes
human rights violations. Causes of this failure include corruption, inadequate
training and resources, and the complicity of prosecutors and public defenders.”)
42 See Matthew C. Ingram et al., Assessing Mexico’s Judicial Reform, TRANSBORDER
INSTITUTE
4
(2012),
available
at
http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/tbi-assessing-judicialreform1.pdf.
43 Extradition Treaty Between the United States and Mexico, U.S.-Mex.,
May 4, 1978, T.I.A.S. No. 9656: 31 UST 5059.
44 Id.
45 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Int’l Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, Merida Initiative (2012), available at https://www.state.gov/j/inl/merida/.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Mexico, The Merida Initiative - Overview,
https://mx.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/the-merida-initiative/
(last visited Feb. 3, 2017).
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helicopters, surveillance equipment and military gear. 49 The funds
appropriated to strengthen institutions under the second pillar focus
primarily on strengthening Mexico’s justice system and the
aforementioned problems that plague it.50 This is accomplished
through the training of prosecutors, defenders, investigators, and
forensic experts, and through judicial exchanges and partnerships
between Mexican and U.S. law schools.51 The U.S. State Department
has claimed that the initiative is responsible for the removal of key
drug trafficking organization leaders, the seizure of tens of thousands
of tons of illicit drugs, millions in currency, and tens of thousands of
weapons.52
D. Drone Use at Border
Though the use of drones to traffic narcotics across the
border is a relatively new tactic, the United States government has
been utilizing drones at the border for nearly a decade.53 In particular,
the United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) operates
ten unmanned aircrafts (“UAs”) for border surveillance and law
enforcement purposes.54 The unmanned aircrafts conduct
reconnaissance missions to gather data and intelligence on drug
trafficking and specific individuals either crossing the border illegally,
See William A. Fix, Kendra J. Harris & Aida A. Montanaro, Offense,
Defense, or Just a Big Fence? Why Border Security is a Valid National Security Issue: St.
Mary’s University School of Law Center for Terrorism Law, 14 SCHOLAR 741, 756 (2012).
50 The Merida Initiative, supra note 45; see also Eric Olson, Six Key Issues in
U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, WILSON CTR. (2008), available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/six_issues_usmex_security_coop.
pdf.
51 Id.
52 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, United States-Mexico Security
Partnership: Progress and Impact (Mar. 23, 2010) (on file with Office of the
Spokesman).
53 Arthur Holland Michel, Customs and Border Protection Drones, CENTER FOR
THE STUDY OF THE DRONE (Jan. 7, 2015), http://dronecenter.bard.edu/customsand-border-protection-drones/.
54 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, DHS/CBP/PIA-018,
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 2 (2013), available at,
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-cbpaircraft-systems-20130926.pdf.
49
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or seeking to smuggle narcotics and other contraband into the United
States.55 These efforts have been met by mild success, with
unmanned aircrafts helping to seize 7,600 pounds of marijuana worth
$19.3 million in 2012.56 While the CBP originally intended to expand
their number of drones to twenty-four at an additional $443 million, 57
the Department of Homeland Security has recently published a
report stating that the CBP drone program has not performed to
expectations and is not worth the cost to maintain. 58 In light of this
report, it is unlikely that the CBP drone program will realize its
projected expansion.59 Given the fact that the United States has been
implementing the use of drones in its efforts to detect drug
trafficking at the border, it is unsurprising that the cartels are
attempting to level the playing field by utilizing drones in their drug
trafficking efforts. With this brief background on the status of drug
trafficking at the border, we turn now to the current state of drone
regulations in Mexico and the United States.
III.

DRONE REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

A. Drone Regulations in the United States
Though public drone use is a relatively new phenomenon, the
foundation for drone regulations in the United States was set in 1958
Id.
Brian Bennett, Predator Drones Have Yet to Prove Their Worth on Border, LOS
ANGELES
TIMES
(Apr.
28,
2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/28/nation/la-na-drone-bust-20120429.
57 Andrew Becker, Border agency looks to expand drone fleet, CALIFORNIA
WATCH (Nov. 19, 2012), http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/border-agencylooks-expand-drone-fleet-18678.
58 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OIG-15-17, U.S.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION’S UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM PROGRAM
DOES NOT ACHIEVE INTENDED RESULTS OR RECOGNIZE ALL COSTS OF
OPERATIONS
(2014),
available
at,
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2015/OIG_15-17_Dec14.pdf.
59 Id. at 1 (“The $443 million CBP plans to spend on program expansion
could be put to better use by investing in alternatives, such as manned aircraft and
ground surveillance assets.”).
55
56
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with the passage of the Federal Aviation Act.60 This act established
the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), which oversees all
aspects of American civil aviation and is responsible for “the safe and
efficient use” of the National Airspace System.61 Consequently, the
FAA is the regulatory agency responsible for administering drone
regulations in the United States.62
The principal piece of drone legislation applicable in the
United States is the Federal Aviation Administration Modernization
and Reform Act of 2012 (“‘FAA Modernization and Reform Act”). 63
This Act directed the FAA “to safely accelerate the integration of
civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system” by
September 30, 2015.64 In other words, the FAA has been tasked with
providing comprehensive drone regulations for various classes of
drone users. The FAA missed this September deadline, however, and
the deadline was extended into 2016.65 The extension of the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act will be of paramount importance in
combatting cartel drone use, as will be discussed in Part IV.
“The United States Government has exclusive sovereignty of
airspace of the United States.”66 The FAA Modernization and
Reform Act directs the FAA to implement three classifications of
Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731.
Id.
62 A federal statute specifies the general policy of the Department of
Transportation. See 49 U.S.C. § 40101. The primary purpose of the FAA (today a
part of the Department of Transportation) is to maintain safety “as the highest
priority in air commerce.”
63 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, 126 Stat.
11 [hereinafter “FAA Modernization and Reform Act”].
64 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, § 332, 126
Stat. 11, 73.
65 See Aviation Pros, ARSA on FAA Extension: Time is Not on Our Side,
AVIATION PROS (Sep. 29, 2015), http://www.aviationpros.com/press_release/
12120302/arsa-on-faa-extension-time-is-not-on-our-side; see also Mark Rockwel,
FAA looks to 2016 for drone rules, 1105 MEDIA, INC. (Sep. 30, 2015),
https://fcw.com/articles/2015/09/30/faa-drones.aspx (“A June 2014 Department
of Transportation Inspector General report stated the agency would miss the 2015
mark because of ‘significant technological barriers,’ including detection and
standardized air traffic procedures and other issues.”).
66 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a).
60
61
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drones into this airspace: public, civil, and model/recreational. 67
Public drones are those owned and used by the United States
government or the government of a state.68 Civil drones are all other
drones not used by the government, but are not recreational. 69 Model
or recreational drones are those that are flown by the general public
strictly for hobby or recreational use.70 Of these three categories, only
public drones currently require certification from the FAA. It is
important to note that while the FAA Modernization and Reform
Act establishes the aforementioned categories of drones, as of August
29, 2016, the FAA has implemented regulations that simply govern
the use of “small” drones – those weighing less than 55 pounds. 71 As
a result, civil drones and model/recreational drones are currently
treated in a similar manner (with minor exceptions for pilots), and
can be flown without FAA certification, as long as the drone is
registered and as long as those piloting them abide by the flight
regulations expressed by the Small Unmanned Aircraft Rules.72
1.

Public (Governmental) Drones.

A number of qualifications must be met before a drone or
aircraft can qualify for public status.73 “Whether an operation
qualifies as a public aircraft operation is determined on a flight-byflight basis, under the terms of the statute.”74 Factors taken into
consideration when determining public status include ownership, the
FAA Modernization and Reform Act, supra note 63.
49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(41) (Operators of public aircrafts include DOD,
DOJ, DHS, NASA, NOAA, state/local agencies and qualifying universities.).
69 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(16).
70 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, §336(c),
126 Stat. 11, 77-78.
71 U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, SUMMARY OF SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT RULE (PART 107),
available at https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/Part_107_Summary.pdf (last visited
Feb. 9, 2017).
72 14 CFR 107.
73 49 U.S.C. § 40125.
74 U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: PUBLIC OPERATIONS
(GOVERNMENTAL), available at http://www.faa.gov/uas/public_operations/ (last
visited Nov. 14, 2015).
67
68
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operator, the purpose of the flight, and the persons on board the
aircraft.75 A drone that qualifies as public must apply for a Certificate
of Waiver or Authorization (“COA”) from the FAA.76 If the COA is
issued, public agencies and organizations are then permitted to
operate a particular aircraft or drone, for a particular purpose, in a
particular area.77 It should be noted that a public drone operator
using the drone in an active, restricted, prohibited or warning area
airspace needs permission from the entity controlling that airspace to
operate the drone in the secured area.78 Alternatively, if the
governmental drone chooses to fly under the small UAS rules, it need
not obtain a COA so long as it follows all rules established under 14
CFR part 107.79
2.

Civil Drones.

Perhaps the most important category for purposes of this
comment, civil drones are all drones that are not public or
recreational. This includes drones used by businesses for commercial
purposes. Currently, there are three methods of gaining FAA
authorization to fly civil drones. First, a civil drone that weighs less
than 55 pounds must be registered with the FAA, and the pilot of
such a drone must meet certain requirements.80 Specifically, the pilot
of a civil drone must be at least 16 years old, pass an initial
aeronautical knowledge test, and be vetted by the Transportation
49 U.S.C. § 40125, supra.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, CERTIFICATES OF WAIVER OR AUTHORIZATION (COA),
available at https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/
service_units/systemops/aaim/organizations/uas/coa/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2017).
77 Id.
78 FAA, Interim Operational Approval Guidance 08-01: Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Operations in the U.S. National Airspace System 5 (2008).
79 U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: BEYOND THE BASICS,
available at https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/#55 (last visited Feb. 9,
2017).
80 U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: FLY FOR WORK/BUSINESS,
available at https://www.faa.gov/uas/getting_started/fly_for_work_business/ (last
visited Feb. 9, 2017).
75
76
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Safety Administration (TSA).81 Further, civil drones under 55 pounds
are subject to various operating rules, however all are subject to
waiver.82 Second, if the civil drone exceeds 55 pounds, the drone
operator must petition for an exemption under section 333 of the
Modernization and Reform Act.83 According to the FAA, a section
333 exemption “provides operators who wish to pursue safe and legal
entry into the NAS a competitive advantage in the UAS marketplace,
thus discouraging illegal operations and improving safety.”84 Third,
civil drone operators can obtain a Special Airworthiness Certificate
(“SAC”).85 To obtain such a certificate, the drone must conform to
the same airworthiness standards as that of any other type of
aircraft.86 Additionally, applicants must be able to describe a number
of details regarding the drone and the anticipated flight pattern. 87 It
Id.
Id. Operating rules include flying in a Class G airspace, under 400 feet,
during the day, at or below 100 mph, and not over people or from a moving car.
83 U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: BEYOND THE BASICS,
available at https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/#55 (last visited Feb. 9,
2017).
84 U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: SECTION 333, available at
https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/section_333/ (last visited
Feb. 9, 2017).
85 U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, SPECIAL AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION: CERTIFICATION FOR
CIVIL OPERATED UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) AND OPTIONALLY
PILOTED AIRCRAFT (OPA), available at https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/
airworthiness_certification/sp_awcert/experiment/sac/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2017).
86 Brandon Bellow, COMMENT: FLOATING TOWARD A SKY NEAR
YOU: UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF
THE FAA MODERNIZATION AND REFORM ACT OF 2012, 78 J. Air L. &
Com. 585, 601 (2013).
87 U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: CIVIL OPERATIONS (NONGOVERNMENTAL), available at http://www.faa.gov/uas/civil_operations/ (last
visited Nov. 14, 2015) (“must be able to describe how their system is designed,
constructed, and manufactured, including engineering processes, software
development and control, configuration management, and quality assurance
procedures used, along with how and where they intend to fly.”); see also Civil
Flight Operations (Non-Governmental), B4UDRONE, available at http://b4udrone.us/
civil-operations/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2017) .
81
82
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should be noted that civil drones may also receive a SAC in the
experimental category to perform research and development, crew
training, and market surveys.88 However, unlike other civil drones,
carrying persons or property for compensation with an experimental
SAC is strictly prohibited.89
3.

Model or Recreational Drones.

The FAA has enacted regulations requiring the registration of
all drones between 0.55 and 55 pounds, even if used for recreational
purposes.90 Those registering small recreational drones must be a U.S.
citizen or legal permanent resident at least 13 years old. 91 The failure
to register such a drone may result in civil and criminal penalties. 92 In
addition to the federal registration process, operators of these drones
must comply with a number of additional “small unmanned aircraft
rules.”93 Specifically, all flights must occur during daylight, at or
below 400 feet, may not exceed 100 mph, and the drone must be
kept within sight of the pilot at all times.94 Further, drones are
prohibited from carrying hazardous materials or being operated in a
reckless manner.95 If a drone operator abides by these regulations, the
pilot does not need FAA authorization to operate their drone. It
should be noted however, that similar to civil drones, to fly a drone
that weighs 55 pounds or more, operators must file for a Section 333
14 CFR §21.191.
14 CFR § 91.319(a)(2).
90 U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: REGISTRATION, available at
https://www.faa.gov/uas/registration/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2017).
91 U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: FLY FOR FUN, available at
https://www.faa.gov/uas/getting_started/fly_for_fun/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2017).
92 U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM (SUAS) REGISTRATION
SERVICE, available at https://registermyuas.faa.gov (last visited Feb. 9, 2017).
93 14 CFR 107.
94 U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, SUMMARY OF SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT RULE (PART 107),
available at https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/Part_107_Summary.pdf (last visited
Feb. 9, 2017).
95 Id.
88
89
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exemption. 96 Despite these limited provisions, “[n]othing in this
section shall be construed to limit the authority of the Administrator
to pursue enforcement action against persons operating model
aircraft who endanger the safety of the national airspace system.”97
4.

Additional Regulations.

In addition to the above regulations, the government may
classify airspace as prohibited, meaning “[n]o person may operate an
aircraft within [the] area unless authorization has been granted by the
using agency.”98 Additionally, foreign aircrafts, not part of the armed
forces of a foreign country, may not navigate in the United States
absent, among other factors, authorization from the Secretary of
Transportation.99 Finally, various criminal penalties have been put in
place for violations of registration requirements in connection with
transporting a controlled substance by aircraft. 100
B. Drone Regulations in Mexico
Mexico’s drone regulations are provided in the Dirección
General de Aeronáutica Civil (General Direction Manual of Civil
Aeronautics). The Dirección General de Aeronáutica Civil is a part of
the Secretariat of Communications and Transportation of Mexico
(“Secretariat”), which in essence is Mexico’s Transportation
Department.101 The Secretariat is responsible for enacting drone
regulations in Mexico, which has been accomplished principally

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: BEYOND THE BASICS,
available at https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/#55 (last visited Feb. 9,
2017).
97 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, §336(b),
126 Stat. 11, 77.
98 14 CFR § 73.83.
99 49 USCS § 41703.
100 49 USCS § 46306.
101 See
generally, Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes,
http://www.sct.gob.mx (last visited Feb. 3, 2017).
96
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through revisions to Mexico’s Aviation Law, COAV23-10R2, in May
2015.102
COAV23-10R2 defines a drone as any vehicle capable of
“transiting through air space.”103 The most important provisions
within this regulation regarding drones are the drone classifications
and the no permit requirement for the operation of small drones in
daylight.104 Specifically, the regulation divides drones into three
categories based on size: small-sized drones weighing 2 kilograms (4.4
pounds) or less; medium-sized drones weighing between 2 kilograms
and 25 kilograms (55 pounds); and large-sized drones weighing over
25 kilograms.105 Small-sized drones are typically those used by
hobbyists, and, as stated above, do not require any permit to fly, so
long as they abide by the general flight laws.106 Medium-sized drones
require a permit to operate, unless operated on the grounds of a flight
club.107 Finally, large-sized drones require an operating permit, and
the operator must also be a licensed pilot.108
Notwithstanding the above categorizations of drones, small
recreational drones must abide by a number of additional regulations.
For example, all drone flights must be operated during daylight hours
only.109 Additionally, all drones must stay 9.2 kilometers (5.72 miles)
away from airports and 900 meters (0.56 miles) from helicopter pads.
Further, small-sized drones are prohibited from flying above 122
meters (400 feet).110 Throughout the duration of the flight, the
102 CO AV-23/10 R2, available at http://www.sct.gob.mx/fileadmin/
DireccionesGrales/DGAC/00-aeronautica/co-av-23-10-r2.pdf.
103 Id.
104 See Nancy Palencia, Mexico drones get green light, CAPITALMEDIA, available
at http://thenews.mx/2015/04/mexico-drones-get-green-light (last visited Nov.
12, 2015).
105 CO AV-23/10 R2, art. 7, p. 4, available at http://www.sct.gob.mx/
fileadmin/DireccionesGrales/DGAC/00-aeronautica/co-av-23-10-r2.pdf.
106 Id. at art. 8, p. 5.
107 Id. at art. 9, p. 6.
108 Id. at art. 10, p. 6.
109 Id. at art. 7.2(k); see also Mexico Drone Laws, UAV SYSTEMS
INTERNATIONAL INC. (Nov. 1, 2015), https://uavsystemsinternational.com/dronelaws-by-country/mexico-drone-laws/.
110 Mexican Drone Regulations, THE DRONE INFO (June 24, 2015),
http://www.thedroneinfo.com/mexican-drone-regulations/.
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operator or pilot must always keep the drone within his visual line of
sight.111 Finally, the regulations provide that all drones may not carry
any dangerous merchandise or prohibited substances,112 and pilots are
responsible for any damage caused by an accident.113
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, Mexico’s drone laws
are not only new, but are not completely developed. That being said,
commentators have stated that Mexico’s drone laws are a step in the
right direction, in part because they have closely modeled their
regulations off of those currently in existence in the United States.
However, both the drone regulations of Mexico and the United
States are not fully comprehensive, leaving gaps for drones to be
utilized in criminal activity, as displayed by the narcotics trafficking
seen at the border.
IV.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO PREVENT DRONES FROM BEING
USED AS TOOLS FOR DRUG TRAFFICKING BY MEXICAN
CARTELS

The previous sections have established the importance and
impact of the use of drones to traffic narcotics into the United States.
Factors contributing to the severity of this issue include the
expanding drone industry, lack of drone regulations, and significant
quantity of narcotics smuggled into the United States from Mexico.
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the trafficking of
narcotics from Mexico into the United States is nothing short of an
epidemic. While certain drone regulations have been established by
both Mexico and the United States, these regulations were not
enacted to control the use of drones as tools for transporting
narcotics. Since evidence suggests that Mexican cartels have begun to
utilize drones as a trafficking technique, the need for a
111
CO AV-23/10 R2, art. 8, p. 5, available at http://www.sct.gob.mx
/fileadmin/DireccionesGrales/DGAC/00-aeronautica/co-av-23-10-r2.pdf.
112 Id. at art. 7.2(e); see also SCT announces new drone regulations, MEXICO
NEWS DAILY (Apr. 30, 2015), http://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/sct-announcesnew-drone-regulations (“[drones] must not carry anything dangerous or illegal.”).
113 CO AV-23/10 R2, art. 7.2(g), p. 4, available at http://www.sct.gob.mx/
fileadmin/DireccionesGrales/DGAC/00-aeronautica/co-av-23-10-r2.pdf.
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comprehensive solution is imminent. This section proposes possible
solutions to prevent drones from being used as tools by Mexican
cartels for drug trafficking. This section will also discuss the
regulation of drones in several other countries, and which policies, if
any, should be adopted at the border.
It should be noted that while there exist several different
theories to reduce the incidences of drug trafficking into the United
States,114 this comment focuses on methods that can be used to
specifically prevent cartels from using drones to traffic narcotics.
While alternative theories could undoubtedly decrease the overall
incidences of narcotics trafficking into the United States, they will not
be the focus of the discussion.
A. Overview of Proposal
The most important aspects of solving the drone crisis at the
border are the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, the
Merida Initiative, and the extradition treaty between the United States
and Mexico. As discussed above, the FAA has been granted an
extension to finalize their implementation of drones into the United
States airspace.115 The FAA should utilize the extension granted in
the FAA Modernization and Reform Act to implement regulations
for drone use at the border, and fill in any gaps not covered by the
current regulations. The specifics of possible regulations will be
discussed in subpart 1, below. These refined regulations within the
FAA Modernization and Reform Act should then be implemented
into collaborative drone regulations with the Mexican government at
the border. This can be accomplished through the Merida Initiative,
and specifically, through the first three pillars, which focus on
disrupting organized criminal groups, strengthening institutions, and
building a twenty-first century border. Such collaborative drone
regulations would be consistent with the goals of the Merida
See inter alia Mark Osler, SYMPOSIUM: DRUG POLICY REALITY
AND REFORM: ASSET FORFEITURE IN A NEW MARKET-REALITY
NARCOTICS POLICY, 52 Harv. J. on Legis. 221 (2015). (proposing that attacking
the “cash flow” of the cartels would disrupt their narcotics operations).
115 Aviation Pros, supra note 65.
114
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Initiative. As part of the Initiative, the Mexican government must
work to honor any new regulations implemented in the United States
through the FAA Modernization and Reform Act. Finally, any
criminal violations of the collaborative regulations would permit the
United States to prosecute any offenders located in Mexico, due to
the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. In order
for this proposal to be effective, both countries must work to honor
the treaty while respecting the other nation’s sovereignty. With the
basic framework of the proposal established, potential new drone
regulations will be discussed below.116
1. New Drone Regulations to be enacted through the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act.
To begin, both the United States and Mexico must enact
regulations that explicitly ban the use of drones as drug trafficking
tools at the border. No such regulation currently exists in either
country, so this proposal is intuitively the first step in solving this
problem. It is significant that a number of states have already enacted
legislation prohibiting the weaponization of drones.117 For this
reason, a prohibition on the transportation of drugs would be feasible
and consistent with existing drone regulations.
Next, the United States and Mexico should create harsher
penalties for offenders who use drones to transport narcotics across
the border. While trafficking narcotics across the border is already
illegal,118 a sentence enhancer for the use of drones would help deter
future incidences of drone transportation, since the relatively small
benefits of a single drone trafficking flight would not outweigh the
potential enhanced sentence attached to such conduct. Such a
sentence enhancer would also apply to those receiving the drone
shipment within the United States. This proposal is closely related to
116 While it is not anticipated that the cartels will follow every regulation this
comment proposes, such regulations may nonetheless help deter cartels from using
drones as trafficking tools by making the penalties for such conduct outweigh its
potential benefits.
117 See inter alia N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-401.24 (2014).
118 21 USC § 841.
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the first, however with slight differences. Whereas the previous
proposal was an explicit ban on trafficking narcotics with drones, this
proposal ensures a harsher penalty for those caught trafficking
narcotics in this fashion. While the former is its own offense, the
latter would attach to legislation already in existence.
Additionally, the United States and Mexico should categorize
the region extending the length of the border as a “no fly zone” for
drones, thus prohibiting unauthorized drone flights within 5 miles of
the border.119 This is accomplished by categorizing this region as
“prohibited airspace,” in which no drone operations may take place
in a designated region of the border without the express permission
of the United States or Mexican governments. 120 Any drone flights
within this region, with the exception of drones currently controlled
by the CBP,121 would be strictly prohibited, and those participating in
unauthorized flights would be subject to severe penalties as well as
confiscation of any drone and narcotics being transferred across the
border.122 While such regions already exist, the border of the United
States and Mexico is not included among these “no-fly zones.”123 As
will be described below, several countries have adopted similar “nofly zones” to help regulate drone flights.124
In conjunction with the prohibited airspace, all drone flights
that fall outside of this region but nevertheless remain within 10 miles
of the border must be operated within the line of sight of the
operator – GPS and camera controlled flights should be strictly
prohibited within this region. Adopting such a regulation would make
it much more difficult for those attempting to traffic narcotics via
Bobby Sudekum, Don’t fly drones here, MAPBOX (July 22, 2014),
https://www.mapbox.com/blog/dont-fly-here/ (Map of current no-fly
zones for drones).
120 14 C.F.R.§§73.81-73.83 (2011).
121 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 54.
122 21 U.S.C. § 881.
123 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, §334, 126
Stat. 11, 76-77.
124 Canada prohibits flights within restricted airspace, including near or over
military bases, prisons, and forest fires. See Canadian Aviation Regulations,
SOR/96-433 (Can.) available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/SOR-96433.pdf.
119
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drones to remain hidden from authorities, and should make the risk
of such a flight outweigh the potential benefits. This would also make
drone trafficking flights less convenient, since they cannot be
controlled through an automatic flight pattern with GPS coordinates
or from a remote location via camera. To be effective, this regulation
would also require the communities neighboring the border to be
well informed of the regulation’s requirements.
Finally, recall that the current United States and Mexican
regulations categorize drones based on weight. 125 However with
reports that the cartels are engineering their own drones with larger
engines to make transporting narcotics more efficient,126 regulations
should be implemented prohibiting certain engine sizes for civilian
drones. By limiting the engine size of drones that can be used for
narcotics trafficking, such drones will be unable to carry greater
weight, and thus will be unable to transport larger quantities of
narcotics. Any drones seized that contain engine sizes exceeding the
statutory limit will be subject to additional penalties. This regulation
will help deter cartels from constructing their own drones with
increased engine sizes, thus making drones an inefficient method for
trafficking narcotics.
2.

Additional Methods.

In addition to the above regulations, the United States and
Mexico should employ the use of geo-fencing technology. Put simply,
geo-fencing is a virtual barrier that surrounds a geographical
boundary through the use of a GPS.127 Geo-fencing technology could
automatically prevent drones from entering a designated prohibited
area. By designating the region extending the length of the border as
125 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, §336, 126
Stat. 11, 77-78; CO AV-23/10 R2, art. 7, p. 4, available at http://www.sct.gob.mx/
fileadmin/DireccionesGrales/DGAC/00-aeronautica/co-av-23-10-r2.pdf.
126 Drug delivery drone crashes in Mexico, BBC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30932395 (Stating that cartels hired
engineers to manufacture drones to carry more weight than those that were
commercially available.).
127 DEFINITION:
geo-fencing (geofencing), TECHTARGET (Sep. 2015),
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/geofencing.
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prohibited airspace, as described above, the use of geo-fencing
technology would ensure that GPS controlled drones do not fly
within 10 miles of the border. This proposal is feasible, as U.S.
lawmakers have recently suggested similar regulations.128
The United States must also continue utilizing their own
surveillance drones at the border to help identify any unauthorized
drones in the border airspace.129 Since the drones utilized by the CBP
already monitor the border for drug trafficking,130 extending their
operation to monitor the skies is the next logical and necessary step
in preventing narcotics trafficking. In fact, China is currently utilizing
drones in their own efforts to prevent drug trafficking on the Indian
border in Tibet and in Xinjiang and Yunnan regions. 131 The use of
such technology comes with its own weaknesses however, as drones
utilized by the CBP may be susceptible to attacks.132 Increased drone
See Kim Kirschenbaum, Recreational Drones Present Enforcement Issues for
FAA, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL (Sept. 23, 2015),
http://www.regblog.org/2015/09/23/kirschenbaum_recreational_drones/ (New
York Senator Chuck Schumer recently announced his intentions to introduce an
amendment mandating the use of geo-fencing technology on drones to restrict
their flying capabilities.); see also Kaveh Waddell, Chuck Schumer Wants to Set Up NoDrone Zones Around Airports, NATIONAL JOURNAL (Aug. 19, 2015),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/2015/08/19/chuck-schumer-wants-set-upno-drone-zones-around-airports (Geo-fencing technology proposals would create
no-fly zones for “sensitive areas.”).
129 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra Note 54.
130 See Thompson, supra note 17.
131 China deploys radars, drones on borders to curb infiltration, THE ECONOMIC
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2015), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/
china-deploys-radars-drones-on-borders-to-curb-infiltration/articleshow/49688679
.cms.
132 See Scott Peterson & Payam Faramarzi, Iran Hijacked US Drone, Says
Iranian
Engineer,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(Dec.
15,
2011),
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1215/Exclusive-Iranhijacked-US-drone-says-Iranian-engineer-Video (Commentators have noted that
the GPS guidance system that allows a UAS to fly free is highly susceptible to
attack); see also Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Drone Hijacking? That’s Just the Start of
GPS Troubles, WIRED (July 6, 2012), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom
/2012/07/drone-hijacking/all/ (“There are already drones in use in the country
that are plausible targets for jamming – think of the drones being used to monitor
the border between the U.S. and Mexico for drug smuggling and border
jumping.”).
128
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security could protect CBP drones from being hijacked,133 and such
techniques could then be used to ground unauthorized drones
trafficking narcotics.134
B. Drone Regulations of Other Nations
Numerous countries around the world have enacted their
own unique drone regulations, the adoption of which may be useful
to the United States and Mexico in their efforts to combat narcotics
trafficking. The following discussion explores a number of drone
regulations from several countries. While some of the outlined
regulations may prove to be useful in the future of drone regulation
at the border, others are included to provide a simple comparison.
This discussion is intended to highlight how the regulations of
Mexico and the United States compare to those of other nations, and
discuss which regulations may be useful to help curb the incidences
of drones being used to traffic narcotics across the border. The
countries described below were selected based on a unique feature
about their drone regulations, and provided a distinct basis of
comparison to the drone regulations of Mexico and the United
States.
1.

United Kingdom.

To begin, drone regulations in the United Kingdom are very
similar to those of the United States. One notable difference is that
the United Kingdom requires direct visual contact to be maintained
at all times, and the operator may not use a monitor to conduct the

133 Bellow, supra note 86 at 615 (“The FAA should also require that all
UASs come equipped with some sort of anti-drone-jacking technology.”).
134 Josh Solomon, Uncertainties Remain as FAA Integrates Drones Into American
Skies, MCCLATCHY DC (April 29, 2013), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013
/04/29/189894/uncertainties-remain-as-faa-integrates.html (“Drones also are
susceptible to communications jamming, leaving the operator unable to control the
aircraft.”).
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flight. 135 A similar regulation should be enforced at the designated 10mile zone at the border, discussed above. This would prohibit GPS
or camera operated flights, thus forcing pilots to keep the drone in
their line of sight. In turn, this UK regulation would increase the risk
that a potential trafficker will be identified.
2. Canada.
As previously noted, Canada prohibits flights within restricted
airspace, including near or over military bases, prisons, and forest
fires.136 A similar regulation could create a “no-fly zone” within five
miles of the border, and impose severe fines or penalties for any
violators caught operating an unauthorized drone in this region.
Additionally, Canada prohibits operating a drone in a region that
would interfere with first responders.137 A similar regulation could be
implemented at the border, prohibiting drone flights that could
interfere with drones currently being utilized by the CBP.
3. Bangladesh.
Contrary to the United States and Mexico, the Government
of Bangladesh has banned all drones that did not have flight
permission prior to December 2014.138 While an interesting approach
to drone regulation, a similar approach would likely be far too drastic
in the United States and Mexico, where demand for drones are
skyrocketing, and would not directly solve the issue of drones used as
trafficking tools. Nevertheless, the approach to drone regulations in
Bangladesh is an interesting contrast to the regulations discussed in
the United States and Mexico.
135 Above the Law: How Drone Laws Around the World Are Affecting Production,
LITTLE BLACK BOOK LTD. (Sept. 2014), http://www.lbbonline.com/news/abovethe-law-how-drone-laws-around-the-world-are-affecting-production/.
136 See Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 124.
137 Id.
138 No drone allowed in country’s airspace, THE DAILY STAR (Dec. 31, 2014),
http://www.thedailystar.net/no-drone-allowed-in-countrys-airspace-57769; see also
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY, BANGLADESH, http://www.caab.gov.bd (last visited
Jan. 7, 2016).
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4. Brazil.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, Brazil does not have
any restrictions on drone usage within their country. 139 The country
intended to implement new drone legislation before the 2016
Olympics,140 however such measures were largely unsuccessful.141
While not a practical solution by any means, this laissez faire approach
to drone regulation is interesting in the context of the rising drone
market across the globe.
5. Austria.
Austria requires that potential drone users either have a pilot
license or pass an exam about Austrian air law.142 While such a
regulation may seem harsh, it undoubtedly would increase the
security of the border, permitting only trained pilots or those with
requisite knowledge to pilot drones. While such a regulation may not
directly have any deterring effects on the trafficking of narcotics into
the United States via drones, this regulation would increase the safety
of the communities at the border by enhancing notice of the no-fly
zones and applicable drone laws prohibiting trafficking.
6. The Netherlands.
The final, and most outlandish, method of drone regulation
in a foreign country is found in the Netherlands. While not exactly a
regulation, it is worth mentioning that the Dutch National Police
Above the Law: How Drone Laws Around the World Are Affecting Production,
LITTLE BLACK BOOK LTD. (Sept. 2014), http://www.lbbonline.com/news/abovethe-law-how-drone-laws-around-the-world-are-affecting-production/.
140 Brazil to Unveil New Drone Legislation ahead of 2016 Olympics, PANAM POST
(Apr. 17, 2015), https://panampost.com/panam-staff/2015/04/17/brazil-tounveil-new-drone-legislation-ahead-of-2016-olympics/.
141 Russell Brandom, How Brazil is trying (and failing) to keep drones away from the
Olympics, THE VERGE (Aug. 8, 2016), http://www.theverge.com/2016/8/8/
12402972/olympics-rio-2016-anti-drone-jamming-public-safety.
142 BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] BGBl No.
253/1957, as amended by Bundesgesetz [BGBl] No. 96/2013, art. 4, § 24 (Austria).
139
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Corps has begun a new initiative using eagles to capture unauthorized
drones from the sky.143 The eagle responds to the drone as it would
its normal prey, snatching the drone mid-flight and carrying it to the
ground. It has been explained that “these birds’ animal instincts . . .
offer an effective solution to a new threat.”144 While this technique
may seem impractical, one cannot deny the poetic justice of seeing a
bald eagle protect the American border by snatching a shipment of
illicit narcotics from the sky.
V.

CONCLUSION

The use of drones to traffic narcotics into the United States
from Mexico is an increasing phenomenon that is contributing to the
United States’ drug epidemic. Drones are becoming more widely
available, and the current regulations cannot keep up with this
expansion. The need for a solution is imminent as we move into
2017. The current drone regulations of Mexico and the United States
are insufficient to solve this crisis, however the pieces of a solution
have been put into place. The United States needs to utilize the
recent extension of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act to
ensure that new regulations are enacted to help prevent future
incidences of drug trafficking into the United States. Potential
regulations include explicit bans on using drones as trafficking tools
as well as sentence enhancers for such uses, categorizing the border
as prohibited airspace or a “no-fly zone,” and limitations on drone
engine sizes. These regulations could be promulgated through the
FAA Modernization and Reform Act, and implemented into
Mexico’s own drone legislation through the Merida Initiative. Once
these two nations have collaborative drone regulations at the border,
they should continue to honor the extradition treaty they signed in
1978. In addition to the above framework, both countries should
utilize geo-fencing technology, thus creating virtual barriers for any
GPS piloted flights. The United States CBP should continue using
Mindy Weisberger, Drone-hunting eagles can snatch devices out of the sky, CBS
NEWS (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/drone-hunting-eagles-cansnatch-the-devices-out-of-the-sky/.
144 Id.
143
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their own drones at the border to not only identify potential
traffickers on foot, but to monitor the skies for any unauthorized
drones. It is important that the CBP ensure these drones are
equipped with anti-drone-jacking technology, and should not hesitate
to use such technology to ground unauthorized drones. Finally,
various regulations (or lack thereof) from the United Kingdom,
Canada, Bangladesh, Brazil, Austria, and the Netherlands provide a
unique dialogue on regulations that the United States and Mexico
could potentially implement at the border.
While drones may not currently be the primary method for
Mexican cartels to traffic narcotics into the United States, this reality
could change if the United States and Mexico do not take steps to
prevent its continued use in the future. The use of drones at the
border has implications beyond drug trafficking, 145 however their use
as trafficking tools can no longer be ignored. With an extension
granted to the FAA for the promulgation of new regulations, only
time will tell if this new drug trafficking method can be grounded
before it finally takes off.

See Bellow, supra note 86, at 609 (“[T]hose with nefarious purposes could
turn large-scale UASs into projectile weapons against the American people or
attempt to weaponize UASs and open fire on the public.”).
145
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INTRODUCTION

Since September 11th, 2001, the United States Government
has faced the ever-evolving challenge of combating foreign terrorists.
The capture of a suspected terrorist by United States forces presents
several legal issues, including, questions over the nature of the
terrorism suspect’s capture, subsequent treatment and afforded
rights.1
Additionally, United States Government officials face the
controversial decision about what to do with captured terrorism
suspects: either detain them as enemy combatants at Guantanamo
Bay to face a military tribunal, or try them before a civilian court in
the United States.2 Since the attacks of September 11th and the
beginning of the War on Terror, terrorism suspects have been tried in
military tribunals as well as civilian courts. However, under the
current administration, the preferred method has been to seek justice
in civilian courts.3
Recently, suspected ringleader of the 2012 Benghazi terrorist
attack,4 Ahmed Abu Khatallah,5 has been subjected to this policy, and

See Steve Vladeck, Kidnapping Is Legally Dubious, But It’s Also The Best Way
To Get Terrorists, WASH. POST, June 18, 2014 (presenting legal issues regarding
rendition of terrorist suspects).
2 For arguments promoting both sides in one particular case, see Karen
DeYoung, Adam Goldman and Julie Tate, U.S. Captures Benghazi Suspect In Secret
Raid, WASH. POST, June 17, 2014.
3 See Karen DeYoung, Adam Goldman and Julie Tate, U.S. Captures Benghazi
Suspect In Secret Raid, WASH. POST, June 17, 2014.
4 For more information on the Benghazi attack, including background on
Ahmed Abu Khatallah as well as details of the attack from several witnesses close
to Abu Khatallah and present on the night of the attack, see David D. Kirkpatrick,
A
Deadly
Mix
In
Benghazi,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
28,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi.
5 While the English spelling of his name sometimes differs based on the
source, from ‘Khattala’ to ‘Khatallah,’ this comment uses the spelling ‘Khatallah,’
which is used in the formal Indictment filed by the United States Attorney’s Office
for the District of Columbia. See Indictment at 1, United States v. Abu Khatallah,
No.14-141 (2014).
1
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is being tried in a civilian court in Washington D.C. 6 Charged in
relation to the September 11th, 2012, attack on the United States
diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya, in which Ambassador J.
Christopher Stevens, Foreign Service Information Management
Officer Sean Patrick Smith, and CIA Security Officers Tyrone
Snowden Woods and Glen Anthony Doherty were killed,7 suspected
leader of Ansar al-Sharia, Ahmed Abu Khatallah, was captured by a
team of United States Special Forces in mid-June, 2014.8 After his
capture in Libya, Ahmed Abu Khatallah was immediately transported
to an American military vessel, the USS New York, which transported
Khatallah across the Atlantic Ocean to face trial in federal court in
the District of Columbia.9
The capture and subsequent handling of Ahmed Abu
Khatallah implicates several legal questions surrounding United States
policy regarding the capture of suspected terrorists.10 Despite
questions surrounding the handling of Abu Khatallah, the decision by
the Obama administration to transport Abu Khatallah back to the
United States on an American military ship was both deliberate and
strategic.11 By choosing to transport Abu Khatallah by military ship,12
See Karen DeYoung and Ann E. Marimow, Benghazi Suspect Ahmed Abu
Khattala May Be Brought To U.S. On Navy Ship, WASH. POST, June 18, 2014.
7 See Government’s Motion For Pretrial Detention at 7, United States v.
Abu Khatallah, No.14-141 (2014).
8 See Id. at 10.
9 See Thomas Gibbons-Neff, USS New York, Carrying a Benghazi Suspect, Has
Gone Dark, WASH. POST, June 25, 2014.
10 See Ben Brumfield, What’s Next For Benghazi Terror Suspect Ahmed Abu
Khatallah?, CNN, June 18, 2014.
11 The reasoning for doing so primarily revolves around the rather dubious
nature of the capture of the suspect by extraordinary rendition. The difficulty in
finding countries willing to allow suspects who have been subject to rendition to
pass through their sovereign territory during the process of transporting the
suspect to America makes transportation by way of military ship extremely
convenient, if not necessary. See Ben Brumfield, What’s Next For Benghazi Terror
Suspect Ahmed Abu Khatallah?, CNN, June 18, 2014.
12 Whether the United States is legally able to use the military for purposes
of law enforcement is a separate, distinct legal question. Under the Posse Comitatus
Act, the armed forces are restrained from aiding civilian law enforcement
authorities in keeping the peace and arresting felons. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1978).
See also 10 U.S.C. § 375 (1981) (requiring the Department of Defense to prescribe
6
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the Obama administration had several days to question and search
Abu Khatallah before the vessel reached the United States.13 Further,
because much of the trip from Libya to the United States involved
crossing the Atlantic Ocean, in international waters, FBI agents were
able to search Abu Khatallah without a warrant and question him
without reading him his Miranda rights.14
This article will argue that the current Administration’s
practice of searching individuals without a warrant by way of
transporting suspected terrorists15 on military ships through
international waters is in direct conflict with the Fourth 16
Amendment.17 On its face, this practice appears to comply with
regulations ensuring that the U.S. Navy, among others, does not directly participate
in civilian law enforcement absent authorization by law). The Department of
Justice maintains the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply outside of the territory of
the United States, and as such, for the purposes of this article, it will be assumed
that the United States Government’s practice of using military vessels in a law
enforcement capacity for suspects bound for civilian courts is itself legal. See Int’l
Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, NWP 1-14M, The Commanders
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, § 3.11.3.1, p. 3-13 (2007).
13 See Evan Perez and Holly Yan, Controversy Swirls Over Handling Of Benghazi
Suspect Abu Khatallah, CNN, June 29, 2014 (Ahmed Abu Khatallah questioned
aboard ship for two weeks).
14 See Michael Schmidt, Matt Apuzzo, Eric Schmitt and Charlie Savage, Trial
Secondary As U.S. Questions a Libyan Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2014.
15 Ahmed Abu Khatallah is not the first suspected terrorist held aboard
military vessels pending transfer to the United States. See Charlie Savage, U.S. Tests
New Approach to Terrorism Cases on Somali Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2011
(describing the handling of Somali Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame aboard the USS
Boxer); Benjamin Weiser and Eric Schmitt, U.S. Said to Hold Qaeda Suspect on Navy
Ship, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2013 (Libyan Abu Anas al-Libi aboard the USS San
Antonio).
16 The Fourth Amendment reads: “The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
17 Again, recognizing that contravention of the Fourth Amendment is likely
only a collateral benefit and not the official reasoning for the use of military ships
to transport suspected terrorists, see Note 11 supra. Additionally, this discussion will
be limited to the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to Abu Khatallah, as well
as similarly situated suspected terrorists. Questions surrounding Miranda and the
Public Safety Exception, while extremely important and relevant to Abu Khatallah,
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numerous Supreme Court cases establishing the extraterritorial reach
of the Fourth Amendment.18 However, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Boumediene v. Bush19 raises questions regarding the applicability of
the Fourth Amendment on a United States military vessel, even if the
ship is located in international waters.
To answer these questions, it is necessary to first understand
the extraterritorial applicability of the Constitution. Part II of this
article will describe the extraterritoriality of the United States
Constitution. Part III will explore the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Boumediene and its impact on the extraterritorial application of the
Constitution. Part IV will examine the United States’ position on the
jurisdiction surrounding American military vessels. Part V discusses a
few policy considerations implicated by the analysis of Parts II-IV.
II.

THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF THE CONSTITUTION

The extraterritoriality of the Constitution can be broken
down as it applies to three main categories of individuals: (1) nonUnited States citizens present within the territory of the United
States, (2) United States citizens outside of the territory of the United
States, and (3) non-United States citizens outside of the territory of
the United States.
Section A will give a brief overview of the applicability of the
Constitution to the first two categories, non-United States citizens
within the United States and United States citizens abroad. Section B
will give a more in-depth look at the category in which Ahmed Abu

as well as other similarly situated suspected terrorists, are too much to address here
and will be saved for another time.
18 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (Fourth
Amendment does not apply to foreign citizens in foreign territories); INS V.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (assuming illegal aliens in the United States
have Fourth Amendment rights); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (Constitutional
provisions applicable to United States citizens abroad); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763 (1950) (no extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment).
19 553 U.S. 723 (2008).

242

DOCUMENT4 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

4/27/2017

Sullivan

5:1

Khatallah falls, a non-United States citizen located outside of the
United States.
A. Applicability to non-United States Citizens within the United
States, and United States Citizens Abroad.
In Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,20 the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether a Chinese national lawfully living in the United
States could be detained without first receiving notice of the charges
levied against him, while further denying the individual any
opportunity to voice their opposition to the detention. 21 The
Supreme Court held that non-United States citizens present within
the United States are afforded constitutional protections. 22 In
deciding the case, the Court stated the “well-established” principle
that, if an alien is lawfully present in the United States, he is within
the protection of the Fifth Amendment and may not be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process.23
The Supreme Court first addressed whether the Constitution,
and more specifically the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, apply to
United States citizens outside of the United States in Reid v. Covert.24
In Reid, the Court addressed the issue of whether military trials of
civilian spouses of servicemen stationed abroad were constitutional. 25
Upon rehearing and reconsideration, the Supreme Court reversed
their earlier decision26 and held that civilian spouses of servicemen
344 U.S. 590 (1953).
Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 595.
22 Id. at 600.
23 Id. at 596. See also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J.,
concurring) (“Once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes
invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our
borders.); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770-771 (1950) (Mere lawful
presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him
certain rights.).
24 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
25 Reid, 354 U.S. at 5.
26 See Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 487 (1956) (holding that Fifth and
Sixth Amendments do not protect American citizens tried by the American
Government for crimes committed and tried in a foreign land).
20
21
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stationed abroad could not be tried by a military tribunal.27 Trying a
civilian in a military tribunal was held to be in violation of the
civilian’s Fifth28 and Sixth29 Amendment rights.30
The Supreme Court reasoned that, because the United States’
power and authority is solely created by the Constitution, the
Government must act within constitutional limitations.31 The Court
rejected the argument that only fundamental constitutional rights
protect Americans abroad.32 Instead, the Court found in favor of
extending every provision of the Constitution to American citizens,
either at home or in another land.33
Kwong Hai Chew and Reid thus begin to define the breadth and
limits of constitutional applicability. Instead of universal applicability,
the Constitution applies to United States citizens, in the United States
as well as abroad, and to foreign nationals that are lawfully within the
territory of the United States. However, one question remains: do the
provisions of the Constitution restrain the United States when it acts
against a foreign national outside of the territory of the United

Reid, 354 U.S. at 5.
The Fifth Amendment reads, in pertinent part: “No person shall be held
to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger... nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.
amend. V.
29 The Sixth Amendment reads, in pertinent part: “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.
30 Reid, 354 U.S. at 5.
31 Id. at 6 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176-180 (1803)).
32 Reid, 354 U.S. at 9.
33 Id. at 9. However, courts have since limited the extent to which some
constitutional provisions apply to citizens outside of the United States. See e.g., In re
Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa (Fourth Amendment
Challenges), 552 F.3d 157, 167 (2nd Cir. 2008) (holding that “the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement does not govern searches conducted abroad by
U.S. agents; such searches of U.S. citizens need only satisfy the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness.”).
27
28
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States? The Supreme Court first addressed this question in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.34
B. Applicability to non-United States Citizens Outside the United
States.
For decades, the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in
Verdugo has stood as the guidepost for determining whether foreign
citizens located outside of the United States have rights under the
United States Constitution. In Verdugo, the Supreme Court addressed
whether the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement was violated
when Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents searched the
defendant’s house without a search warrant.35 The Court ultimately
held that because the defendant was a Mexican national, and the
property searched was located in Mexico, the Fourth Amendment did
not apply. 36
The defendant in Verdugo, a citizen and resident of Mexico,
was apprehended by Mexican authorities based on an American
arrest warrant issued in connection with narcotics distribution. 37 The
Mexican citizen was transported to the Mexican-American border
where he was delivered to United States Marshals for arrest.38
Following the arrest, DEA agents, in conjunction with Mexican
Federal Judicial Police Officers searched the defendant’s properties in
Mexicali and San Felipe and seized evidence of the defendant’s
narcotics trafficking.39
At trial, the District Court for the Southern District of
California suppressed the seized evidence, concluding that the Fourth
Amendment applied to the search and that there had been no
justification for searching the premises without a warrant.40 The

34
35
36
37
38
39
40

494 U.S. 259 (1990).
Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 261.
Id. at 274-75.
Id. at 262.
Id.
Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 262.
Id. at 263.
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, although divided, affirmed
the District Court’s ruling by relying on Reid.41 On further appeal, in a
6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment
did not apply to the defendant because at the time of the search, the
defendant “was a citizen and resident of Mexico with no voluntary
attachment to the United States, and the place searched was located
in Mexico.”42
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority opinion,
examined the function of the Fourth Amendment compared to the
Fifth Amendment, which was at issue in Reid.43 Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that while constitutional violations of the Fifth
Amendment occur at trial, violations of the Fourth Amendment are
“fully accomplished” at the time of the search.44 Therefore, even if
there was a constitutional violation of the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights, it occurred solely in Mexico. 45 Remedial exclusion
of the evidence is a separate question and does not touch on the
existence of a constitutional violation in and of itself.46
The Chief Justice, in an effort to determine whether the
Fourth Amendment was meant to apply to foreign nationals,
analyzed the language and history of the Fourth Amendment.47 First,
the language of the Fourth Amendment, using the term of art ‘the
people,’ refers to “a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection
with this country to be considered part of that community.”48
Second, the history of the Fourth Amendment suggests that
its provisions were meant to protect the American people against
arbitrary action by the United States Government, and not intended
to restrain the actions of the United States Government against aliens

41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id.
Id. at 274-75.
Id. at 264.
Id.
Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 264.
Id.
Id. at 265.
Id.
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outside American territory.49 As an example, Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that in 1798 Congress passed an act allowing commanders of
both public and private armed vessels of the United States to
“subdue, seize and take any armed French vessel . . . on the high
seas.”50 While some commanders were held liable for seizures beyond
the scope of Congress’ grant of authority, 51 the Supreme Court never
suggested the Fourth Amendment restrained commanders from
conducting such seizures authorized by Congress.52
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist looked at previous case law to
determine whether the Fourth Amendment applied to the DEA
search conducted in Mexico. 53 The opinion in Verdugo stated that the
Court of Appeals’ global application of the Constitution goes against
precedential cases, known as the Insular Cases.54 As Chief Justice
Rehnquist points out, the Insular Cases55 held that not every
constitutional provision applies to Government activity, even when
the United States may have sovereign power, and that only
fundamental constitutional rights are guaranteed to inhabitants of
unincorporated territories of the United States. 56 Because the
Constitution “does not, without legislation and of its own force”
apply to territories ultimately governed by Congress, the claim that

Id. at 266.
Id. at 267. See also §§ 1-2 of An Act Further to Protect the Commerce of
the United States, ch. 68, 1 Stat. 578-9.
51 See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170, 177-178 (1804); cf. Talbot v.
Seeman, 1 Cranch 1, 31 (1801) (seizure of neutral ship lawful where American
captain had probable cause to believe vessel was French).
52 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 268.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial inapplicable in Puerto Rico); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S.
91 (1914) (Fifth Amendment grand jury provision inapplicable in Philippines);
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (jury trial provision inapplicable in
Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (jury trial and indictment by
grand jury provisions inapplicable in Hawaii); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901) (Revenue Clauses inapplicable to Puerto Rico).
56 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 268 (citing Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148).
49
50
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protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to aliens in foreign
nations is especially weak.57
In addition to the Insular Cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist found
support for holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
foreign nationals in foreign territories in Johnson v. Eisentrager.58 The
Chief Justice emphasized that while some constitutional provisions
extend beyond the citizenry of the United States, the Eisentrager
opinion emphatically rejected the extraterritorial application of the
Fifth Amendment, as the extraterritorial application of organic law is
a practice that every modern government is opposed to. 59
In contrast to the Insular Cases and Eisentrager, the Chief
Justice distinguished Verdugo from the Reid decision relied on by the
lower courts.60 In quoting from the Reid decision, Chief Justice
Rehnquist emphasized that, “when the government reaches out to
punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and
other parts of the Constitution provided to protect his life and liberty
should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another
land.”61 While the lower courts interpreted such language as
constraining federal officials under the Fourth Amendment wherever
and against whomever they act, the Chief Justice stated that Reid dealt
with United States citizens abroad and that the holding of Reid is
therefore not applicable to the case at hand.62
Chief Justice Rehnquist similarly rejected the contention that
case law dealing with the application of the Constitution to foreign
nationals within the United States63 applies to the case at hand
because the defendant in Verdugo had no voluntary connection with
the United States, and foreign nationals can only avail themselves of
Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 268 (citing Dorr, 195 U.S. at 149).
339 U.S. 763 (1950) (rejecting the claim that enemy aliens imprisoned in
Germany after World War II are entitled to habeas corpus writs in federal courts
on the ground that their war crimes convictions were violations of the Fifth
Amendment and other constitutional provisions).
59 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 269 (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784).
60 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 270.
61 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 270 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6).
62 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 270.
63 See Kwong Hai Chew, supra note 21.
57
58
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the protections of the Constitution when they come within the
territory of, and develop substantial connections with, the United
States.64 In response to Justice Stevens’ concurrence,65 Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that the applicability of the Fourth Amendment
should not turn on the “fortuitous circumstance” that the foreign
national had been transported to the United States prior to the
search. Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained that only voluntary
presence in the United States invokes constitutional protections for
foreign nationals.66
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy noted that in addition to
the reasoning of the Chief Justice, practicality concerns also weigh in
favor of the Fourth Amendment not having any application to
searches of foreign nationals in foreign territories. 67 Justice Kennedy
reasoned that due to the absence of local magistrates or judges in
foreign territories that have the authority or ability to issue American
search warrants, as well as the “differing and perhaps unascertainable
conceptions of reasonableness” in foreign territories, the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment should not apply in foreign
territories as it does in the United States.68 Likewise, Justice Stevens
concurred with the majority opinion that the Fourth Amendment
does not apply, primarily because American magistrates have no
authority to authorize searches in foreign territories.69

64 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 271. (citing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1982)
(“The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment are universal in their application,
to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction…”) (emphasis in original); Kwong Hai Chew,
344 U.S. at 596(“But once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes
invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our
borders”) (emphasis in original)).
65 In his concurrence, Justice Stevens stated that aliens lawfully present in
the United States are protected by the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether
they are present voluntarily or, as in the case at hand, involuntarily. Verdugo, 494
U.S. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring).
66 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 272. However, the voluntary presence standard failed
to gain acceptance by a majority of the Court and is therefore dicta.
67 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
68 Id. Additionally, in his dissent, Justice Blackmun agreed that the Warrant
Clause does not apply and searches conducted abroad are subject only to the
reasonable aspect of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 297 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
69 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Applying the Supreme Court’s previous analyses of the scope
of the Constitution to the Government’s actions in dealing with
Ahmed Abu Khatallah, it seems that the Constitutional protections
of the Fourth Amendment do not apply. First, Abu Khatallah is not a
citizen of the United States, and therefore cannot avail himself of the
Fourth Amendment’s protections on the grounds of citizenship.
Second, the search of Abu Khatallah did not occur in the territory of
the United States, but rather occurred in international waters,
eliminating the protections of the Fourth Amendment afforded noncitizens within the United States. Lastly, while an argument can be
made that Abu Khatallah was in the possession of the United States
when he was searched, the Chief Justice’s “voluntary connection”
language from Verdugo suggests that because Abu Khatallah had no
connection to the United States other than his capture and
subsequent rendition to justice, which is most certainly not a
voluntary connection, the Fourth Amendment does not apply.
Following the Verdugo holding, the United States could have
viably searched, without a search warrant, not only Abu Khatallah’s
physical person in international waters, but also any properties owned
by Abu Khatallah outside of the United States (i.e., his house in
Libya). However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush
raises questions as to whether the Constitution in fact does apply to
Abu Khattallah, and whether the Government’s search of Abu
Khatallah was legal.
III.

BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH AND DE FACTO JURISDICTION
THROUGH EXCLUSIVE CONTROL

In Boumediene, the Supreme Court dealt with several issues
revolving around foreign national enemy combatants held at
Guantanamo Bay.70 Specifically, the Supreme Court addressed
whether foreign nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay could avail
themselves of the constitutional protection of the Writ of Habeas
70

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732.
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Corpus.71 The Supreme Court in Boumediene denied the Government’s
argument that the foreign nationals were held in territory outside of
the Nation’s borders, which therefore leaves the detainees without
constitutional rights,72 and concluded that foreign nationals detained
as enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay may invoke the
protections of habeas corpus.73 In doing so, the Supreme Court
created a functional test to determine the extraterritorial reach of the
Constitution. 74
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that
pursuant to the agreement between Cuba and the United States, Cuba
retains “ultimate sovereignty,” while the United States exercises
“complete jurisdiction and control” over Guantanamo Bay.75 Because
of this division of power, Justice Kennedy stressed that while Cuba
has de jure jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay, the United States
nonetheless has de facto jurisdiction.76 This distinction ultimately lead
Justice Kennedy to conclude that “[i]n every practical sense
Guantanamo [Bay] is not abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction
of the United States.”77 Because of the “complete and total control”
of the United States over Guantanamo Bay, foreign detainees held
there could avail themselves of the constitutional protections of
habeas corpus.78
Justice Kennedy found support for the holding in the lack of
prudential concerns previously preventing the extension of habeas
corpus to territories under the sovereign control of a different
nation.79 Specifically, Justice Kennedy noted that there was no reason
Id.
Id. at 739.
73 Id. at 798.
74 Id. at 764.
75 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 753. See also Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval
Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, Art. III, T.S. No. 418.
76 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755.
77 Id. at 769.
78 Id. at 771.
79 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 751. See generally King v. Cowle, 2 Burr. 834 (As a
territory that was not a part of England, yet controlled by the English monarch, the
writ of habeas corpus was never extended to Scotland); R. Sharpe, The Law of
Habeas Corpus 191 (2d ed. 1989). See also Note on the Power of English Courts to
71
72
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to believe that a federal court’s order would be disobeyed at
Guantanamo Bay, and that no other law besides that of the United
States applies to the naval base.80
Additionally, Justice Kennedy attempted to reconcile his
functional holding with previous case law. First, in addressing the
Insular cases, Justice Kennedy found that by utilizing the doctrine of
territorial incorporation,81 the Court devised a functional approach to
the application of the Constitution.82 This approach served as a
foundation to the functional approach established by the Supreme
Court in Boumediene.83
Second, Justice Kennedy found support for his holding in the
practical concerns that influenced the Court in Reid.84 Justice
Kennedy read Reid to rely not on the citizenship of the petitioners,
but instead on the petitioner’s place of confinement and trial.85
Relying primarily on Justice Frankfurter’s and Justice Harlan’s
concurrences in Reid, Justice Kennedy noted that Reid rejected a rigid
rule in favor of analyzing the circumstances of each particular case
when applying the Constitution extraterritorially.86

Issue the Writ of Habeas to Places Within the Dominions of the Crown, But Out
of England, and On the Position of Scotland in Relation to that Power, 8 Jurid.
Rev. 158 (1896).
80 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 751.
81 Under the doctrine of territorial incorporation, utilized in the Insular cases,
the Constitution is fully incorporated and applies only to territories destined for
statehood. For unincorporated territories (those not destined for statehood) the
Constitution only applies in part, determined by the situation of the territory and its
relationship to the United States. See Dorr, 195 U.S. at 143.
82 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 759. See also Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312.
83 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764.
84 Id. at 759.
85 Id. at 760.
86 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768. In his concurrence to Reid Justice Harlan
rejected a “rigid and abstract rule,” reading the Insular cases to mean that
constitutional provisions’ extraterritorial effect depends on the particular
circumstances, particularly whether judicial enforcement would be “impracticable
and anomalous.” Reid, 351 U.S. at 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring in result). See also
Reid, 351 U.S. at 54 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result).
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Lastly, to reconcile his holding with the holding of Eisentrager,
Justice Kennedy distinguished Landsberg prison from Guantanamo
Bay on the basis that, while both are located outside the sovereign
territory of the United States, Guantanamo Bay is under the exclusive
control of the United States, whereas Landsberg prison was under
the control of the combined Allied Forces.87 In an attempt at further
reconciliation, Justice Kennedy noted that nothing in Eisentrager
stated that de jure sovereignty has ever been the only consideration in
determining the reach of the Constitution.88 Justice Kennedy thus
concluded that “a common thread” used to determine “questions of
extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not
formalism[,]” and thus unites the Insular cases, Eisentrager, and Reid.89
However, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent in
Boumediene, the majority completely missed the mark with Eisentrager,
which “conclusively establishes the opposite” of a functional test for
extraterritoriality.90 Quoting Justice Jackson in Eisentrager, Justice
Scalia noted, “in extending constitutional protections beyond the
citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out that it was the
alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the judiciary
power to act.”91 From the language in Eisentrager, Justice Scalia
concluded that Eisentrager “held beyond any doubt - that the
Constitution does not ensure habeas for aliens held by the United
States in areas over which our Government is not sovereign.”92
The Insular cases, Reid, and Eisentrager, do in fact stand for the
same idea, as observed by the majority. However, the majority
interpreted these cases incorrectly. Instead of standing for a
functional approach to extraterritoriality, Justice Scalia pointed out
that, like Eisentrager, the Insular cases stand for the proposition that
aliens outside of United States sovereign territory do not have
87 Boumedien, 553 U.S. at 768. The United States was therefore “answerable
to its Allies” for all activities occurring at Landsberg prison. Id.
88 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 834 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91 Boumedien, 553 U.S. at 835 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Eisentrager, 339
U.S. at 770-71).
92 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 835 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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constitutional rights.93 Quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico,94 Justice Scalia
stated that, “The Constitution of the United States is in force in
Porto Rico as it is wherever and whenever the sovereign power of that
government is exerted.”95 Moreover, all of the Justices of the Reid
majority, save one, limited their analysis to the rights of citizens
abroad.96
The Insular cases dealt with territory that was a part of the
United States’ sovereign territory,97 the Reid Court addressed the
rights of citizens abroad, and Eisentrager specifically declined to
extend constitutional privileges to foreign nationals outside of United
States sovereign territory. Functional approach or not, the idea that
the Constitution applies to foreign nationals outside of the United
States’ sovereignty can not be found in any of the Supreme Court’s
previous opinions. Contrary to Justice Kennedy’s ultimate holding in
Boumediene, Justice Frankfurter stated in his concurrence that, while
the “deck of a private American vessel . . . is considered for many
purposes constructively as territory of the United States . . . persons
on board such vessels . . . cannot invoke the protection of the
provisions [of the Constitution] until brought within the actual
territorial boundaries of the United States.”98 Thus, the functional de
jure versus de facto sovereignty approach adopted by the majority in
Boumediene is not only judicially created, but is a blatant
misconstruction and revision of the Court’s previous case law in a
weak attempt at justification.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 839 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
258 U.S. 298 (1922). Justice Kennedy cited this case in concluding that
the Insular Cases created a functional test for the application of the Constitution to
American territories. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 758.
95 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 839 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U.S. at 312.) (emphasis added).
96 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 839 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6
(plurality opinion of Black, J., Harlan, J., and Frankfurter, J., concurring in result).
Justice Frankfurter was the only Justice in the majority that did not limit the
analysis to American citizens abroad. However, Justice Frankfurter went a step
further and limited his analysis to civilian dependents of American military abroad,
an even narrower class.
97 See Boumediene, 553. U.S. at 839; Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 268; Reid, 354 U.S. at
13 (plurality opinion of Black, J.).
98 Reid, 354 U.S. at 55-6. (quoting In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).
93
94
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Although Boumediene seems to have rewritten the Insular cases,
Reid, and Eisentrager, and did not overrule Verdugo despite being in
direct contradiction to it, it is still controlling law. Therefore, there is
a rather gray area of law regarding the application of the Constitution
to foreign national terror suspects held aboard American military
vessels that are located in international waters. Under Eisentrager and
Verdugo, the Fourth Amendment would not apply to the search of a
foreign-national terrorism suspect, so long as the search occurs
outside of the territory of the United States, where the United States
lacks de jure sovereignty. Under Boumediene, however, the Fourth
Amendment seemingly applies to a search of such foreign-national
terrorism suspects if conducted within an area where the United
States exercises de facto sovereignty through ‘complete and total
control,’ in addition to searches conducted within the de jure
sovereignty of the United States. While the Eisentrager/Verdugo and
Boumediene rules may lead to the same result in some cases, such as if a
search of a foreign-national terrorism suspect occurred within the
sovereign territory of the United States, the same cannot be said
when the search is conducted where the United States only exercises
de facto, and not de jure sovereignty.
Such a situation is in fact presented by the handling of
Ahmed Abu Khatallah by the United States Government. By
searching Abu Khatallah on a military vessel in international waters,
the United States searched Abu Khatallah in a location where the
country certainly lacks de jure jurisdiction (by virtue of being in
international waters), yet arguably exercises de facto jurisdiction (by
virtue of being on an American military vessel). Applying the
Boumediene holding to the actions of the Government in dealing with
Abu Khatallah, his search would not be legal, absent a warrant, if the
military vessel on which the search occurred can be equated to being
under de facto sovereignty of the United States.
One significant question thus arises: was Ahmed Abu
Khatallah within the ‘complete and total control’ of the United States
when he was searched while being held on the American military ship
in international waters? The answer to this question may dictate not
only the legality of the Government’s actions with Abu Khatallah,
but also may impact the future course of conduct of the United
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States in dealing with similarly-situated terrorism suspects that have
been captured.
IV.

DOES THE UNITED STATES EXERCISE DE FACTO
SOVEREIGNTY OVER AMERICAN MILITARY SHIPS IN
INTERNATIONAL WATERS?

In determining whether an American military vessel in
international waters is equivalent to Guantanamo Bay for Boumediene
purposes, several sources may help shed light on how the vessel
should be treated. One such source is the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea.99
Designed to define the rights and responsibilities of nations
regarding the world’s oceans, the Convention on the Law of the Sea
states that, “[s]hips have the nationality of the State whose flag they
are entitled to fly,”100 and that, “ships shall sail under the flag of one
State only and . . . shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the
high seas.”101 Additionally, the Convention goes further in specifying
that warships on the high seas “have complete immunity from the
jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State.”102 Lastly, the
Convention mandates that every State shall “assume jurisdiction
under its internal law over each ship flying its flag.”103
Following the language in the Convention of the Law of the
Sea and the rule laid down in Boumediene, a search of Ahmed Abu
Khatallah aboard an American military ship in international waters
would be subject to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 243.
100 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 91, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 243.
101 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 92, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 243.
102 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 95, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 243.
103 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 94, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 243.
99
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Because he was searched on an American military vessel, the ship
carries the nationality of the United States and is subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. The “internal law” that the
Convention subjects the ship to as an American vessel most certainly
refers to the United States Constitution, including the provisions of
the Fourth Amendment.
The provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea do
not bind the United States because the United States has not become
a signatory party to the Convention. 104 However, customary
international law echoes the rule eventually adopted by the
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Predating the Convention on the
Law of the Sea, the Permanent Court of International Justice stated
in The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey)105 [hereinafter “the Lotus
case”], “a ship on the high seas is assimilated to the territory of the
State the flag of which it flies.”106 Furthermore, the Lotus case points
out that “a ship is placed in the same position as national territory,”
and that “what occurs on board a vessel on the high seas must be
regarded as if it occurred on the territory of the State whose flag the
ship flies.”107
While the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea may not
bind the United States, the Lotus case does bind the United States
absent conflicting domestic law.108 Because neither Congress nor
104 Int’l & Operational Law Dep’t, The Judge Advocate Gen.’s Legal Ctr. &
Sch., U.S. Army, JA 422, Operational Law Handbook, p. 163 (2014). But see Id. at n.
13 (describing support for US ratification, including support from former
Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush).
105 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10
(Sept. 7).
106 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10,
¶ 65 (Sept. 7).
107 Id.
108 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding that customary
international law is binding on the United States in the absence of conflicting
domestic law). On the other hand, courts have held that customary international
law is not controlling where Congress has specifically enacted a law on the issue. See
Echeverria-Hernandez v. INS, 923 F.2d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated on other
grounds, 946 F.2d 1481 (1991) (holding that the customary norm of safe haven in
times of civil war was preempted by the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980 and
the executive act of voluntary departure).
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courts have directly dealt with the territorial characteristics of military
vessels, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations is perhaps the most important tool in analyzing the way
the United States Government views its military vessels, as well as the
jurisdictional laws surrounding them. It is therefore helpful in
determining whether an American military vessel can be equated to
Guantanamo Bay for Boumediene purposes of applying the
Constitution to foreign nationals.
According to the Commander’s Handbook, which provides
guidance for American military officers “on the rules of law
governing naval operations in peacetime and during armed
conflict,”109 United States Naval policy requires warships to assert the
rights of sovereign immunity.110 The privilege of sovereign immunity
entitles all U.S. warships and United States ships (USS) to “exclusive
control over persons onboard such vessels with respect to acts
performed onboard.”111 More importantly, the Commander’s
Handbook states, “U.S. law applies at all times aboard U.S. vessels as
the law of the flag nation and is enforceable on U.S. vessels . . .
anywhere in the world.”112
Similar to the Commander’s Handbook, the Judge Advocate
General’s Operational Law Handbook, which acts as a “how to”
guide for military lawyers113 declares that state craft, including
warships, are “absolutely immune on the high seas.”114

Int’l Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, NWP 1-14M, The
Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, p. 3 (2007).
110 Int’l Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, NWP 1-14M, The
Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, § 2.2.2, p. 2-2 (2007).
111 Int’l Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, NWP 1-14M, The
Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, § 2.1, p. 2-1 (2007).
112 Int’l Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, NWP 1-14M, The
Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, § 3.11.2.1, p. 3-10
(2007).
113 Int’l & Operational Law Dep’t, The Judge Advocate Gen.’s Legal Ctr. &
Sch., U.S. Army, JA 422, Operational Law Handbook, p. i (2014).
114 Int’l & Operational Law Dep’t, The Judge Advocate Gen.’s Legal Ctr. &
Sch., U.S. Army, JA 422, Operational Law Handbook, p. 174 (2014) (citing article
109
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Both the Commander’s Handbook and the Operational Law
Handbook strongly suggest that American military ships in
international waters are essentially United States territory abroad, and
certainly under the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the United
States. Both the Commander’s Handbook and the Operational Law
Handbook thus can be said to equate an American military ship in
international waters to Guantanamo Bay, for de facto jurisdictional
purposes. Similar to the Boumediene reasoning of “complete and total
control” that the United States holds over Guantanamo Bay, the
Commander’s Handbook gives the United States “exclusive control”
over military vessels such as the one used to transport Ahmed Abu
Khatallah.
Moreover, the Commander’s Handbook specifically states
that U.S. law applies at all times on American flagged vessels. Surely,
U.S. law refers to the whole Constitution including the Fourth
Amendment. Therefore, the United States Government must abide
by the Fourth Amendment when it searches terrorism suspects like
Ahmed Abu Khatallah aboard an American military vessel, even if
the vessel is located in international waters.
V.

RAMIFICATIONS OF EXTENDING FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS TO FOREIGN NATIONALS HELD ABOARD
AMERICAN MILITARY SHIPS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS.

The practice of extending the provisions of the Fourth
Amendment to foreign nationals held aboard an American military
vessel in international waters raises several important policy
considerations. Firstly, who has the jurisdiction to issue warrants for
such searches? Could any federal judge in the United States issue
such a warrant? Or would it be limited to judges within a certain
jurisdiction? And if so, which jurisdiction? Similarly, what court can
hear challenges to such warrants? Would it be the district court to
which the suspect is ultimately brought? Or would it be a special
court created specifically for such purposes?
95 of the Convention of the Law of the Sea). See also Id. at 171 (providing complete
sovereign immunity for State vessels).
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The second policy consideration implicated by such a
decision is what effect that decision will have on future dealings with
captured terrorism suspects. The United States can easily defeat
having to grant the protections of the Fourth Amendment to a
foreign suspect by delaying the suspect from reaching an American
vessel. Capturing forces could take the time to search and interrogate
the suspect in the nation where the capture takes place before
transporting the suspect back to the United States. However, this
would result in added delay, and most likely added risk for both the
capturing forces and the captured suspect, who would have to spend
more time in a likely hostile environment. The consequences of
extending the protections of the Fourth Amendment to foreign
suspects aboard American ships in international waters could
therefore result in a failure to even prevent a search of the suspect
without a warrant, while at the same time place American citizens,
and even the foreign suspect himself, at greater harm.
A third important policy consideration is the likelihood of
compliance with such a rule. Compliance with such a rule ultimately
relies on whether the information resulting from a search would later
be used or excluded from the trial of the captured terrorism suspect.
Exclusion of ill-gotten information would most likely help ensure
compliance with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
However, if the Government already has a strong enough case (and if
the Government is going to exercise its rendition powers, it likely has
a strong enough case already) then exclusion of the information
resulting from the search would not be of much consequence.
Searches would be conducted more for intelligence value rather than
evidentiary value during a subsequent prosecution, and the threat of
future exclusion of information gained would therefore not stop
searches when a warrant is unable to be obtained. The rule requiring
a warrant would thus prove toothless, all the while unnecessarily
restricting the later prosecution of the captured suspect.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While the history of decisions regarding the extraterritorial
application of the Constitution, from Eisentrager to Verdugo, seems to
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suggest that the United States Government’s search of Ahmed Abu
Khatallah aboard a ship in international waters is legal, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Boumediene challenges that theory.
Following the Verdugo holding and Justice Frankfurter’s
concurrence in Reid, the Fourth Amendment would not be applicable
to foreign nationals held aboard American ships in international
waters. However, following the more recent Boumediene holding,
because the American military vessel on which he was searched is
subject to the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the United States,
despite being in international waters and outside United States
territory, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would seemingly
extend to Abu Khatallah just as the protections of a habeas corpus
petition extended to the detainees held at Guantanamo Bay in
Boumediene. In other words, the Fourth Amendment would protect
Abu Khatallah because an American military ship in international
waters is “not abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction of the
United States.”115
Regardless of the lack of value and heavy burden produced
by such a rule, in light of Boumediene, the Fourth Amendment, as well
as the rest of the Constitution, likely applies to foreign terrorism
suspects held aboard American military vessels, even if the ships are
located in international waters. This unintended consequence of the
Boumediene decision leaves the United States Government operating in
a dubious zone of legality when it searches terrorist suspects aboard
military vessels absent a warrant, and may ultimately necessitate a
change in the way the United States deals with captured terrorism
suspects in the future.

115

See Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723 at 769; Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480

(2004).
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